Defining India-China Relationship
India’s
War with China started on 20 October 1962, when China launched simultaneous
attacks in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, then called NEFA. The war ended on 21
November 1962, when China unilaterally declared a ceasefire. China withdrew
from all areas it had captured, but not from the Aksai Chin area. Official
details of the month-long conflict remain largely opaque to this day in India, locked away in classified documents. However, we often come across bits and pieces,
carefully curated for political returns.
The
shroud over bilateral relations between India and China notwithstanding, the
two most populous neighbours remain locked in distrust and domestic denials,
despite growing trade between them. The occasional glimmers of hope in the
relationship often end up being extinguished by disappointments, and every
photo opportunity, from the “Hindi-Chini, bhai-bhai” days to the
contemporary “riverside spectacle,” eventually turned out to be harbingers of
sinister outcomes. The common man in India, now by experience, firmly
associates betrayal as the principal characteristic of the India-China
relationship.
Source
and Discourse
There
are several books on the 1962 War, and all authors converge on the same set of
causes. The History Division of the Ministry of Defence, Government of India,
published the official history of the 1962 war, titled “History of the Conflict
with China, 1962”, in 1992. Sufficient information is available in the public
domain, claiming to be from this report. One can also browse
and read about the stormy debates in Parliament regarding the war, where
opposition members voiced their concerns, and the government responded. The
intense debate in the parliament took place during the war without fear of
being labelled anti-national. On 31 October 1962, 11 days into the war, Mr VK
Krishna Menon, then the defence minister, resigned. On 14 November 1962, one
week before the war ended, the House unanimously resolved as follows: -
“This
House records its firm opinion that the Chinese forces must evacuate the areas
of India which they have illegally occupied, and declares its united
determination to see that India's territorial integrity and frontier are
respected and upheld.”
"The
House places on record its deep appreciation of the gallantry of the officers
and men of our Defence Forces who are engaged in defending our country, and
assures them of its complete support."
"The
House is confident that our people will face the grave emergency confronting
the country with unity, determination and courage and are prepared to make any
sacrifice to preserve India’s freedom and honour."
"The
House solemnly declares that it stands united behind the Government in its
determination to drive out the aggressor from the sacred soil of India, and to
ensure that the territory of India is held and maintained inviolate.”
The
Weaponised Report
The
Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report, published in 1963, evokes more political
interest than all the others put together. The report, authored by Lieutenant
General TB Henderson Brooks and Brigadier PS Bhagat, was the result of an
inquiry ordered by General J N Chaudhuri, the Chief of Army Staff, to conduct
an internal operational review of the Indian Army’s performance. The report
remains a classified document under the Official Secrets Act. Mr Nevile
Maxwell, a British-Australian journalist, however, quoted the Henderson
Brooks–Bhagat report in his book, “India’s China War,” first published in 1970.
In the book, he painted India as the aggressor. Mr Zhou Enlai, the Chinese
Premier, is said to have acknowledged Maxwell's contributions in revealing the
truth and benefiting China. He complimented Mr Maxwell, who was in China
covering the visit of the President of Pakistan, Mr Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, in
1972.
Mr
Nevile Maxwell had no love lost for India. Stationed in Delhi from 1959 to 1967
as a correspondent for The Times, he authored a series of articles ahead of the
fourth Lok Sabha elections in 1967. He is believed to have written, “the
great experiment of developing India within the democratic framework has failed”, and he even went on to predict that the general election to the fourth Lok
Sabha would be the last. Not easily offended and provoked as
we are now, there were no protests or violent activity in India against the
author, his book, or his reports. Mr Maxwell shot to fame suddenly, this time
before the 2014 elections. On 17 March 2014, for reasons not difficult to
fathom, he made public selected portions of the report on his website.
The
Henderson Brooks–Bhagat Report immediately kicked up a political storm with the
principal opposition party asking the government to declassify the report for
transparency and accountability. After all, the Nation had the right to know
the truth. The Government, citing National security and operational
implications, refused to oblige. In April 2014, Mr Maxwell removed the
references from his website. With the elections done, the storm died. The party
that demanded disclosure rode to power and has been in power ever since. Call
it compulsions, the report remains classified. A classified, vaulted and buried
report has political relevance.
It has been six decades since the war. Everything about the two countries, their geopolitical positioning and strength, their military structure, hardware, armament, war fighting strategy, interdependent economy, demography, and virtually everything one can imagine has changed. We now live in an environment where satellites continuously scan every inch of land, thousands of electronic eyes are on the lookout for anything that moves or does not move, every conversation is listened to and scrutinised, and every digital footprint is critically examined. There is a saying in Malayalam, “nee manssil kanumpol, njan maanthu kanum.” It roughly means, “when you think of something, I see it in the sky.” Nothing remains hidden. None of those things from the sixties exist today as it was then. In such an environment, the report is nothing more than an archaic document, meaningless to modern warfare.
Declassifying the age old official reports would open a debate, derive lessons, if at all, there are any
relevant ones, and if someone wants to learn from those. It would also bring
closure to something that we have already forgotten, but are periodically reminded of during elections. Keeping it classified only
serves to capitalise electoral returns at will, through the easily infuriated.
Causes
Study
of the war leads us to two causes: India’s “Flawed Forward Policy” and
China’s Territorial compulsions. All the other causes attributed to the Indian
side, like poor intelligence, an ill-equipped and ill-prepared Army, and
political interference overriding military inputs, are all subsumed by “Forward
Policy.” That brings us to three fundamental questions. These are: -
1. What
is the forward policy?
2. Why
is it considered flawed?
3. What
else should have been done?
Roots
of The Forward Policy
To
understand the Forward Policy, we need to first understand how it came about.
When the Indian subcontinent was under the administrative control of the British Empire, much of the territory that lay between British India, China, and Tibet was the subject of territorial dispute. In 1913, the British decided to settle the dispute. A series of tripartite meetings took place in Shimla (then called Simla). The first meeting was on 6 October 1913, and the ninth and last was on 3 July 1914. The discussions led by Sir Henry McMahon, the foreign secretary of British India, agreed to delineate the boundary. This is now called the McMahon line. Mr Ivan Chen, the Chinese representative to the meeting, did not object to the proposed boundary. He also initialled the draft proposal. However, on 3 July 1914, at the final meeting, when Britain and Tibet signed to seal the convention confirming the McMahon line as the boundary between British India, Tibet and China, Mr Ivan Chen refused to sign.
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When
the British handed over the reins of power to India, the land in possession of
British India was automatically passed on to independent India. There was a
problem. There were two claimants for the same piece of land. India had the
convention documents initialled by China. However, China refused to
accept the boundaries, claiming that it had not agreed to the delineation. In
our perception, the land legally belonged (and still belongs) to India, and
China claimed it as a historical possession. The seeds of territorial disputes
were thus sown.
Immediately
after the partition, India had to handle the first Kashmir War. It also had to
grapple with managing the accession of the princely states and the serious
issues of internal administration. With the defeat and eventual retreat of
Chiang Kai-Shek to the island of Taiwan, China became the People's Republic of
China on 1 October 1949. India recognised the new rule in China on 30 December
1949. The PLA, on 7 October 1950, launched an offensive against Tibet in the
Chamdo region of Eastern Tibet and captured Chamdo on 19 October 1950.
The military annexation of Tibet was an indicator of China’s territorial
ambitions. This became an irritant between the two countries.
After
the series of negotiations referred to as the “Sino-India conference on Tibetan
trade and intercourse,” the two countries signed the “Agreement on trade and
intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India” on 29 April 1954.
Famous as the Panchsheel agreement, enshrining the five principles of peaceful
coexistence, it became the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship, giving
birth to the slogan "Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai."
Meanwhile,
China started construction of a road through Aksai Chin connecting Xinjiang to
Tibet. India discovered this only in 1957–58. In November 1958, India lodged a
diplomatic protest, but China denied that there was any infringement, claiming
that the area historically belonged to China. This led to the border dispute,
slowly turning into clashes between the two countries. The political situation
worsened in Tibet, drawing India into direct confrontation with China. The
massive Lhasa uprising was dealt with an iron hand by China, killing thousands
of Tibetans, and destroying their monasteries. The Dalai Lama fled Tibet on 17
Mar 1959 and reached the safety of India on 31 March 1959. He was granted
political asylum. Bilateral relations took a turn for the worse.
China’s
incursions across the border became more frequent. On 7 August 1959, a
Chinese patrol crossed the McMahon line, pushing back the border post at
Khinzemane in NEFA. India claimed that China attacked, but China responded,
saying it was the Indians who attacked. On 25 August 1959, Chinese troops
crossed the McMahon line and attacked the Indian post at Longju, in NEFA, now
Arunachal Pradesh. Taken by surprise, the post withdrew, and the Chinese
occupied the post. However, they vacated it later. The post was, thereafter,
taken over by the Indian Army. On 28 Aug 1959, the Prime Minister, Mr
Jawaharlal Nehru, reported multiple border incidents to the parliament. On 21
October 1959, an Indian patrol was ambushed by the People's Liberation Army in
Kongka pass, killing nine soldiers and capturing ten, who were returned later.
There was widespread protest in the country, and the Prime Minister assured the
country that India’s sovereignty would not be compromised.
The
diplomatic negotiations between the two countries were heading nowhere.
Something had to be done to prevent China from establishing military posts in
Indian territory and claiming it. The concept of the “Forward
Policy" was born thus. This policy required the Indian Army to
establish small forward military posts along the disputed border along the
McMahon line to reassert control over the territory India claimed as its own.
By the middle of 1962, about 60 such posts were said to have been created, 43
of which were to the north of the McMahon line. China responded by creating its
network of posts opposite the Indian deployment and many more, leading to
multiple standoffs and skirmishes.
Flaws
Critics
point out that despite infrastructural deficiencies, inadequate supplies, and a
lack of strategic depth, rendering Indian positions untenable, it was decided
to deploy troops forward. Most posts were said to have been isolated, thinly
held, and with barely any logistical backup. The Army is said to have asked for
more troops but did not receive any. It is also said that the troops were given
orders to fight “Last Man - Last Round.” The political decision makers are also
condemned for overruling the military advice about the Army’s unpreparedness
for such a war. The Forward Policy, therefore, is labelled naive and
impractical.
The
1962 War was a comprehensive military defeat for India. If the outcome of the
policy and its execution are the only criteria, then the policy was utterly
flawed and its execution suicidal. Even after condemning the political
leadership, there is scope to study the wherewithal the political
leadership at that time had in their hands to decide on evaluating the efficacy
of the plan/policy.
Flaws?
Assured
by the Intelligence Bureau that China will not respond militarily, the
political leadership would have been led to underestimate the threat perception, if not negated it completely. Intelligence failures have been repeated.
Fortunately, situations have been retrieved, albeit at huge human costs, mostly
by the uniformed.
Army
men who served in the mountains would be familiar with the saying that “the
mountain eats up men.” Manpower will always be inadequate when it comes to
high-altitude and mountain deployments. Recent military history operations
would vouch for this old saying. An unstable border with Pakistan might have
made it difficult for the political brass to allow thinning out the defence on
the northern and western borders. The faulty intelligence assessment would
certainly have aided that decision.
Inadequacy
of the military hardware was another issue. If we look at the allocations by
both countries towards defence, China spent a far lot more on its defence than
India. It has not changed even once in the history of both countries, both in
absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP. That the Indian Army would not have
got what they asked for was a natural consequence. About the Army being
ill-equipped, when it is a matter of differential resource allocations,
dictated by the political hierarchy, the Army has no option but to be deployed
with what they have been provided with. Even today, the Armed Forces would
want many things, but the purse remains with the political masters. We had
a chief in the recent past who announced that “we would go to war with what
we have and not with what we want.” If the higher commanders fail to voice
dissent and prevent deployment, it is only because they either fail to carry
out a realistic appraisal of the situation or remain silent in subservience.
If the
Government, in power then, went ahead despite the advice, there would have been
compulsions. What would those compulsions be? Did they have an alternative?
An
Alternative?
Let us
recreate the decision scenario.
What
were the options available to the leadership? They had two options. First, let
things be as it is, give up our claim and let China take possession of the land
they claimed was theirs. This option, if adopted, would have been an
uncontested surrender of the land that we claimed was legally ours and continue
to claim as ours. In that case, a war could have been avoided. The adversary
would then have continued to increasingly claim and creep forward as years
progressed. Surrender would have become the norm. The current generation would
have never forgiven the past for not putting up a fight, irrespective of the
outcome.
In that case, there was only one option available to the leadership, and that was to fight, last man last round, irrespective of what the morrow brought along. So, we fought with whatever resources we could muster and with all the ferocity that we could command. Could there be any other option available?
Unparalleled?
In
1962, the Government of India was faced with the dilemma of deciding either to
give up meekly or to put up resistance, however weak it would have been. In a
situation of “damned if you do and damned if you don't,” the Government of
India decided to go on the offensive. The only political and military objective
of the 1962 war was to hold on to each inch of land, whatever the
cost. We, armed with all the wherewithal that hindsight can provide,
devoid of the burden of decision, and insulated from consequences, can sit to
critique the decisions taken then. Could there have been any other decision?
Judgement
In
war, meek surrender not only brings defeat and dishonour, it pawns the dignity
and honour of future generations. The only option for an honourable country was
to put up a fight with whatever means it had at its disposal, even if martyrdom
and defeat were the only guaranteed outcome then and scorn later. The unmatched
courage and valour of our troops are worthy of eternal remembrance. But
for leaders, “uneasy lies the head that wears the crown.” It takes broad
shoulders and a huge heart to take the responsibility for a defeat. Lesser
mortals are incapable of doing it. Some make history winning, and some are
remembered for having led in tough times.
Let
the future judge the past as always, but empowered with knowledge,
kinder.
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