Part 3: Fight About The McMahon Line

Defining India-China Relationship 

India’s War with China started on 20 October 1962, when China launched simultaneous attacks in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, then called NEFA. The war ended on 21 November 1962, when China unilaterally declared a ceasefire. China withdrew from all areas it had captured, but not from the Aksai Chin area. Official details of the month-long conflict remain largely opaque to this day in India, locked away in classified documents. However, we often come across bits and pieces, carefully curated for political returns. 

The shroud over bilateral relations between India and China notwithstanding, the two most populous neighbours remain locked in distrust and domestic denials, despite growing trade between them. The occasional glimmers of hope in the relationship often end up being extinguished by disappointments, and every photo opportunity, from the “Hindi-Chini, bhai-bhai” days to the contemporary “riverside spectacle,” eventually turned out to be harbingers of sinister outcomes. The common man in India, now by experience, firmly associates betrayal as the principal characteristic of the India-China relationship.

Source and Discourse

There are several books on the 1962 War, and all authors converge on the same set of causes. The History Division of the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, published the official history of the 1962 war, titled “History of the Conflict with China, 1962”, in 1992. Sufficient information is available in the public domain, claiming to be from this report. One can also browse and read about the stormy debates in Parliament regarding the war, where opposition members voiced their concerns, and the government responded. The intense debate in the parliament took place during the war without fear of being labelled anti-national. On 31 October 1962, 11 days into the war, Mr VK Krishna Menon, then the defence minister, resigned. On 14 November 1962, one week before the war ended, the House unanimously resolved as follows: -

 “This House records its firm opinion that the Chinese forces must evacuate the areas of India which they have illegally occupied, and declares its united determination to see that India's territorial integrity and frontier are respected and upheld.”

"The House places on record its deep appreciation of the gallantry of the officers and men of our Defence Forces who are engaged in defending our country, and assures them of its complete support."

"The House is confident that our people will face the grave emergency confronting the country with unity, determination and courage and are prepared to make any sacrifice to preserve India’s freedom and honour."

"The House solemnly declares that it stands united behind the Government in its determination to drive out the aggressor from the sacred soil of India, and to ensure that the territory of India is held and maintained inviolate.”

The Weaponised Report

The Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report, published in 1963, evokes more political interest than all the others put together. The report, authored by Lieutenant General TB Henderson Brooks and Brigadier PS Bhagat, was the result of an inquiry ordered by General J N Chaudhuri, the Chief of Army Staff, to conduct an internal operational review of the Indian Army’s performance. The report remains a classified document under the Official Secrets Act. Mr Nevile Maxwell, a British-Australian journalist, however, quoted the Henderson Brooks–Bhagat report in his book, “India’s China War,” first published in 1970. In the book, he painted India as the aggressor. Mr Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, is said to have acknowledged Maxwell's contributions in revealing the truth and benefiting China. He complimented Mr Maxwell, who was in China covering the visit of the President of Pakistan, Mr Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, in 1972.

Mr Nevile Maxwell had no love lost for India. Stationed in Delhi from 1959 to 1967 as a correspondent for The Times, he authored a series of articles ahead of the fourth Lok Sabha elections in 1967. He is believed to have written, “the great experiment of developing India within the democratic framework has failed”, and he even went on to predict that the general election to the fourth Lok Sabha would be the last.  Not easily offended and provoked as we are now, there were no protests or violent activity in India against the author, his book, or his reports. Mr Maxwell shot to fame suddenly, this time before the 2014 elections. On 17 March 2014, for reasons not difficult to fathom, he made public selected portions of the report on his website. 

The Henderson Brooks–Bhagat Report immediately kicked up a political storm with the principal opposition party asking the government to declassify the report for transparency and accountability. After all, the Nation had the right to know the truth. The Government, citing National security and operational implications, refused to oblige. In April 2014, Mr Maxwell removed the references from his website. With the elections done, the storm died. The party that demanded disclosure rode to power and has been in power ever since. Call it compulsions, the report remains classified. A classified, vaulted and buried report has political relevance. 

It has been six decades since the war. Everything about the two countries, their geopolitical positioning and strength, their military structure, hardware, armament, war fighting strategy, interdependent economy, demography, and virtually everything one can imagine has changed. We now live in an environment where satellites continuously scan every inch of land, thousands of electronic eyes are on the lookout for anything that moves or does not move, every conversation is listened to and scrutinised, and every digital footprint is critically examined. There is a saying in Malayalam, “nee manssil kanumpol, njan maanthu kanum.” It roughly means, “when you think of something, I see it in the sky.” Nothing remains hidden. None of those things from the sixties exist today as it was then. In such an environment, the report is nothing more than an archaic document, meaningless to modern warfare. 

Declassifying the age old official reports would open a debate, derive lessons, if at all, there are any relevant ones, and if someone wants to learn from those. It would also bring closure to something that we have already forgotten, but are periodically reminded of during elections. Keeping it classified only serves to capitalise electoral returns at will, through the easily infuriated.

Causes

Study of the war leads us to two causes: India’s “Flawed Forward Policy” and China’s Territorial compulsions. All the other causes attributed to the Indian side, like poor intelligence, an ill-equipped and ill-prepared Army, and political interference overriding military inputs, are all subsumed by “Forward Policy.” That brings us to three fundamental questions. These are: -

1.         What is the forward policy?

2.         Why is it considered flawed?

3.         What else should have been done?

Roots of The Forward Policy

To understand the Forward Policy, we need to first understand how it came about. 

When the Indian subcontinent was under the administrative control of the British Empire, much of the territory that lay between British India, China, and Tibet was the subject of territorial dispute. In 1913, the British decided to settle the dispute. A series of tripartite meetings took place in Shimla (then called Simla). The first meeting was on 6 October 1913, and the ninth and last was on 3 July 1914. The discussions led by Sir Henry McMahon, the foreign secretary of British India, agreed to delineate the boundary. This is now called the McMahon line. Mr Ivan Chen, the Chinese representative to the meeting, did not object to the proposed boundary. He also initialled the draft proposal. However, on 3 July 1914, at the final meeting, when Britain and Tibet signed to seal the convention confirming the McMahon line as the boundary between British India, Tibet and China, Mr Ivan Chen refused to sign. 

 

When the British handed over the reins of power to India, the land in possession of British India was automatically passed on to independent India. There was a problem. There were two claimants for the same piece of land. India had the convention documents initialled by China.  However, China refused to accept the boundaries, claiming that it had not agreed to the delineation. In our perception, the land legally belonged (and still belongs) to India, and China claimed it as a historical possession. The seeds of territorial disputes were thus sown.

Immediately after the partition, India had to handle the first Kashmir War. It also had to grapple with managing the accession of the princely states and the serious issues of internal administration. With the defeat and eventual retreat of Chiang Kai-Shek to the island of Taiwan, China became the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949. India recognised the new rule in China on 30 December 1949. The PLA, on 7 October 1950, launched an offensive against Tibet in the Chamdo region of Eastern Tibet and captured Chamdo on 19 October 1950.  The military annexation of Tibet was an indicator of China’s territorial ambitions. This became an irritant between the two countries.

After the series of negotiations referred to as the “Sino-India conference on Tibetan trade and intercourse,” the two countries signed the “Agreement on trade and intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India” on 29 April 1954. Famous as the Panchsheel agreement, enshrining the five principles of peaceful coexistence, it became the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship, giving birth to the slogan "Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai."

Meanwhile, China started construction of a road through Aksai Chin connecting Xinjiang to Tibet. India discovered this only in 1957–58. In November 1958, India lodged a diplomatic protest, but China denied that there was any infringement, claiming that the area historically belonged to China. This led to the border dispute, slowly turning into clashes between the two countries. The political situation worsened in Tibet, drawing India into direct confrontation with China. The massive Lhasa uprising was dealt with an iron hand by China, killing thousands of Tibetans, and destroying their monasteries. The Dalai Lama fled Tibet on 17 Mar 1959 and reached the safety of India on 31 March 1959. He was granted political asylum. Bilateral relations took a turn for the worse.

China’s incursions across the border became more frequent. On 7 August 1959, a Chinese patrol crossed the McMahon line, pushing back the border post at Khinzemane in NEFA. India claimed that China attacked, but China responded, saying it was the Indians who attacked. On 25 August 1959, Chinese troops crossed the McMahon line and attacked the Indian post at Longju, in NEFA, now Arunachal Pradesh.  Taken by surprise, the post withdrew, and the Chinese occupied the post. However, they vacated it later. The post was, thereafter, taken over by the Indian Army. On 28 Aug 1959, the Prime Minister, Mr Jawaharlal Nehru, reported multiple border incidents to the parliament. On 21 October 1959, an Indian patrol was ambushed by the People's Liberation Army in Kongka pass, killing nine soldiers and capturing ten, who were returned later. There was widespread protest in the country, and the Prime Minister assured the country that India’s sovereignty would not be compromised.

The diplomatic negotiations between the two countries were heading nowhere. Something had to be done to prevent China from establishing military posts in Indian territory and claiming it. The concept of the “Forward Policy" was born thus. This policy required the Indian Army to establish small forward military posts along the disputed border along the McMahon line to reassert control over the territory India claimed as its own. By the middle of 1962, about 60 such posts were said to have been created, 43 of which were to the north of the McMahon line. China responded by creating its network of posts opposite the Indian deployment and many more, leading to multiple standoffs and skirmishes.

Flaws

Critics point out that despite infrastructural deficiencies, inadequate supplies, and a lack of strategic depth, rendering Indian positions untenable, it was decided to deploy troops forward. Most posts were said to have been isolated, thinly held, and with barely any logistical backup. The Army is said to have asked for more troops but did not receive any. It is also said that the troops were given orders to fight “Last Man - Last Round.” The political decision makers are also condemned for overruling the military advice about the Army’s unpreparedness for such a war. The Forward Policy, therefore, is labelled naive and impractical.

The 1962 War was a comprehensive military defeat for India. If the outcome of the policy and its execution are the only criteria, then the policy was utterly flawed and its execution suicidal. Even after condemning the political leadership, there is scope to study the wherewithal the political leadership at that time had in their hands to decide on evaluating the efficacy of the plan/policy. 

Flaws?

Assured by the Intelligence Bureau that China will not respond militarily, the political leadership would have been led to underestimate the threat perception, if not negated it completely. Intelligence failures have been repeated. Fortunately, situations have been retrieved, albeit at huge human costs, mostly by the uniformed.

Army men who served in the mountains would be familiar with the saying that “the mountain eats up men.” Manpower will always be inadequate when it comes to high-altitude and mountain deployments. Recent military history operations would vouch for this old saying. An unstable border with Pakistan might have made it difficult for the political brass to allow thinning out the defence on the northern and western borders. The faulty intelligence assessment would certainly have aided that decision.

Inadequacy of the military hardware was another issue. If we look at the allocations by both countries towards defence, China spent a far lot more on its defence than India. It has not changed even once in the history of both countries, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP. That the Indian Army would not have got what they asked for was a natural consequence. About the Army being ill-equipped, when it is a matter of differential resource allocations, dictated by the political hierarchy, the Army has no option but to be deployed with what they have been provided with. Even today, the Armed Forces would want many things, but the purse remains with the political masters. We had a chief in the recent past who announced that “we would go to war with what we have and not with what we want.” If the higher commanders fail to voice dissent and prevent deployment, it is only because they either fail to carry out a realistic appraisal of the situation or remain silent in subservience.

If the Government, in power then, went ahead despite the advice, there would have been compulsions. What would those compulsions be? Did they have an alternative?

An Alternative?

Let us recreate the decision scenario. 

What were the options available to the leadership? They had two options. First, let things be as it is, give up our claim and let China take possession of the land they claimed was theirs. This option, if adopted, would have been an uncontested surrender of the land that we claimed was legally ours and continue to claim as ours. In that case, a war could have been avoided. The adversary would then have continued to increasingly claim and creep forward as years progressed. Surrender would have become the norm. The current generation would have never forgiven the past for not putting up a fight, irrespective of the outcome.

In that case, there was only one option available to the leadership, and that was to fight, last man last round, irrespective of what the morrow brought along. So, we fought with whatever resources we could muster and with all the ferocity that we could command. Could there be any other option available? 

Unparalleled?

In 1962, the Government of India was faced with the dilemma of deciding either to give up meekly or to put up resistance, however weak it would have been. In a situation of “damned if you do and damned if you don't,” the Government of India decided to go on the offensive. The only political and military objective of the 1962 war was to hold on to each inch of land, whatever the cost. We, armed with all the wherewithal that hindsight can provide, devoid of the burden of decision, and insulated from consequences, can sit to critique the decisions taken then. Could there have been any other decision? Everything about the war was unparalleled, then and is unparalleled, even now.

Judgement

In war, meek surrender not only brings defeat and dishonour, it pawns the dignity and honour of future generations. The only option for an honourable country was to put up a fight with whatever means it had at its disposal, even if martyrdom and defeat were the only guaranteed outcome then and scorn later. The unmatched courage and valour of our troops are worthy of eternal remembrance.  But for leaders, “uneasy lies the head that wears the crown.” It takes broad shoulders and a huge heart to take the responsibility for a defeat. Lesser mortals are incapable of doing it. Some make history winning, and some are remembered for having led in tough times.

 Let the future judge the past as always, but empowered with knowledge, kinder. 

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Part 2: Future of India’s Military Operations and Lessons from the Past

 

PART 2: First War of Kashmir 1947

Change in Mind

When I first sat down to write the article, I believed I could finish it in three parts. After all, I had studied these military operations, and all it needed was putting things in an easily readable form. Once I started reading up on the material I collected, I realised, my knowledge had been confined purely to the military perspective. The canvas on which each of the military operations was conducted stretched far beyond matters of arms. Their beginnings rested in complex geopolitical vortices, and the battlefields stretched far back and far ahead. To my horror, I also realised that we find ourselves repeatedly in a state of déjà Vu, moving forward linearly but in circles. This aspect shall be discussed in the concluding part of the article, dealing with “what lies ahead for us.” 

Each operation India has undertaken demands deference. It is that deep respect and admiration for those involved in the operations that compelled me to discuss major operations one by one and share with my readers across the world the political events that led to the military interventions and outcomes.

Keeping in line with the enhanced scope and coverage, I took the liberty of changing the title of the article from “Operation Sindoor and Other Unparalleled Operations” to “Future of India’s Military Operations: Lessons from the Past.”

 

A Lingering Question

The spectrum of political issues behind the First Kashmir War is seldom discussed and therefore remains hidden. Whenever the First Kashmir War comes up for discussion nowadays, it is always served on politically coloured plates, to serve the needs of the election hour. The WhatsApp university does the rest, providing fertile grounds where half-truths, hearsay, assumptions, and lies thrive, infecting anyone in the proximity. Reluctance or inability to do serious reading, aided by the rampant presence of visuals ridden with political messaging, helps proliferate untruths, burying truth in fathomless depths.

The question that resonates most in highly charged contemporary political debates, in an ignorant, ill-informed, or misinformed environment, with outcomes on expected lines, is “Why was the military operation against the raiders in Kashmir not allowed to continue till the entire territory of Kashmir under Maharaja Hari Singh was retrieved?” The question is invariably followed up with the expression, “if only…”

To answer that all-important question, we must understand the complex political events leading up to the war and those that unfolded thereafter on both sides of the border. Armed with hindsight, seated accusingly in the knowledge of the present, and ignorant of the compulsions of the past, it is easy to judge. To be fair to the people who led the government then, I have relied on works published by authors whom I consider unbiased academics, unfettered by political compulsions, to bring to you the conditions under which the leaders of India, emerging into independence, took decisions. 

Consolidation of Territory

The years preceding or succeeding independence were unbelievably tough on the administration. According to information available in the public domain, India in 1947 had about 565 princely states within the current geographical limits of India. These states/regions were not part of British India but were semi-autonomous territories ruled by local leaders under British Suzerainty.  A sovereignty, where a state had absolute authority over all its affairs without any external interference, is different from a suzerainty, where the state and the ruler could only make local laws and were under the rule of another state or ruler for all major decisions.

The Indian Independence Act 1947, as interpreted then, gave these states the freedom to join India or Pakistan or even remain independent, once the British Suzerainty ceased. It was left to the leaders of the Indian freedom movement to motivate these rulers to join India. The process involved tough and long-drawn negotiations, assurances and promises of safety, status, income, and such other things. It is very important to understand that the process of integration was a cauldron of boiling contradictions, requiring deft handling. 

According to the information available in the public domain, states like Baroda, Bikaner, and others from Rajasthan were the first among princely states to join the Indian Union. Manipur and Jodhpur are said to have acceded to India on 11 August 1947, and Tripura on 13 August 1947. Piploda joined after March 1948, and Bilaspur on 12 October 1948. Interestingly, a few of the principalities that initially opted to join Pakistan were motivated and convinced to accede to India.  Some required a different motivation.

Sir, CP Ramaswamy Iyer, the Dewan of Travancore, the southernmost Kingdom within the boundaries of India, we now know, declared, on 11 June 1947, that Travancore would stay independent after the British left. The Indian National Congress launched the civil unrest protesting the ruler's decision. Travancore finally agreed to the accession on 30 July, but not before an assassination attempt on the Dewan. They finally ceded to India on 15 August 1947. 

Nawab Hamidulllah Khan, the Muslim ruler of Bhopal, a Hindu-majority state, reluctantly agreed to join after public unrest.  He signed the Instrument of Accession on 30 August 1947. Hyderabad, also a Hindu-majority state with a Muslim Ruler, opted for independence, but was annexed through Operation Polo in September 1948. 

Junagadh, a Hindu-majority state under a Muslim ruler, Nawab Muhammad Mahabat Khanji III, opted to join Pakistan. The choice did not please Delhi. There were severe protests in Junagadh. India imposed economic sanctions and cut off access to the state. On 24 October 1947, the Nawab fled to Pakistan, leaving the administration to the Dewan, Shah Nawaz Bhutto, father of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. On 7 November 1947, Shah Nawaz Bhutto, considering the deteriorating law and order situation, invited India to take over the administration of Junagadh. The Indian forces annexed Junagadh on 9 November 1947. In February 1948, when a plebiscite was conducted, 99% people wanted to join India. Separate polls in other areas too, found most opting in favour of India. It took many more years for India to reach the present boundary configuration. There was a lot more to consolidate.

In 1954, Indian nationalist volunteers, supported by residents, through a non-violent movement, wrested control of Dadra and Nagar Haveli from the Portuguese. These territories were administered by a local body under India’s oversight from 1954 to 1961. The Portuguese also refused to cede Goa, Daman, and Diu, the colonial territories on the western coast of India. Intense diplomatic efforts throughout the 1950s failed. India launched Operation Vijay on 18 December 1961 and annexed Goa, Daman, and Diu on 19 December 1961. After the annexation of Goa in 1961, Portugal relinquished claims, and Dadra and Nagar Haveli were formally integrated as a Union Territory in 1961.

The French agreed to cede Chandernagore, also called Chandan Nagar, a French colony, situated on the west bank of the Hooghly River, 35 km north of Kolkata, after the referendum on 19 June 1949, with 114 voting to stay with the French and 7473 voting to join India. The process was completed in 1950. In 1954, the French handed over de facto control of Pondicherry (now Puducherry), Karaikal, Mahe, and Yanam to India following negotiations and local referendums. The “de jure” (legal) transfer was formalised through the Treaty of Cession signed on May 28, 1956, and ratified by France in 1962 after parliamentary approval.

Sikkim remained an autonomous monarchy under the Chogyal, with special protectorate status under India as per the Indo-Sikkim Treaty of 1950, with external affairs, defence, and communication controlled by India. Dissatisfied with the monarchy, political unrest, led by the Sikkim National Congress and other democratic parties, erupted in Sikkim in 1973, demanding democratic governance. In 1974, elections were held after a new constitution was drafted. The Sikkim Assembly, now pro-India, passed a resolution seeking full integration with India.  This led to serious turmoil in the area. In April 1975, the Indian Army entered Sikkim, disarmed the palace guard, and placed the Chogyal (King) under house arrest. A referendum was held in Sikkim on 14 April 1975, in which over 97% of the population voted in favour of joining India. The Indian Parliament, on 16 May 1975, amended the Constitution (36th Amendment), making Sikkim a full-fledged state of India.

Territorial consolidation of India started earnestly in 1947 and, in the form we know now, was completed only in 1975. The process went far beyond the lives of many who initially led the freedom movement or the territorial consolidation immediately after independence. Irrespective of when it happened, it required a lot of negotiation, mediation, motivation, manoeuvring and even the military. Kashmir presented a different matrix altogether.

Kashmir

Kashmir, the territory between India and Pakistan, consisted of three distinct areas. The Jammu region was predominantly Hindu, the valley predominantly Muslim and Ladakh mostly Buddhist. The kingdom was ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh, a Hindu. He wanted independence from both India and Pakistan. He signed a standstill agreement with Pakistan, but India did not sign the agreement. Pakistan sensed that Maharaja Hari Singh could deliver Kashmir to India and went on the offensive on 22 October 1947. A careful reading of the history books of that time would give a clear picture of the complex and peculiar political situation Kashmir presented to Delhi. Some leaders who are now projected as having strongly wanted Kashmir in India are said to have initially told Lord Mountbatten otherwise. 

With the raiders almost at his doorstep, Maharaja Hari Singh fled Srinagar on the night of 25 October 1947 and reached his palace in Jammu. Aware of the territorial losses suffered, he signed the instrument of accession in the afternoon of 26 October 1947. A decision was immediately taken to airlift troops to Srinagar. The civil and military authorities were busy the entire night of 26 October, getting together the required number of planes, pilots, and supplies to be lifted. By the morning of 27 October, they managed to get about 100 planes. These big and small aircrafts were used for airlifting 329 soldiers of the 1 Sikh led by Lieutenant Colonel Ranjit Rai and the load required for the operation. They took off from Willingdon Airfield, Delhi, as and when each one was loaded. The authorities were not sure if the airfield at Srinagar had already fallen to the enemy.  The Colonel was therefore under instructions to circle the airfield and, in case of doubt, not land but return to Jammu. By 10:30 in the morning, Delhi received the much-awaited message that the planes had landed safely.

Meanwhile, Mohammed Ali Jinnah had already moved from Karachi to Lahore, waiting for a triumphant entry into Srinagar on 26 or 27 October, only to learn that Srinagar had been taken by the Indian forces. Jinnah immediately instructed Sir Francis Mudie, Governor of West Punjab, to telephone General Gracey, Acting Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani army, ordering him to move the Army towards Kashmir. Sir Francis Mudie obeyed Jinnah, but Gracy did not obey Mudie, telling him that he required the permission of General Auchinleck, the Supreme Commander, in Delhi, who remained in charge of all the British officers on both sides. On 28 October, General Auchinleck flew to Lahore and met Jinnah and told him that while India was entitled to send troops to Kashmir, a part of India, Pakistan could not. He also told Jinnah that if he sent troops, British nationals in the Pakistan Army would not participate. Meanwhile, Indian troops were bloodying the encroachers.  

The Elusive Answer

It is said that the military wanted permission to go ahead and capture the entire area of Kashmir that belonged to Maharaja Hari Singh before signing the instrument of accession. There are reasons to believe it, too. The battalion that landed at the airport after securing the airport advanced towards Baramulla to stop the raiders there. When they contacted the enemy, they realised that the raiders “had expert commanders, modern weapons and were in great numerical superiority.” He decided to withdraw to Pattan. Unfortunately, he was killed in action during the withdrawal.

Three more battalions of the Indian Army landed in Srinagar to defend the state's capital. About 700 raiders made a sneak attack on Srinagar on 3 November 1947. The Attack was repulsed, but not without losses. The locals also turned against the raiders because of the cruel loot, plunder, and rape they had inflicted on them. By December 1947, Indian forces were gaining ground against the tribals and Pakistani forces in Jammu and Kashmir. This led to serious discussion in Delhi about pushing the offensive further into Muzaffarabad, Mirpur and other areas held by the Pakistan forces. There were problems.

Both India and Pakistan had retained British officers in the top military positions when they gained independence. General Auchinleck was the Supreme Commander of both Indian and Pakistani forces. The supreme command was dissolved on 30 November 1947, and both countries had their own separate National commands from 1 December 1947. General Sir Francis Robert Roy Bucher, who was the Deputy Commander-in-Chief under General Auchinleck, became the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army on 1 January 1948 and served till 15 January 1949 to hand over the reins to General KM Cariappa, the First Indian Army Chief of free India.

Meanwhile, there were differences of opinion between Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and his Deputy Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel on how the state should be ruled. The issue became so intense that both Patel and Nehru offered to resign. The interaction between the two by way of letters was, however, dignified and with immense respect for each other. In the end, Vallabhbhai, as Minister of States, gave the reins of shaping India's Kashmir policy to Nehru. Nehru continued to take Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel's advice and consent on most issues regarding Kashmir. 

General Sir Francis Robert Roy Bucher advised Nehru against pursuing the offensive because he felt that the Indian Army was not yet logistically or organisationally ready for a full-scale war with Pakistan. He also cautioned the Prime Minister about the harsh winter in the Kashmir region and its impact on already-strained supply lines, which could prolong the operations and increase casualties. He advised the Prime Minister to stop the offensive and refer the case to the United Nations. It is possible that the advice was also to avoid the British officers from the unpleasant situation of being on both sides of the conflict.

Most of the negotiation with the ruler of Kashmir was based on the advice of Lord Mountbatten. The decision to approach the United Nations on the issue of Kashmir was also based on the Governor General’s prescriptions. Sardar Patel was against the reference of Kashmir to the UN and preferred timely action on the ground. While he held that idea, he did not insist because Kashmir was being handled by Nehru, who had the consent from Gandhi.

The Connected Question

Another question connected to the decision to stop the military offensive against Pakistan in 1947 is, “Why did Nehru take the Kashmir issue to the United Nations?”

The United Nations officially came into existence on 24 October 1945, following the end of the Second World War, with the noble aim of preventing future global conflicts. India, still under British colonial rule, was among the 51 founding members of the United Nations, which ratified the charter that came into force on 24 October 1945. It was those heady days when peace was romanticised and everyone thought that the UN would deliver peace from situations of conflict. There was a strong precedent suggesting effective conflict resolution by the UNSC. 

The first complaint to the United Nations Security Council came from Iran on 19 January 1946. Iran complained that the Soviet Union, which was supposed to withdraw its troops, had not done so and was interfering in its internal matters by supporting separatists. The dispute was resolved through discussion, and the Soviet Union withdrew troops in May 1946. In September 1946, Greece accused Bulgaria of a border attack and military aggression. This matter was also discussed and defused. In October 1946, the UK brought the case to the Security Council, the Corfu Channel incident, where British naval ships hit mines in Albanian waters. The UK accused Albania of laying the mines or failing to warn. It also took the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Incidentally, this became the first case ever heard at the ICJ.  ICJ ruled in favour of the UK in 1949, awarding compensation. In July 1947, the Netherlands launched a military action against Indonesian independence forces. When India and Australia raised the issue in the Security Council, the UN called for ceasefires and negotiations, eventually leading to Indonesia’s independence in 1949. With such strong precedence and India being a responsible nation, going to the UN seemed to be the right thing then. After all, the UN had not become the lifeless entity that it has become now.

On 1 January 1948, India submitted its complaint to the president of the Security Council, and it read,

“Under Article 35 of the Charter of the United Nations, any Member may bring any situation whose continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security to the attention of the Security Council. Such a situation now exists between India and Pakistan owing to the aid which invaders, consisting of nationals of Pakistan and of tribesmen from the territory immediately adjoining Pakistan on the north‑west, are drawing from Pakistan for operations against Jammu and Kashmir, a State which has acceded to the Dominion of India and is part of India. The circumstances of accession, the activities of the invaders that led the Government of India to take military action against them, and the assistance which the attackers have received and are still receiving from Pakistan are explained later in this memorandum. The Government of India request the Security Council to call upon Pakistan to put an end immediately to the giving of such assistance, which is an act of aggression against India. If Pakistan does not do so, the Government of India may be compelled, in self‑defence, to enter Pakistan territory to take military action against the invaders. The matter is, therefore, one of extreme urgency and calls for immediate action by the Security Council for avoiding a breach of international peace”

Ours to Judge

The crown of authority comes with the pain of accountability. Weighed down by fear of consequences and unimaginable imponderables, placed in an endless sea of ambiguity, and the possibility of having to eternally bear the cross for the outcome, decision-making is not easy. The hallmark of strong leaders is their ability to take bold decisions with the hope of success, knowingly pushing aside the fear of failure.  The agony of decision-making does not guarantee them kindness in judgment by future generations, especially when it is about political dividends. The toast of the town today could be burnt at the stake tomorrow, even in absentia. It is far easier to evaluate, criticise, and suggest a better way out, without having to bear the cross at all, many decades after a decision was taken. In hindsight, stopping the military advance or going to the UN did no good to us. But did they have the luxury of hindsight?

If the success of an operation is measured by outcomes, given the ambiguity and complexity of the prevailing situation, the First Kashmir War was a resounding success. If peace between India and Pakistan is still a mirage, there are other reasons. The decision to go to the UN is insignificant. In the process of understanding the evolution of modern India’s territorial boundaries, I also realised that knowledge humbles arrogance empowered by ignorance.

(Coming up in the next part -1962 Operations)

PS: 

1. The Picture  is representative of soldiers in 1947 and AI-generated.

2.  For those wanting to clarify dates and inference request post query in the comments section. I shall happily share the details and sources.

 

 

Part 1: India's Unparalleled Military Operations

 

The Many Roads to Rome 

Operation Sindoor continues to be a popular topic of discussion among military thinkers, policymakers, arms manufacturers, and the self-proclaimed vocal strategic affairs experts proliferating over the equally expanding audio-visual modes of communication. Every aspect of the operation continues to be flogged emotionally with  intentional or inherent bias, but with louder claims of being bias less. The common refrain in all these discussions and analyses is that Operation Sindoor was a multidomain operation combining military precision with diplomatic and strategic messaging, unparalleled in the history of independent India. 

Let us first be on even keel on ‘multi-domain’ that experts now endlessly talk about. According to me, ‘multi domain’ typically includes the well-known conflict domains of land, maritime, air, and the recently evolved realms of cyber, information, space, electromagnetic spectrum, intelligence, and now the all-pervasive narrative and optics management. The presence of so many individual domains matters, but their amalgam becomes a force to reckon with only when there is interoperability among them, ensuring synchronised application before and during the operation. Each expert adds his or her own set of arguments to arrive at the destination many others have already reached. Finally, everybody agrees that OP Sindoor was exceptional and unparalleled. All roads lead to Rome.

Could there be another road, one not leading to Rome?

The Comparison Matrix

How do we describe any event as unparalleled? We compare other events and find nothing similar, or when there are similar events, the unparalleled one stands far beyond comparison. How do we describe a specific military operation as unparalleled in the history of independent India? The verdict must come after a comparison with all the other military operations independent India has undertaken. How do we compare operations? What should be the comparison matrix? Should it be on the range of weaponry used or the modes of delivery? Should it be on the superiority of the means used? Should it be on the length of the operation or its geographical reach? Should it be based on a specific aspect like surprise? Should it be on the quantum of destruction caused to the enemy? Should it be based on what the political or strategic aim of the operation was?

A mission is successful if all the aims for which it was launched have been achieved. Everything else, plans, tactics, targets, weaponry, logistics, innovations, inventions, and technology available and employed are mere means to the end. Means do not matter in war, where anything but success is meaningless. It is the outcome and outcome alone that matters. Comparison should therefore be done on a common denominator of the outcomes of the operations weighed against the intentions with which they were launched. In other words, have the political and strategic aims set for the operation been achieved?  Everything else remains secondary. But there are problems associated with this approach. 

It would be easy if political and strategic aims were explicitly enunciated or declared before the commencement of an operation. It seldom happens. However, when an operation is in progress, political and military authorities make announcements for the consumption of both domestic and foreign audiences. Some announcements are meant specifically for the adversary. The academia or strategic affairs experts can deduce the political and military aims from the maze of these public utterances. Military aims can be deduced from the objectives or targets chosen. Experts can reverse-link military objectives to reasonably assume the political aim behind an operation. Luckily, in the case of some of the recent operations, political aims were enunciated.  

What about comparing military capabilities and technologies employed? Don't they matter?

If we have a capability, it is meant to be used. Otherwise, the presence of such capability, like nuclear warheads, must ensure deterrence. Capability in the stable with no impact is as good as not having it. Comparison of capabilities employed in operations separated by a long period may not be an objective evaluation. Exponential growth of technology measured over an incremental linear scale of time can be brutally biased against the past. To make the statement easy to visualise, imagine telling Gen Z about a time when people normally stood in lines at night to make an STD call. They may not call us primitive or laugh in our face out of respect. Likewise, given the evolution of technology, adaptation, aggregation, and weaponisation, the array of weapons deployed will remain incomparable. On the technology front, the next operation will be ages ahead of the last operation. Comparison, therefore, would be best served by analysing the political and strategic aims and checking if those have been achieved by diplomatic or military means. Knowing the context of the operation will aid in understanding the political and military aims of that operation.

Operations of Independent India

The military operations India has undertaken can be divided into two specific groups. The first one consists of all the wars starting with the First Kashmir War and ending with the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971. All these were full-fledged wars or those that led to full-fledged wars. The second group consists of military operations, starting with Operation Meghdoot and ending with Operation Sindoor, which were limited operations. Irony or coincidence, Operation Meghdoot has not been officially declared closed, but the military face off continues with ceasefire conditions in place, whereas Operation Sindoor has officially been declared, suspended, and NOT terminated, but without any military actions.

Each of the operations will be taken up to evaluate how well the political and military aims that drove the operation were achieved.  Let us start from the first operation of Independent India.  

First Kashmir War. 

When India gained independence in 1947, the British gave the rulers of the princely states the freedom of choice to join India, Pakistan, or remain independent. On 12 Aug 1947, the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir under Maharaja Hari Singh sent a telegram to the authorities of Pakistan and India seeking a ‘standstill agreement’, hoping to remain independent from India and Pakistan. Pakistan responded positively on 14 /15 August. India did not reply, as parleys were on to motivate him to join the Union of India. Legally and technically, Kashmir was still not a part of Independent India. Unknown to the ruler, in breach of the standstill agreement, Pakistan planned to invade and capture Kashmir. On 12 September 1947, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, permitted the launch of Operation Gulmarg. 

About 20,000 tribal fighters, organised into lashkars or militias of 1000 men each, trained and armed by the Pakistani army, crossed the border into Kashmir. They attacked, looted areas on the way and on 22 October 1947, captured Muzaffarabad. Meanwhile, one group of raiders had already occupied the commanding heights of Zojila. The only access to Leh-Ladakh was also threatened. On 26 October, they attacked Baramulla. Srinagar was their intended destination. It is very important to understand this context of the operation. Maharaja Hari Singh was still the ruler of the sovereign Princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, consisting of regions of Jammu, Kashmir Valley, Ladakh, Gilgit Baltistan and many parts of the currently Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. With the enemy fast approaching the gates of his capital and fearing his capture and a certain end at the hands of the marauders, Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947, officially making Jammu and Kashmir and all parts of his Kingdom, including those under the control of the raiders, an integral part of India. 

The moment Maharaja Hari Singh signed the instrument, the entire geographical area that was once the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir became part of India. The Government of India now had to do everything possible to safeguard the integrity and sovereignty of the country. The army airlifted two companies of the 1st Battalion, The Sikh Regiment and landed them at the Srinagar airport on 27 October 1947. They immediately went about the counteroffensive. In a historic first in the history of warfare, the 13-tonne Stuart tanks from the 7th Light Cavalry were most audaciously deployed to engage the enemy entrenched in Zojila heights. The tanks moved to their operational location through equally audacious innovation in transportation. A series of operations were launched across Kashmir by the Indian Army, and the enemy was beaten back. The war ended with a ceasefire brokered by the United Nations. The concept of the “Line of Control” came into being.

What would have been India’s political aim?  

There are no documents in the public domain that can give an official version of the strategic or political aims. At best, we can deduce from the events that took place.

Was it about saving Maharaja Hari Singh? He, having chosen to remain away from India, had asked for a standstill agreement.

Defending India’s territorial integrity? Purely in legal terms, India’s sovereignty had not been threatened directly since that area technically became India only on 26 October 1947. We took over what was available after what the ruler lost to Pakistan. 

Prevent the expansion of the Pakistani estate? Certainly. 

Expand the Indian borders beyond what was handed over and consolidate geographically? Likely, though still undeclared.

Saving Kashmiris from the plunderers? Yes, maybe.

There can be differing versions of defining success or failure, especially in connection with this operation. Expecting the political masters of those times, having won freedom through nonviolence, to militarily annexe the princely state immediately after gaining independence goes against logic. It will be fair to the people then to grant them the credit for adding real estate, redrawing the geographical boundary of the country, and enhancing our strategic depth, through negotiation and diplomacy. They did it at the first possible moment, even when the embers of the biggest human migration in history were still alive. It will be illogical to blame them for the loss of territory that Maharaja Hari Singh brought upon himself. This is one narrative that filled its sails with the contemporary political winds. Why did the army not capture the entire geographical territory that was under Maharaja Hari Singh? The geographical boundary in the above question can be shifted West or North, depending on the convenience. The answer, on the strength of hindsight, lies in the fact that the further West or North we added, that much more chaos, lawlessness, and poverty would have been added to the country. 

To be just and fair, the planners must be credited for their foresight and quick response. They gathered adequate intelligence and prepared the troops and tanks to be moved. Imagine airlifting two companies from Delhi hours after signing the Instrument of Accession. Imagine moving a column of tanks by road, over rickety bridges from Jammu to Zojila without losing surprise. Looking at the operation dispassionately, it is evident that the operation was guided by clear political and strategic aims of territorial gains and holding on to them. To that extent, the military aims were achieved too. That operation remains unparalleled in Indian History, not because it was the first one in independent India, but for the foresight, well-prepared contingencies, audacious aims, quick planning, courageous execution, and for achieving the political and operational aims.

Locked with inimical neighbours ever willing to needle, India was destined for more.

To be Continued in Part 2

Pixels of an Emerging Picture: Understanding Operation Sindoor (Part – 3)

 

A Dissection

 

The terrorist incident and India’s response, in time, will become statistics, like the previous ones. However, the objectives of the operation and the modus operandi adopted will become the subject of intense scrutiny by the militaries of the world. When two militaries come face to face, the optics of the hardware array and application strategy can be captivating. The social media, print and visual media are sizzling with conspiracy theories, propaganda in favour of one and against the other, depending on who is initiating it. But beyond the brute force, chest thumping, media carnage and the fleeting exuberance of public euphoria fanned by politicians, exists the reality of strategic victory. It is worthwhile to analyse the entire event to understand the long-term impact it has on each country.  

Pakistan's army has led Pakistan to comprehensive defeats against India in all the confrontations between the two countries. No country, however irrational, initiates an adverse action against another without political reasons. Therefore, it is logical to believe that the Pakistan army must have drawn up some objectives while strategising the attack. What could those have been? How successful were they in achieving them? While time will tell us the truth, we can make some intelligent assumptions, with as much objectivity as possible.

Pak Objectives and Evaluation of Success

Win or Lose – Regain Relevance.

Pakistan was created using the Two-Nation theory, which identifies, differentiates, and discriminates against human beings based on religion. General Asim Munir’s speech leaves no room for doubt about the deep divide that Pakistan holds about other religions. It is well established that anti-India sentiments not only unite Pakistanis but also help drive the country. The Pakistan army runs that country. However, if the recent developments within the country were any indication, the stock of Pakistan’s armed forces had plummeted. They needed something worthwhile to shore up their image. Clear prospects of a military defeat notwithstanding, there is nothing better than a direct military confrontation with India to come out as Pakistan’s saviour once again.

Victory and defeat in battle can be debated. Despite the irrefutable military losses suffered by them this time again, Pakistan's social media peddles the myth that Pakistan has decimated India. The domestic audience seems to believe that their army saved them from India. Believe or dispute anything you want to, but there can be no disputing the fact that the Pak Army has once again succeeded in positioning itself as the saviours of Pakistan. Pakistan Army has regained relevance despite an irrefutable military loss. Immediate objective achieved!

Resumption of Dialogue with India.

When two countries go into conflict, only a dialogue between the two can conclude or halt the conflict. Since 2016, India has refused Pakistan an opportunity for any formal dialogue. Whether bilaterally agreed or through a third-party mediation, India agreeing to a talk between two government functionaries, this time the respective DGMOs, has essentially obtained for Pakistan what India had been denying it all this while. The outcome of the discussion might be anything, but Pakistan has wrested from India what India had been steadfastly denying Pakistan.

Immediate objective achieved! 

Indo-Pak Hyphenation.

It was common practice for the world at large to hyphenate Pakistan with India. However, growing economic disparity, vastly different internal security situations, ease of doing business, and safety of foreign investments have, over the years, reduced the instances of the Western world hyphenating the two adversaries. With Ms Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, explicitly articulating the de-hyphenation policy in 2005, and an aggressive strategy followed by the BJP Government since 2014, India had achieved a great degree of de-hyphenation. However, with this one terrorist attack, Pakistan has succeeded in slowing the process and, to an extent, re-hyphenating the two adversaries despite India’s overwhelming response.

Short-term objective achieved! 

Kashmir to Fore again.

Pakistan had been attempting to internationalise the Kashmir issue in every possible forum and whenever possible. India had been successful in thwarting their attempts almost every time. However, the armed conflict and the likelihood of a military flare-up between two nuclear neighbours have brought Kashmir to the fore again, raising a new challenge to Indian Diplomacy.

Immediate objective achieved! 

Deepen Religious Divide in India. 

India has been going through some amount of inter-religious turmoil.  The selective targeting of Hindu males immediately sent a deeply disturbing and provocative message across the country. It could easily have spiralled out of control, deepening the divide and sowing the seeds of civil unrest. While there were some untoward incidents of targeted attack against the minority community, the country, by and large, remained peaceful and united.  The local population of Kashmir displayed a brilliant example of National Unity, coming out in large numbers against the terrorists.

The objective was not achieved.

Spinoffs 

Terrorism as an Instrument of Foreign Policy.

The terrorist attack and the funeral of known terrorists attended by senior civil and military functionaries have once again confirmed that Pakistan considers terrorists an extension of its military and pursues terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy. Not only has the attack confirmed the efficacy of its strategy, it succeeded in garnering the requisite traction in its favour. As the cradle and fountainhead of terrorism, the attack in Pahalgam also serves as a message to the other countries in the world about Pakistan’s capability to wage this mode of warfare anywhere. Distances may be a source of comfort for many, but it does serve one well to remember that plague spreads. 

Reaffirmation of International Support.

China and Turkey came out in open support of Pakistan; so did Bangladesh. India received support from some, but couched in diplomatic semantics and nuances. It is impossible that Pakistan planned this operation without the intelligence services of the developed countries getting wind of it. While no accusations are being made against any agencies for having given tacit support or approval to the Pakistani plan, the failure of those intelligence agencies to alert Indian Agencies, which anyway did not get even a whiff of it, does not augur well for India. 

Milking Geographical Advantage

Pakistan has its borders with Iran, Afghanistan, and China, making it a springboard for those with close ties with it. Despite its double game and terrible ways, Pakistan is still sought after by the Western world and China because of its strategic location. They all need Pakistan’s real estate for their strategic purpose. Therefore, the world does not want to see a failed state descending into disintegration. That is one reason, no major Western power openly came in support of India. 

Indian Objectives

The Indian response to the terrorist attack, prima facie, had one political objective: “message Pakistan and all the terrorist organisations within Pakistan and POJK, that India will not hesitate to reach any place in Pakistan to get them.” The military aims, therefore, were in pursuance of this political diktat. This message has amply been driven home unambiguously to Pakistan and to the whole world.

Objective achieved.

Spinoffs

Redefining the response threshold. Now on, India does not differentiate between acts of terrorism and military action against it. It has bracketed nonstate actors, state, and terror proponents, all into one. The threshold for retaliation has been redefined, at least for now. We also demonstrated our willingness to use our military across the IB and LoC and accept the risks involved.

Unity in diversity. With the country facing adversity, all political parties buried their differences and supported the ruling party. Unity is possible even against odds.

Make-in India Competency. The response gave India the room to war-test its homegrown armoury and technology, and prove the efficacy of its AD shield. It proved to the world that the Indian arsenal is world-class. Considering the accuracy and extent of damage inflicted on targets by the Indian missiles, it is reliably learned that many countries are seeking to purchase ‘Made in India” weapons, especially missiles.

Digital shaping the battlefield. The conflict had a huge segment of digital warfare that both sides used to shape the battlefield in their own favour. Over the 48 hours since 7 May, India had gradually gained dominance and held sway over the adversary.

Joint Manship. The three services gave an exemplary demonstration of jointness through the seamless interoperability of various platforms. Planners can now sit to refine them.

Nuclear bluff. Exposing the Nuclear bluff, Operation Sindoor created a space to conventionally tackle a nuclear Pakistan and yet keep it under the nuclear threshold. It will be irrational to expect Pakistan to adhere to reason. One can never rule out a desperate Pakistan resorting to a nuclear launch. The planners will do well to strategise how that threat can be managed.

AD Resources. In the 48 hours of military engagement, India successfully laid to waste most of the launching pads and the air defence resources of Pakistan. Though all that will be repaired and made usable, it will cost Pakistan a lot. It will also force Pakistan to commit more resources to them. One school of thought says that India had destroyed Pakistan’s war-waging capability.

Forcing the enemy to move troops. With troops being diverted to the Indian front, the western part of Pakistan became more vulnerable.  This indirectly helped the Baloch freedom fighters to exploit the gaps in Pakistani defences. This has helped India militarily. 

Days Ahead 

One of the most repeatedly asked questions is, “Will the ceasefire hold? How long will it last?”

It is one of the easiest sets of questions to answer. History will repeat itself, and Pakistan cannot help but violate our borders. The only question left to answer is, when would that be? The objectives that they had in mind when they started the terrorist attack remain relevant and current. It will force Pakistan to strike again.

In the meantime, it will do well for India to publicly define which terrorist activity would be considered an act of war. It would also serve the country well if the required responses were well defined, tasked, and resources kept ready for instant retribution. This becomes very important because we have already progressively ratcheted up our responses.

Now, if Pakistan does something, they would have already prepared themselves for the Indian responses. Our retribution will have to be few screws tighter and yet keep the region safe.

The situation that has evolved from the combat situation presents a fresh set of challenges to the strategists. But isn’t it easier to follow the time-tested saying, “prevention is better than cure?” The sudden call to action must have also thrown up many challenges. Planners must have taken note of it, too. Without getting blown away by the euphoria of success, it may serve India well if all the lessons are faithfully and truthfully recorded, studied and remedials determined.

Operation Sindoor has not officially been concluded.