Part 3: Fight About The McMahon Line

Defining India-China Relationship 

India’s War with China started on 20 October 1962, when China launched simultaneous attacks in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, then called NEFA. The war ended on 21 November 1962, when China unilaterally declared a ceasefire. China withdrew from all areas it had captured, but not from the Aksai Chin area. Official details of the month-long conflict remain largely opaque to this day in India, locked away in classified documents. However, we often come across bits and pieces, carefully curated for political returns. 

The shroud over bilateral relations between India and China notwithstanding, the two most populous neighbours remain locked in distrust and domestic denials, despite growing trade between them. The occasional glimmers of hope in the relationship often end up being extinguished by disappointments, and every photo opportunity, from the “Hindi-Chini, bhai-bhai” days to the contemporary “riverside spectacle,” eventually turned out to be harbingers of sinister outcomes. The common man in India, now by experience, firmly associates betrayal as the principal characteristic of the India-China relationship.

Source and Discourse

There are several books on the 1962 War, and all authors converge on the same set of causes. The History Division of the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, published the official history of the 1962 war, titled “History of the Conflict with China, 1962”, in 1992. Sufficient information is available in the public domain, claiming to be from this report. One can also browse and read about the stormy debates in Parliament regarding the war, where opposition members voiced their concerns, and the government responded. The intense debate in the parliament took place during the war without fear of being labelled anti-national. On 31 October 1962, 11 days into the war, Mr VK Krishna Menon, then the defence minister, resigned. On 14 November 1962, one week before the war ended, the House unanimously resolved as follows: -

 “This House records its firm opinion that the Chinese forces must evacuate the areas of India which they have illegally occupied, and declares its united determination to see that India's territorial integrity and frontier are respected and upheld.”

"The House places on record its deep appreciation of the gallantry of the officers and men of our Defence Forces who are engaged in defending our country, and assures them of its complete support."

"The House is confident that our people will face the grave emergency confronting the country with unity, determination and courage and are prepared to make any sacrifice to preserve India’s freedom and honour."

"The House solemnly declares that it stands united behind the Government in its determination to drive out the aggressor from the sacred soil of India, and to ensure that the territory of India is held and maintained inviolate.”

The Weaponised Report

The Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report, published in 1963, evokes more political interest than all the others put together. The report, authored by Lieutenant General TB Henderson Brooks and Brigadier PS Bhagat, was the result of an inquiry ordered by General J N Chaudhuri, the Chief of Army Staff, to conduct an internal operational review of the Indian Army’s performance. The report remains a classified document under the Official Secrets Act. Mr Nevile Maxwell, a British-Australian journalist, however, quoted the Henderson Brooks–Bhagat report in his book, “India’s China War,” first published in 1970. In the book, he painted India as the aggressor. Mr Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, is said to have acknowledged Maxwell's contributions in revealing the truth and benefiting China. He complimented Mr Maxwell, who was in China covering the visit of the President of Pakistan, Mr Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, in 1972.

Mr Nevile Maxwell had no love lost for India. Stationed in Delhi from 1959 to 1967 as a correspondent for The Times, he authored a series of articles ahead of the fourth Lok Sabha elections in 1967. He is believed to have written, “the great experiment of developing India within the democratic framework has failed”, and he even went on to predict that the general election to the fourth Lok Sabha would be the last.  Not easily offended and provoked as we are now, there were no protests or violent activity in India against the author, his book, or his reports. Mr Maxwell shot to fame suddenly, this time before the 2014 elections. On 17 March 2014, for reasons not difficult to fathom, he made public selected portions of the report on his website. 

The Henderson Brooks–Bhagat Report immediately kicked up a political storm with the principal opposition party asking the government to declassify the report for transparency and accountability. After all, the Nation had the right to know the truth. The Government, citing National security and operational implications, refused to oblige. In April 2014, Mr Maxwell removed the references from his website. With the elections done, the storm died. The party that demanded disclosure rode to power and has been in power ever since. Call it compulsions, the report remains classified. A classified, vaulted and buried report has political relevance. 

It has been six decades since the war. Everything about the two countries, their geopolitical positioning and strength, their military structure, hardware, armament, war fighting strategy, interdependent economy, demography, and virtually everything one can imagine has changed. We now live in an environment where satellites continuously scan every inch of land, thousands of electronic eyes are on the lookout for anything that moves or does not move, every conversation is listened to and scrutinised, and every digital footprint is critically examined. There is a saying in Malayalam, “nee manssil kanumpol, njan maanthu kanum.” It roughly means, “when you think of something, I see it in the sky.” Nothing remains hidden. None of those things from the sixties exist today as it was then. In such an environment, the report is nothing more than an archaic document, meaningless to modern warfare. 

Declassifying the age old official reports would open a debate, derive lessons, if at all, there are any relevant ones, and if someone wants to learn from those. It would also bring closure to something that we have already forgotten, but are periodically reminded of during elections. Keeping it classified only serves to capitalise electoral returns at will, through the easily infuriated.

Causes

Study of the war leads us to two causes: India’s “Flawed Forward Policy” and China’s Territorial compulsions. All the other causes attributed to the Indian side, like poor intelligence, an ill-equipped and ill-prepared Army, and political interference overriding military inputs, are all subsumed by “Forward Policy.” That brings us to three fundamental questions. These are: -

1.         What is the forward policy?

2.         Why is it considered flawed?

3.         What else should have been done?

Roots of The Forward Policy

To understand the Forward Policy, we need to first understand how it came about. 

When the Indian subcontinent was under the administrative control of the British Empire, much of the territory that lay between British India, China, and Tibet was the subject of territorial dispute. In 1913, the British decided to settle the dispute. A series of tripartite meetings took place in Shimla (then called Simla). The first meeting was on 6 October 1913, and the ninth and last was on 3 July 1914. The discussions led by Sir Henry McMahon, the foreign secretary of British India, agreed to delineate the boundary. This is now called the McMahon line. Mr Ivan Chen, the Chinese representative to the meeting, did not object to the proposed boundary. He also initialled the draft proposal. However, on 3 July 1914, at the final meeting, when Britain and Tibet signed to seal the convention confirming the McMahon line as the boundary between British India, Tibet and China, Mr Ivan Chen refused to sign. 

 

When the British handed over the reins of power to India, the land in possession of British India was automatically passed on to independent India. There was a problem. There were two claimants for the same piece of land. India had the convention documents initialled by China.  However, China refused to accept the boundaries, claiming that it had not agreed to the delineation. In our perception, the land legally belonged (and still belongs) to India, and China claimed it as a historical possession. The seeds of territorial disputes were thus sown.

Immediately after the partition, India had to handle the first Kashmir War. It also had to grapple with managing the accession of the princely states and the serious issues of internal administration. With the defeat and eventual retreat of Chiang Kai-Shek to the island of Taiwan, China became the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949. India recognised the new rule in China on 30 December 1949. The PLA, on 7 October 1950, launched an offensive against Tibet in the Chamdo region of Eastern Tibet and captured Chamdo on 19 October 1950.  The military annexation of Tibet was an indicator of China’s territorial ambitions. This became an irritant between the two countries.

After the series of negotiations referred to as the “Sino-India conference on Tibetan trade and intercourse,” the two countries signed the “Agreement on trade and intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India” on 29 April 1954. Famous as the Panchsheel agreement, enshrining the five principles of peaceful coexistence, it became the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship, giving birth to the slogan "Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai."

Meanwhile, China started construction of a road through Aksai Chin connecting Xinjiang to Tibet. India discovered this only in 1957–58. In November 1958, India lodged a diplomatic protest, but China denied that there was any infringement, claiming that the area historically belonged to China. This led to the border dispute, slowly turning into clashes between the two countries. The political situation worsened in Tibet, drawing India into direct confrontation with China. The massive Lhasa uprising was dealt with an iron hand by China, killing thousands of Tibetans, and destroying their monasteries. The Dalai Lama fled Tibet on 17 Mar 1959 and reached the safety of India on 31 March 1959. He was granted political asylum. Bilateral relations took a turn for the worse.

China’s incursions across the border became more frequent. On 7 August 1959, a Chinese patrol crossed the McMahon line, pushing back the border post at Khinzemane in NEFA. India claimed that China attacked, but China responded, saying it was the Indians who attacked. On 25 August 1959, Chinese troops crossed the McMahon line and attacked the Indian post at Longju, in NEFA, now Arunachal Pradesh.  Taken by surprise, the post withdrew, and the Chinese occupied the post. However, they vacated it later. The post was, thereafter, taken over by the Indian Army. On 28 Aug 1959, the Prime Minister, Mr Jawaharlal Nehru, reported multiple border incidents to the parliament. On 21 October 1959, an Indian patrol was ambushed by the People's Liberation Army in Kongka pass, killing nine soldiers and capturing ten, who were returned later. There was widespread protest in the country, and the Prime Minister assured the country that India’s sovereignty would not be compromised.

The diplomatic negotiations between the two countries were heading nowhere. Something had to be done to prevent China from establishing military posts in Indian territory and claiming it. The concept of the “Forward Policy" was born thus. This policy required the Indian Army to establish small forward military posts along the disputed border along the McMahon line to reassert control over the territory India claimed as its own. By the middle of 1962, about 60 such posts were said to have been created, 43 of which were to the north of the McMahon line. China responded by creating its network of posts opposite the Indian deployment and many more, leading to multiple standoffs and skirmishes.

Flaws

Critics point out that despite infrastructural deficiencies, inadequate supplies, and a lack of strategic depth, rendering Indian positions untenable, it was decided to deploy troops forward. Most posts were said to have been isolated, thinly held, and with barely any logistical backup. The Army is said to have asked for more troops but did not receive any. It is also said that the troops were given orders to fight “Last Man - Last Round.” The political decision makers are also condemned for overruling the military advice about the Army’s unpreparedness for such a war. The Forward Policy, therefore, is labelled naive and impractical.

The 1962 War was a comprehensive military defeat for India. If the outcome of the policy and its execution are the only criteria, then the policy was utterly flawed and its execution suicidal. Even after condemning the political leadership, there is scope to study the wherewithal the political leadership at that time had in their hands to decide on evaluating the efficacy of the plan/policy. 

Flaws?

Assured by the Intelligence Bureau that China will not respond militarily, the political leadership would have been led to underestimate the threat perception, if not negated it completely. Intelligence failures have been repeated. Fortunately, situations have been retrieved, albeit at huge human costs, mostly by the uniformed.

Army men who served in the mountains would be familiar with the saying that “the mountain eats up men.” Manpower will always be inadequate when it comes to high-altitude and mountain deployments. Recent military history operations would vouch for this old saying. An unstable border with Pakistan might have made it difficult for the political brass to allow thinning out the defence on the northern and western borders. The faulty intelligence assessment would certainly have aided that decision.

Inadequacy of the military hardware was another issue. If we look at the allocations by both countries towards defence, China spent a far lot more on its defence than India. It has not changed even once in the history of both countries, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP. That the Indian Army would not have got what they asked for was a natural consequence. About the Army being ill-equipped, when it is a matter of differential resource allocations, dictated by the political hierarchy, the Army has no option but to be deployed with what they have been provided with. Even today, the Armed Forces would want many things, but the purse remains with the political masters. We had a chief in the recent past who announced that “we would go to war with what we have and not with what we want.” If the higher commanders fail to voice dissent and prevent deployment, it is only because they either fail to carry out a realistic appraisal of the situation or remain silent in subservience.

If the Government, in power then, went ahead despite the advice, there would have been compulsions. What would those compulsions be? Did they have an alternative?

An Alternative?

Let us recreate the decision scenario. 

What were the options available to the leadership? They had two options. First, let things be as it is, give up our claim and let China take possession of the land they claimed was theirs. This option, if adopted, would have been an uncontested surrender of the land that we claimed was legally ours and continue to claim as ours. In that case, a war could have been avoided. The adversary would then have continued to increasingly claim and creep forward as years progressed. Surrender would have become the norm. The current generation would have never forgiven the past for not putting up a fight, irrespective of the outcome.

In that case, there was only one option available to the leadership, and that was to fight, last man last round, irrespective of what the morrow brought along. So, we fought with whatever resources we could muster and with all the ferocity that we could command. Could there be any other option available? 

Unparalleled?

In 1962, the Government of India was faced with the dilemma of deciding either to give up meekly or to put up resistance, however weak it would have been. In a situation of “damned if you do and damned if you don't,” the Government of India decided to go on the offensive. The only political and military objective of the 1962 war was to hold on to each inch of land, whatever the cost. We, armed with all the wherewithal that hindsight can provide, devoid of the burden of decision, and insulated from consequences, can sit to critique the decisions taken then. Could there have been any other decision? Everything about the war was unparalleled, then and is unparalleled, even now.

Judgement

In war, meek surrender not only brings defeat and dishonour, it pawns the dignity and honour of future generations. The only option for an honourable country was to put up a fight with whatever means it had at its disposal, even if martyrdom and defeat were the only guaranteed outcome then and scorn later. The unmatched courage and valour of our troops are worthy of eternal remembrance.  But for leaders, “uneasy lies the head that wears the crown.” It takes broad shoulders and a huge heart to take the responsibility for a defeat. Lesser mortals are incapable of doing it. Some make history winning, and some are remembered for having led in tough times.

 Let the future judge the past as always, but empowered with knowledge, kinder. 

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Part 1: India's Unparalleled Military Operations

 

The Many Roads to Rome 

Operation Sindoor continues to be a popular topic of discussion among military thinkers, policymakers, arms manufacturers, and the self-proclaimed vocal strategic affairs experts proliferating over the equally expanding audio-visual modes of communication. Every aspect of the operation continues to be flogged emotionally with  intentional or inherent bias, but with louder claims of being bias less. The common refrain in all these discussions and analyses is that Operation Sindoor was a multidomain operation combining military precision with diplomatic and strategic messaging, unparalleled in the history of independent India. 

Let us first be on even keel on ‘multi-domain’ that experts now endlessly talk about. According to me, ‘multi domain’ typically includes the well-known conflict domains of land, maritime, air, and the recently evolved realms of cyber, information, space, electromagnetic spectrum, intelligence, and now the all-pervasive narrative and optics management. The presence of so many individual domains matters, but their amalgam becomes a force to reckon with only when there is interoperability among them, ensuring synchronised application before and during the operation. Each expert adds his or her own set of arguments to arrive at the destination many others have already reached. Finally, everybody agrees that OP Sindoor was exceptional and unparalleled. All roads lead to Rome.

Could there be another road, one not leading to Rome?

The Comparison Matrix

How do we describe any event as unparalleled? We compare other events and find nothing similar, or when there are similar events, the unparalleled one stands far beyond comparison. How do we describe a specific military operation as unparalleled in the history of independent India? The verdict must come after a comparison with all the other military operations independent India has undertaken. How do we compare operations? What should be the comparison matrix? Should it be on the range of weaponry used or the modes of delivery? Should it be on the superiority of the means used? Should it be on the length of the operation or its geographical reach? Should it be based on a specific aspect like surprise? Should it be on the quantum of destruction caused to the enemy? Should it be based on what the political or strategic aim of the operation was?

A mission is successful if all the aims for which it was launched have been achieved. Everything else, plans, tactics, targets, weaponry, logistics, innovations, inventions, and technology available and employed are mere means to the end. Means do not matter in war, where anything but success is meaningless. It is the outcome and outcome alone that matters. Comparison should therefore be done on a common denominator of the outcomes of the operations weighed against the intentions with which they were launched. In other words, have the political and strategic aims set for the operation been achieved?  Everything else remains secondary. But there are problems associated with this approach. 

It would be easy if political and strategic aims were explicitly enunciated or declared before the commencement of an operation. It seldom happens. However, when an operation is in progress, political and military authorities make announcements for the consumption of both domestic and foreign audiences. Some announcements are meant specifically for the adversary. The academia or strategic affairs experts can deduce the political and military aims from the maze of these public utterances. Military aims can be deduced from the objectives or targets chosen. Experts can reverse-link military objectives to reasonably assume the political aim behind an operation. Luckily, in the case of some of the recent operations, political aims were enunciated.  

What about comparing military capabilities and technologies employed? Don't they matter?

If we have a capability, it is meant to be used. Otherwise, the presence of such capability, like nuclear warheads, must ensure deterrence. Capability in the stable with no impact is as good as not having it. Comparison of capabilities employed in operations separated by a long period may not be an objective evaluation. Exponential growth of technology measured over an incremental linear scale of time can be brutally biased against the past. To make the statement easy to visualise, imagine telling Gen Z about a time when people normally stood in lines at night to make an STD call. They may not call us primitive or laugh in our face out of respect. Likewise, given the evolution of technology, adaptation, aggregation, and weaponisation, the array of weapons deployed will remain incomparable. On the technology front, the next operation will be ages ahead of the last operation. Comparison, therefore, would be best served by analysing the political and strategic aims and checking if those have been achieved by diplomatic or military means. Knowing the context of the operation will aid in understanding the political and military aims of that operation.

Operations of Independent India

The military operations India has undertaken can be divided into two specific groups. The first one consists of all the wars starting with the First Kashmir War and ending with the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971. All these were full-fledged wars or those that led to full-fledged wars. The second group consists of military operations, starting with Operation Meghdoot and ending with Operation Sindoor, which were limited operations. Irony or coincidence, Operation Meghdoot has not been officially declared closed, but the military face off continues with ceasefire conditions in place, whereas Operation Sindoor has officially been declared, suspended, and NOT terminated, but without any military actions.

Each of the operations will be taken up to evaluate how well the political and military aims that drove the operation were achieved.  Let us start from the first operation of Independent India.  

First Kashmir War. 

When India gained independence in 1947, the British gave the rulers of the princely states the freedom of choice to join India, Pakistan, or remain independent. On 12 Aug 1947, the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir under Maharaja Hari Singh sent a telegram to the authorities of Pakistan and India seeking a ‘standstill agreement’, hoping to remain independent from India and Pakistan. Pakistan responded positively on 14 /15 August. India did not reply, as parleys were on to motivate him to join the Union of India. Legally and technically, Kashmir was still not a part of Independent India. Unknown to the ruler, in breach of the standstill agreement, Pakistan planned to invade and capture Kashmir. On 12 September 1947, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, permitted the launch of Operation Gulmarg. 

About 20,000 tribal fighters, organised into lashkars or militias of 1000 men each, trained and armed by the Pakistani army, crossed the border into Kashmir. They attacked, looted areas on the way and on 22 October 1947, captured Muzaffarabad. Meanwhile, one group of raiders had already occupied the commanding heights of Zojila. The only access to Leh-Ladakh was also threatened. On 26 October, they attacked Baramulla. Srinagar was their intended destination. It is very important to understand this context of the operation. Maharaja Hari Singh was still the ruler of the sovereign Princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, consisting of regions of Jammu, Kashmir Valley, Ladakh, Gilgit Baltistan and many parts of the currently Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. With the enemy fast approaching the gates of his capital and fearing his capture and a certain end at the hands of the marauders, Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947, officially making Jammu and Kashmir and all parts of his Kingdom, including those under the control of the raiders, an integral part of India. 

The moment Maharaja Hari Singh signed the instrument, the entire geographical area that was once the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir became part of India. The Government of India now had to do everything possible to safeguard the integrity and sovereignty of the country. The army airlifted two companies of the 1st Battalion, The Sikh Regiment and landed them at the Srinagar airport on 27 October 1947. They immediately went about the counteroffensive. In a historic first in the history of warfare, the 13-tonne Stuart tanks from the 7th Light Cavalry were most audaciously deployed to engage the enemy entrenched in Zojila heights. The tanks moved to their operational location through equally audacious innovation in transportation. A series of operations were launched across Kashmir by the Indian Army, and the enemy was beaten back. The war ended with a ceasefire brokered by the United Nations. The concept of the “Line of Control” came into being.

What would have been India’s political aim?  

There are no documents in the public domain that can give an official version of the strategic or political aims. At best, we can deduce from the events that took place.

Was it about saving Maharaja Hari Singh? He, having chosen to remain away from India, had asked for a standstill agreement.

Defending India’s territorial integrity? Purely in legal terms, India’s sovereignty had not been threatened directly since that area technically became India only on 26 October 1947. We took over what was available after what the ruler lost to Pakistan. 

Prevent the expansion of the Pakistani estate? Certainly. 

Expand the Indian borders beyond what was handed over and consolidate geographically? Likely, though still undeclared.

Saving Kashmiris from the plunderers? Yes, maybe.

There can be differing versions of defining success or failure, especially in connection with this operation. Expecting the political masters of those times, having won freedom through nonviolence, to militarily annexe the princely state immediately after gaining independence goes against logic. It will be fair to the people then to grant them the credit for adding real estate, redrawing the geographical boundary of the country, and enhancing our strategic depth, through negotiation and diplomacy. They did it at the first possible moment, even when the embers of the biggest human migration in history were still alive. It will be illogical to blame them for the loss of territory that Maharaja Hari Singh brought upon himself. This is one narrative that filled its sails with the contemporary political winds. Why did the army not capture the entire geographical territory that was under Maharaja Hari Singh? The geographical boundary in the above question can be shifted West or North, depending on the convenience. The answer, on the strength of hindsight, lies in the fact that the further West or North we added, that much more chaos, lawlessness, and poverty would have been added to the country. 

To be just and fair, the planners must be credited for their foresight and quick response. They gathered adequate intelligence and prepared the troops and tanks to be moved. Imagine airlifting two companies from Delhi hours after signing the Instrument of Accession. Imagine moving a column of tanks by road, over rickety bridges from Jammu to Zojila without losing surprise. Looking at the operation dispassionately, it is evident that the operation was guided by clear political and strategic aims of territorial gains and holding on to them. To that extent, the military aims were achieved too. That operation remains unparalleled in Indian History, not because it was the first one in independent India, but for the foresight, well-prepared contingencies, audacious aims, quick planning, courageous execution, and for achieving the political and operational aims.

Locked with inimical neighbours ever willing to needle, India was destined for more.

To be Continued in Part 2