KUNDIL VEENA CHUNDELI - LESSONS IN LEADERSHIP (Corporate and others)

 

“Kundil Veena Chundeli” is in Malayalam and means “mouse that fell in a ditch.

“History repeats itself” is an idiom that finds frequent mention nowadays. Both sides, especially in animated television discussions that become no-holds-barred debates, use it at will. The events that unfold daily across the world somehow give me the impression that the contemporary is often a repetition of the past, and we, in our own little ways, are all part of this great drama. To make things clearer, let me share a Malayalam story I learned as a child in the second or third grade. The story seems to repeat endlessly, though the characters keep changing. Let me narrate the story, giving it a contemporary flavour.

The story

Once upon a time, a mouse landed up in a kitchen in search of food. Without much problem, he found two “neyyappams” (a Malayali sweet and my childhood favourite) wrapped in a newspaper. Without waiting to eat, he picked up the packet and walked. He wanted to reach home and share the food with his children. The package was bigger than him, and naturally, holding it in his mouth, it blocked his sight. Not the one to give up, he walked, though blinded. Soon enough, he fell and fell into a deep ditch. He tried to climb out of the ditch but could not. Oblivious to his plight, the world outside carried on. He could, however, hear other animals walking past the ditch far above him. Then an idea struck him. He pretended to read the newspaper and read it aloud. 

“The sky is about to fall, and those who fear for life run and hide in some deep ditch,” he read it at the top of his voice from the depths of the pit. He kept repeating the same thing again.

A tiger, with a keen sense of hearing and smell, walking by, heard the mouse. “What?” He looked up at the sky. It was still there. He looked into the ditch and saw the mouse reading the newspaper. 

“Is it true? Is the sky going to fall?” He asked the mouse. 

“It is true. You are in danger. It is written here in the paper. Save yourself.” 

“How?”

“Are you deaf? Are you dumb? I just read this paper for you. Jump into a deep ditch,” replied the mouse and continued to pretend to read the paper. 

Who does not fear for life? “Can I come in?” asked the tiger. 

“Yeah. You and I are in danger. Jump in,” replied the mouse.

The Tiger jumped into the ditch to save his life. Worse, he was unlettered and was ashamed that he could not read, but a mouse could. But he was very grateful to the mouse, for he had used his wisdom to save another fellow forester from death without seeking anything in return. The mouse kept reading the message aloud again and again.

“Why are you repeating the message?” asked the tiger.

“Why? I am not selfish. I know the threat and know how to get out of it. Don't you want to save our brothers and sisters in the forest? Humans will take care of themselves.”

The tiger was overcome with remorse. In repentance, he started repeating what the mouse said. Obviously, the tiger had a bigger roar. All the animals in the jungle heard it and started running helter-skelter. Soon, the ditch was filled with various animals from the forest. The elephant followed. Others, one by one, big and small, different species, all united in their anxiety and grief, and hoping to save their own lives, joined them. Slowly, the ditch started getting filled up, and everyone was announcing that the sky was about to fall. After all, the community was under threat. The mouse continued with his pretend he was reading as others looked at him in awe. He stopped reading aloud because others had started parroting it for him, much louder and more convincing than he could be.  

A monkey was passing by and heard the commotion. He also wanted to join, but the mouse would let nothing of that sort happen.  “This place is already full. You go and find some other place,” the mouse commanded. After all, he was in command! Everyone there had unquestioningly accepted his wisdom and saw him as their saviour and supreme leader. Moreover, he had access to the scripture, and others did not know how to read. “Must be a divine gift,” they thought when they saw the mouse silently reading. Nobody questioned how he came to possess that competency. Even if someone suspected that it was a pretension, he could not speak out because the mouse had saved their lives.

“Please,” said the monkey. Nobody spoke. They all looked admiringly at the mouse, like devout disciples.

“I know you sneeze a lot, and God despises people who sneeze. Letting you in here will kill us all. Go away,” decreed the mouse.

“No. I do not sneeze. Nobody in my family sneezes,” replied the monkey.

“Are you telling us that we are lying?”  asked the mouse. He made sure that the word “us” stood out clearly from everything else. All the other animals noticed it and felt happy that the mouse was talking for all of them and taking care of everybody.

“Please,” the monkey begged, almost on the verge of tears. He did not want to die.

“Okay, we will accept you on one condition. Whosoever sneezes first will be thrown out of this ditch,” said the mouse, and looked at his audience. The word “we” was louder than everything else. All the animals were happy because their kind, benevolent, respected leader of all time included them in the decision-making. They were getting a role in governance, too!  They loved their leader. 

“Yes,” that is a fair condition,” they said in unison.

“This rule applies to everybody, even me,” declared the leader. The crowd was already grateful to their leader for having saved their life. Now he was putting himself on par with everybody in the crowd.  They loved him even more. They felt like worshipping him and seeing God in him. “Is it okay with everybody?” asked the leader.

Given a voice and the chance to be heard, everybody shouted in unison, “Yes, lord, let the rule be applied, and let us get the monkey in if he agrees to our condition.” The word “our” was distinct and had a taste of unity and brotherhood. The monkey gladly jumped into the ditch, touched the feet of the mouse, and stood on one side. Meanwhile, the other animals, out of reverence, gave the mouse a little space of his own. They also spoke amongst themselves about how they should now control entry. 

The mouse retrieved the two neyyappams he had come with, wrapped them back inside the newspaper and held them tight and close to his chest. He moved to the space allotted and declared that he had left most of the space for others. The other animals agreed, acknowledged his generosity, though they were adjusting themselves so as not to stamp on each other. They all looked at the mouse with even more admiration. One even said, “See our leader. He is simple and humble. He is carrying his own bags. He is humility personified.” 

Then what?

Finale

After some time, the mouse looked around and sneezed. The animals were shocked. They did not know what to do. They looked at each other, and then the mouse sneezed again. He was their saviour, and now what were they supposed to do? They looked up to the mouse.

The mouse stood up, looked at the others and said, “I know you all love me, but rules are rules, and for your sake, please throw me out.”

All the other animals got into a hurdle and nominated one of them to do the difficult job. The elephant was nominated because he had a trunk. He, with a heavy heart, took the mouse and flung him out of the ditch with his long trunk. The ditch was overcome with sorrow. They sat down in sorrow to discuss how magnanimous the mouse was towards all of them. Someone even started blaming the elephant for what he had done. 

“How could you do that?” The pig asked. 

“But you all told me to,” the elephant protested. Other animals started avoiding the elephant. 

The mouse hurried home happily and shared the delicacy with his children.

What happened to the others?

Your guess. 

Relevance 

How is the story relevant now? “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it,” (George Santayana, The Life of Reason, 1903)

The story continues to be repeated right in front of us, every day in different forms. We make leaders out of mice, who peddle untruth that we accept without question. What is worse? We peddle the same untruth, believing it to be the sole truth, louder and more vigorously than its original peddler.  

Social media platforms are the deep ditches that humanity finds itself stuck in.  The platform by itself may not be harmful, but when we populate it with our version of truth, which is falsehoods, fake news, untruths, and half-truths, it becomes an all-consuming ditch. Fuelled by the desire to become the messiah, we use our fast fingers to reach out for those we know, with the messages we just received, without bothering to check the veracity of what we propagate. (My friend Colonel Reji Koduvath calls them Centre forwards) In almost every interactive social media platform, one can find virulent violence of ignorance. But people do not realise that behind all the churn is a mouse with his two neyyappams held close to his chest, waiting to sneeze and scoot. The sad truth is that we would be left to fight it amongst ourselves against each other. Sadder still, we would vehemently refuse to accept that the “mouse” got the better of us, exploiting our inherent inadequacies that incapacitate our rationality.

Caveat

The story also brings out lessons on easy steps to rewarding leadership, albeit disruptive and, in the long run, destructive. I am consciously restricting my examples to corporate leadership because nowadays, people tend to be easily offended and are actively on the lookout for reasons to be offended. Parts of a conversation or text can be consciously weaned, taken out of context and weaponised. 

Let me restate the caveat here. The examples given here are strictly about the corporate environment. Bringing similarity to any leader, dead or alive, any organisation thriving or decaying, any ideology benevolent or discriminatory, is entirely your imagination. I declare myself free of your sins!

Tips for Disruptive Leadership 

1.    Find a cause, preferably one that can be dressed up as existential. It does not need to be real. Unsubstantiated ones or hearsay will just be fine. (Threat of a competitor killing our product or company.) It must, however, give the feel that the like-minded ones are together in the “depths of the pit,” and can survive only if we stand together.

2.    That also needs an enemy, a competitor. It will be best if we can find a person or a group of persons who can be blamed. Does not matter if they did anything wrong. But blame someone anyway. It helps give a face to be aware of.

3.    Give historical references, even if there are none, or what is being given is made up. (Who cares about the truth. Make up statistics.) It will give a sense of credibility, just like the mouse reading the newspaper. Faithful followers blinded by fear of extinction will stand in support with no questions asked. 

4.    Repeat it as many times as possible, till it assumes critical mass. Otherwise, such followers may lose the sense of purpose. 

5.    Define the group to be protected and announce it till it reaches a stage where people start claiming that they are in that group and identify others as outsiders. This will give a sense of identity. Only when there are competitors can there be competition. Divisions make adversaries out of friends, and then the differences will start showing as existential threats. Within an organisation, the competition can be between production and marketing. Who cares if our aim is achieved?

6.    Pretend willingness to die for the cause. Announce that, “I will not be taking a raise,” or offer to give up some part of the pay, perks, or allowance. Nobody expects you to, and even if you take a hike or add more perks and allowances, nobody will ask if the existential cause is in place. After some time, the followers would have come so far behind you, they cannot go back. 

7.    Declare that you are willing to be crucified (Pretend. Nobody will crucify the leader) 

You think I am being sarcastic? Look around and look within your organisations and even in the households. You will be able to find it playing out.

I do not know if the story is still taught in schools. 

It is time to teach this story in all management schools.

Learning management from a mouse? 

Yeah. Let me list out a few!

Crisis Management. 

Crowd Management.

Resource Management. 

Narrative Management. 

Perception Management. 

Outcome Management. 

Effective Communication.

Team Management. 

If you are resourceful enough, you can list many more.

PS: 

Gratitude to Colonel Reji Koduvath for sharing the original story immediately after our discussion on why people want to become forwarding agents.

Picture courtesy AI

 

This Cancer is Preventable

 

It was a beautiful morning that day, way back in 2008. Then, I received that call from my friend in Mumbai. A Malayalee born and bred in Hyderabad, married to a Malayalee settled in Mumbai, she speaks a unique tongue. Our friendship had gone past the necessity of starting conversations with a good morning or good evening. The telephone calls between us were not very regular, but when we spoke, we picked up from where we left off last. We talked about small things in life. Most of the conversation was reserved for pulling each other's legs and laughing. There was happiness in our conversation, always. It has been like that since we met for the first time in 2005. But that call in 2008 was different. 

 “Arey, do you know something?” she asked. She sounded dead serious. 

In the normal course of conversation, I would have said something funny or pulled her leg. “What happened?’ I asked, sensing something wrong in her voice. “I have breast cancer,” she said.

I was stunned and did not know what to say. I kept quiet, all the while thinking what to say and how to console her. I did not have to. She told me the details of the diagnosis and what she planned to do next.  This was one time when I was tongue-tied, and she led the conversation, and I was just making some incoherent sounds to tell her that I was alive at the other end. There was nothing much I could have done to help her in any manner. 

In the 17 years since then, I have met a few people afflicted with cancer. Many of them survived. Some of them with whom I spent time did not make it. There was nothing that I could have done for anyone to change their medical condition. In a few cases, I helped them prepare themselves and their families for the days ahead. In the others, I was only a witness to the unravelling events. That is when I noticed a pattern.

The initial response to the discovery of the disease is shock, pain, and disbelief. The uncertainty of the future immediately steps into take whatever mind space is left. Almost concurrently, the question, “Why me?” begins to gnaw at the person. During this time, the afflicted individuals and those around them undergo a visible change in their behaviour. They close ranks and behave as if they are guarding a state secret. Extra efforts are made to keep the secret away from other friends, relatives, and neighbours. As the situation worsens, most people withdraw into the shells of their own making and inevitably suffer in loneliness, the intense pain and anxiety. Only a very few choose to share their problem beyond their immediate support system. This reaction is not limited to cancer. When we come face-to-face with serious adversities or life-threatening challenges, most of us react likewise; the way our responses manifest might differ.

Why should anyone share their problem with everyone? 

Why should they publicise their sufferings?

How does sharing our problems with others help us?

Valid questions. The rights and privileges of privacy are paramount to an individual. The decision to share an individual's problem with somebody else is a personal choice. It must unequivocally remain so. 

I am interested in the study of human behaviour and often look at people's behaviour more as manifestations of something beyond what the eye can see. Life, over the last 66 years, has convinced me that the weaknesses and inadequacies inherent in each one of us drive our responses to various stimuli. This holds even for groups. Fake news and propaganda fan our vulnerabilities. That is the reason why it spreads faster than the truth. That is why religious teachers and politicians thrive on fear and hate. When afflictions are personal, individual traits drive the response. Therefore, people from similar socio-economic and cultural backgrounds and even from the same family respond very differently when they are afflicted with similar grave personal challenges or adversities. 

Why do we behave the way we do? 

Some experts point to fear of social stigma as the cause. Diseases like AIDS, lunacy, and leprosy are associated with social stigma. In a deeply conservative society like ours, there are serious consequences and repercussions associated with personal afflictions. The stigma could continue to socially impact the near and dear ones well beyond the life of the afflicted person. In such circumstances, withholding information, hiding the ailment, or denying the adversity can be understood. When COVID-19 was raging, and people at large attired in protective suits were chasing down anyone suspected of being infected, keeping the infection a secret was understandable. Heart-related conditions, diabetes or blood pressure issues are not communicable diseases and cannot be attributed to immoral living. Many people take pains to hide lifestyle diseases and even take offence at being asked. 

Some people tend to hide their problems due to fear of losing their position in society or the image of wealth and well-being they think they have in society. Not long ago, when most of us knew we needed each other, we accepted dependence on others as normal. We were open to sharing and caring materially and emotionally. It was expected and easily accepted. The growth of affluence in society has brought along a sense of omnipotence amongst us individuals. Sharing an adversity or a problem with others is nowadays perceived as an erosion of that self-assumed potency. Anyone sympathising risks being seen as a threat to that notion of adequacy. Deeply suspicious individuals, who take care to remain aloof, have nothing to do with others. They moat themselves into emotional isolation. It could even be due to the fear of loss of opportunities.  Despite easily discernible and obvious signs, people still deny loss of jobs, financial setbacks and many such adversities, hoping to recover and regain the position they think they occupy. Reasons could be any. My search narrowed down to two possible reasons, equally strong and interconnected but less discussed.

We are a deeply conservative society driven by faith, beliefs, and customs. Irrespective of how we treat religion or faith in our personal lives now, most of us have been brought up deeply religious and with the conviction that our present is the result of our past; our deeds, in this life or the ones before. Life seen through the prism of a cause-and-effect continuum in perpetuity, with an infinite repayment term to cope with, comes with the burden of servicing presumed debts of the unknown past with sufferings of the present. Effectively, we tend to believe we are suffering because we did something wrong and are now the subject of divine displeasure.  Destiny, or God's will, is what most people would call it. It may not be the case with all of us universally, but most people around us certainly subscribe to that thought. Subconsciously, we do not like to be seen as servicing debts of the past!  Imprinted deep within our DNA, the belief system that we have inherited or developed has a significant role in dictating how we respond to stimuli. The strong belief that we are reaping the fruits of our own doing drives us immediately to invoke God. We even approach crafty godmen to augment our efforts in seeking divine intervention. They immediately set about using the godsent opportunity to their best.

Most of us, if not all, grew up with the phrase, “What will others think?” It has been used by our parents and elders to effectively rein us in. Our life has evolved around the concept of external validation of right and wrong. 

What will people think when we are in the deep? The guy must have done something bad to be suffering this! Who wants to be seen as having sinned in this life or in the earlier ones? Nobody, especially the afflicted, would. There is another side to this line of thought, equally bad. People tend to think that others will be happy seeing them in a state of suffering. So, they deliberately get into denial mode to prevent others from saying, “This wasn't good enough for him!”

When I reached this stage of the article, I decided to call my friend in Mumbai and check with her my deductions. She agreed with me on what I had concluded. She, a firm believer, told me that she did not ask, “Why me?” I concede, but she would be an exception rather than a rule. 

Did she share her problem with others? 

Yes. She shared her predicament with a very few. The reason she gave me was revealing. When people come to know of an issue, the first response is normally sympathy, genuine or make-believe. The discussion has only one natural course of progression. Usually, it is about people they know and have faced similar situations, and the terrible times they went through. In the garb of providing moral support, the sympathy-talk normally puts the fear of the devil in the person who is already suffering. “I shared the news with a very few, and you were one among those few. I had not disclosed it even to my mother that time,” she replied.

“Why did you share the news with me?” I asked.

“I knew you would not put on a show of sympathy. I trusted you,” she said.

That answered it all. In times of need, there are just a few whom we can trust. Yet, we need to find someone, however helpless they may be, to share our fears and worries. Do not let our thoughts become crabs.

My friend from Mumbai and I talk whenever we feel like. We still laugh a lot. There is happiness in our conversation, even when the chips are down. 

 

PS: Gratitude to Dr Abraham Kuruvilla, a renowned counsellor, for helping me refine my thoughts on the subject.

 

Part 3: Fight About The McMahon Line

Defining India-China Relationship 

India’s War with China started on 20 October 1962, when China launched simultaneous attacks in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, then called NEFA. The war ended on 21 November 1962, when China unilaterally declared a ceasefire. China withdrew from all areas it had captured, but not from the Aksai Chin area. Official details of the month-long conflict remain largely opaque to this day in India, locked away in classified documents. However, we often come across bits and pieces, carefully curated for political returns. 

The shroud over bilateral relations between India and China notwithstanding, the two most populous neighbours remain locked in distrust and domestic denials, despite growing trade between them. The occasional glimmers of hope in the relationship often end up being extinguished by disappointments, and every photo opportunity, from the “Hindi-Chini, bhai-bhai” days to the contemporary “riverside spectacle,” eventually turned out to be harbingers of sinister outcomes. The common man in India, now by experience, firmly associates betrayal as the principal characteristic of the India-China relationship.

Source and Discourse

There are several books on the 1962 War, and all authors converge on the same set of causes. The History Division of the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, published the official history of the 1962 war, titled “History of the Conflict with China, 1962”, in 1992. Sufficient information is available in the public domain, claiming to be from this report. One can also browse and read about the stormy debates in Parliament regarding the war, where opposition members voiced their concerns, and the government responded. The intense debate in the parliament took place during the war without fear of being labelled anti-national. On 31 October 1962, 11 days into the war, Mr VK Krishna Menon, then the defence minister, resigned. On 14 November 1962, one week before the war ended, the House unanimously resolved as follows: -

 “This House records its firm opinion that the Chinese forces must evacuate the areas of India which they have illegally occupied, and declares its united determination to see that India's territorial integrity and frontier are respected and upheld.”

"The House places on record its deep appreciation of the gallantry of the officers and men of our Defence Forces who are engaged in defending our country, and assures them of its complete support."

"The House is confident that our people will face the grave emergency confronting the country with unity, determination and courage and are prepared to make any sacrifice to preserve India’s freedom and honour."

"The House solemnly declares that it stands united behind the Government in its determination to drive out the aggressor from the sacred soil of India, and to ensure that the territory of India is held and maintained inviolate.”

The Weaponised Report

The Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report, published in 1963, evokes more political interest than all the others put together. The report, authored by Lieutenant General TB Henderson Brooks and Brigadier PS Bhagat, was the result of an inquiry ordered by General J N Chaudhuri, the Chief of Army Staff, to conduct an internal operational review of the Indian Army’s performance. The report remains a classified document under the Official Secrets Act. Mr Nevile Maxwell, a British-Australian journalist, however, quoted the Henderson Brooks–Bhagat report in his book, “India’s China War,” first published in 1970. In the book, he painted India as the aggressor. Mr Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, is said to have acknowledged Maxwell's contributions in revealing the truth and benefiting China. He complimented Mr Maxwell, who was in China covering the visit of the President of Pakistan, Mr Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, in 1972.

Mr Nevile Maxwell had no love lost for India. Stationed in Delhi from 1959 to 1967 as a correspondent for The Times, he authored a series of articles ahead of the fourth Lok Sabha elections in 1967. He is believed to have written, “the great experiment of developing India within the democratic framework has failed”, and he even went on to predict that the general election to the fourth Lok Sabha would be the last.  Not easily offended and provoked as we are now, there were no protests or violent activity in India against the author, his book, or his reports. Mr Maxwell shot to fame suddenly, this time before the 2014 elections. On 17 March 2014, for reasons not difficult to fathom, he made public selected portions of the report on his website. 

The Henderson Brooks–Bhagat Report immediately kicked up a political storm with the principal opposition party asking the government to declassify the report for transparency and accountability. After all, the Nation had the right to know the truth. The Government, citing National security and operational implications, refused to oblige. In April 2014, Mr Maxwell removed the references from his website. With the elections done, the storm died. The party that demanded disclosure rode to power and has been in power ever since. Call it compulsions, the report remains classified. A classified, vaulted and buried report has political relevance. 

It has been six decades since the war. Everything about the two countries, their geopolitical positioning and strength, their military structure, hardware, armament, war fighting strategy, interdependent economy, demography, and virtually everything one can imagine has changed. We now live in an environment where satellites continuously scan every inch of land, thousands of electronic eyes are on the lookout for anything that moves or does not move, every conversation is listened to and scrutinised, and every digital footprint is critically examined. There is a saying in Malayalam, “nee manssil kanumpol, njan maanthu kanum.” It roughly means, “when you think of something, I see it in the sky.” Nothing remains hidden. None of those things from the sixties exist today as it was then. In such an environment, the report is nothing more than an archaic document, meaningless to modern warfare. 

Declassifying the age old official reports would open a debate, derive lessons, if at all, there are any relevant ones, and if someone wants to learn from those. It would also bring closure to something that we have already forgotten, but are periodically reminded of during elections. Keeping it classified only serves to capitalise electoral returns at will, through the easily infuriated.

Causes

Study of the war leads us to two causes: India’s “Flawed Forward Policy” and China’s Territorial compulsions. All the other causes attributed to the Indian side, like poor intelligence, an ill-equipped and ill-prepared Army, and political interference overriding military inputs, are all subsumed by “Forward Policy.” That brings us to three fundamental questions. These are: -

1.         What is the forward policy?

2.         Why is it considered flawed?

3.         What else should have been done?

Roots of The Forward Policy

To understand the Forward Policy, we need to first understand how it came about. 

When the Indian subcontinent was under the administrative control of the British Empire, much of the territory that lay between British India, China, and Tibet was the subject of territorial dispute. In 1913, the British decided to settle the dispute. A series of tripartite meetings took place in Shimla (then called Simla). The first meeting was on 6 October 1913, and the ninth and last was on 3 July 1914. The discussions led by Sir Henry McMahon, the foreign secretary of British India, agreed to delineate the boundary. This is now called the McMahon line. Mr Ivan Chen, the Chinese representative to the meeting, did not object to the proposed boundary. He also initialled the draft proposal. However, on 3 July 1914, at the final meeting, when Britain and Tibet signed to seal the convention confirming the McMahon line as the boundary between British India, Tibet and China, Mr Ivan Chen refused to sign. 

 

When the British handed over the reins of power to India, the land in possession of British India was automatically passed on to independent India. There was a problem. There were two claimants for the same piece of land. India had the convention documents initialled by China.  However, China refused to accept the boundaries, claiming that it had not agreed to the delineation. In our perception, the land legally belonged (and still belongs) to India, and China claimed it as a historical possession. The seeds of territorial disputes were thus sown.

Immediately after the partition, India had to handle the first Kashmir War. It also had to grapple with managing the accession of the princely states and the serious issues of internal administration. With the defeat and eventual retreat of Chiang Kai-Shek to the island of Taiwan, China became the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949. India recognised the new rule in China on 30 December 1949. The PLA, on 7 October 1950, launched an offensive against Tibet in the Chamdo region of Eastern Tibet and captured Chamdo on 19 October 1950.  The military annexation of Tibet was an indicator of China’s territorial ambitions. This became an irritant between the two countries.

After the series of negotiations referred to as the “Sino-India conference on Tibetan trade and intercourse,” the two countries signed the “Agreement on trade and intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India” on 29 April 1954. Famous as the Panchsheel agreement, enshrining the five principles of peaceful coexistence, it became the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship, giving birth to the slogan "Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai."

Meanwhile, China started construction of a road through Aksai Chin connecting Xinjiang to Tibet. India discovered this only in 1957–58. In November 1958, India lodged a diplomatic protest, but China denied that there was any infringement, claiming that the area historically belonged to China. This led to the border dispute, slowly turning into clashes between the two countries. The political situation worsened in Tibet, drawing India into direct confrontation with China. The massive Lhasa uprising was dealt with an iron hand by China, killing thousands of Tibetans, and destroying their monasteries. The Dalai Lama fled Tibet on 17 Mar 1959 and reached the safety of India on 31 March 1959. He was granted political asylum. Bilateral relations took a turn for the worse.

China’s incursions across the border became more frequent. On 7 August 1959, a Chinese patrol crossed the McMahon line, pushing back the border post at Khinzemane in NEFA. India claimed that China attacked, but China responded, saying it was the Indians who attacked. On 25 August 1959, Chinese troops crossed the McMahon line and attacked the Indian post at Longju, in NEFA, now Arunachal Pradesh.  Taken by surprise, the post withdrew, and the Chinese occupied the post. However, they vacated it later. The post was, thereafter, taken over by the Indian Army. On 28 Aug 1959, the Prime Minister, Mr Jawaharlal Nehru, reported multiple border incidents to the parliament. On 21 October 1959, an Indian patrol was ambushed by the People's Liberation Army in Kongka pass, killing nine soldiers and capturing ten, who were returned later. There was widespread protest in the country, and the Prime Minister assured the country that India’s sovereignty would not be compromised.

The diplomatic negotiations between the two countries were heading nowhere. Something had to be done to prevent China from establishing military posts in Indian territory and claiming it. The concept of the “Forward Policy" was born thus. This policy required the Indian Army to establish small forward military posts along the disputed border along the McMahon line to reassert control over the territory India claimed as its own. By the middle of 1962, about 60 such posts were said to have been created, 43 of which were to the north of the McMahon line. China responded by creating its network of posts opposite the Indian deployment and many more, leading to multiple standoffs and skirmishes.

Flaws

Critics point out that despite infrastructural deficiencies, inadequate supplies, and a lack of strategic depth, rendering Indian positions untenable, it was decided to deploy troops forward. Most posts were said to have been isolated, thinly held, and with barely any logistical backup. The Army is said to have asked for more troops but did not receive any. It is also said that the troops were given orders to fight “Last Man - Last Round.” The political decision makers are also condemned for overruling the military advice about the Army’s unpreparedness for such a war. The Forward Policy, therefore, is labelled naive and impractical.

The 1962 War was a comprehensive military defeat for India. If the outcome of the policy and its execution are the only criteria, then the policy was utterly flawed and its execution suicidal. Even after condemning the political leadership, there is scope to study the wherewithal the political leadership at that time had in their hands to decide on evaluating the efficacy of the plan/policy. 

Flaws?

Assured by the Intelligence Bureau that China will not respond militarily, the political leadership would have been led to underestimate the threat perception, if not negated it completely. Intelligence failures have been repeated. Fortunately, situations have been retrieved, albeit at huge human costs, mostly by the uniformed.

Army men who served in the mountains would be familiar with the saying that “the mountain eats up men.” Manpower will always be inadequate when it comes to high-altitude and mountain deployments. Recent military history operations would vouch for this old saying. An unstable border with Pakistan might have made it difficult for the political brass to allow thinning out the defence on the northern and western borders. The faulty intelligence assessment would certainly have aided that decision.

Inadequacy of the military hardware was another issue. If we look at the allocations by both countries towards defence, China spent a far lot more on its defence than India. It has not changed even once in the history of both countries, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP. That the Indian Army would not have got what they asked for was a natural consequence. About the Army being ill-equipped, when it is a matter of differential resource allocations, dictated by the political hierarchy, the Army has no option but to be deployed with what they have been provided with. Even today, the Armed Forces would want many things, but the purse remains with the political masters. We had a chief in the recent past who announced that “we would go to war with what we have and not with what we want.” If the higher commanders fail to voice dissent and prevent deployment, it is only because they either fail to carry out a realistic appraisal of the situation or remain silent in subservience.

If the Government, in power then, went ahead despite the advice, there would have been compulsions. What would those compulsions be? Did they have an alternative?

An Alternative?

Let us recreate the decision scenario. 

What were the options available to the leadership? They had two options. First, let things be as it is, give up our claim and let China take possession of the land they claimed was theirs. This option, if adopted, would have been an uncontested surrender of the land that we claimed was legally ours and continue to claim as ours. In that case, a war could have been avoided. The adversary would then have continued to increasingly claim and creep forward as years progressed. Surrender would have become the norm. The current generation would have never forgiven the past for not putting up a fight, irrespective of the outcome.

In that case, there was only one option available to the leadership, and that was to fight, last man last round, irrespective of what the morrow brought along. So, we fought with whatever resources we could muster and with all the ferocity that we could command. Could there be any other option available? 

Unparalleled?

In 1962, the Government of India was faced with the dilemma of deciding either to give up meekly or to put up resistance, however weak it would have been. In a situation of “damned if you do and damned if you don't,” the Government of India decided to go on the offensive. The only political and military objective of the 1962 war was to hold on to each inch of land, whatever the cost. We, armed with all the wherewithal that hindsight can provide, devoid of the burden of decision, and insulated from consequences, can sit to critique the decisions taken then. Could there have been any other decision? Everything about the war was unparalleled, then and is unparalleled, even now.

Judgement

In war, meek surrender not only brings defeat and dishonour, it pawns the dignity and honour of future generations. The only option for an honourable country was to put up a fight with whatever means it had at its disposal, even if martyrdom and defeat were the only guaranteed outcome then and scorn later. The unmatched courage and valour of our troops are worthy of eternal remembrance.  But for leaders, “uneasy lies the head that wears the crown.” It takes broad shoulders and a huge heart to take the responsibility for a defeat. Lesser mortals are incapable of doing it. Some make history winning, and some are remembered for having led in tough times.

 Let the future judge the past as always, but empowered with knowledge, kinder. 

It will be a nice gesture of gratitude to the author if you subscribe to the blog and click the "Follow" button.

 

Part 2: Future of India’s Military Operations and Lessons from the Past

 

PART 2: First War of Kashmir 1947

Change in Mind

When I first sat down to write the article, I believed I could finish it in three parts. After all, I had studied these military operations, and all it needed was putting things in an easily readable form. Once I started reading up on the material I collected, I realised, my knowledge had been confined purely to the military perspective. The canvas on which each of the military operations was conducted stretched far beyond matters of arms. Their beginnings rested in complex geopolitical vortices, and the battlefields stretched far back and far ahead. To my horror, I also realised that we find ourselves repeatedly in a state of déjà Vu, moving forward linearly but in circles. This aspect shall be discussed in the concluding part of the article, dealing with “what lies ahead for us.” 

Each operation India has undertaken demands deference. It is that deep respect and admiration for those involved in the operations that compelled me to discuss major operations one by one and share with my readers across the world the political events that led to the military interventions and outcomes.

Keeping in line with the enhanced scope and coverage, I took the liberty of changing the title of the article from “Operation Sindoor and Other Unparalleled Operations” to “Future of India’s Military Operations: Lessons from the Past.”

 

A Lingering Question

The spectrum of political issues behind the First Kashmir War is seldom discussed and therefore remains hidden. Whenever the First Kashmir War comes up for discussion nowadays, it is always served on politically coloured plates, to serve the needs of the election hour. The WhatsApp university does the rest, providing fertile grounds where half-truths, hearsay, assumptions, and lies thrive, infecting anyone in the proximity. Reluctance or inability to do serious reading, aided by the rampant presence of visuals ridden with political messaging, helps proliferate untruths, burying truth in fathomless depths.

The question that resonates most in highly charged contemporary political debates, in an ignorant, ill-informed, or misinformed environment, with outcomes on expected lines, is “Why was the military operation against the raiders in Kashmir not allowed to continue till the entire territory of Kashmir under Maharaja Hari Singh was retrieved?” The question is invariably followed up with the expression, “if only…”

To answer that all-important question, we must understand the complex political events leading up to the war and those that unfolded thereafter on both sides of the border. Armed with hindsight, seated accusingly in the knowledge of the present, and ignorant of the compulsions of the past, it is easy to judge. To be fair to the people who led the government then, I have relied on works published by authors whom I consider unbiased academics, unfettered by political compulsions, to bring to you the conditions under which the leaders of India, emerging into independence, took decisions. 

Consolidation of Territory

The years preceding or succeeding independence were unbelievably tough on the administration. According to information available in the public domain, India in 1947 had about 565 princely states within the current geographical limits of India. These states/regions were not part of British India but were semi-autonomous territories ruled by local leaders under British Suzerainty.  A sovereignty, where a state had absolute authority over all its affairs without any external interference, is different from a suzerainty, where the state and the ruler could only make local laws and were under the rule of another state or ruler for all major decisions.

The Indian Independence Act 1947, as interpreted then, gave these states the freedom to join India or Pakistan or even remain independent, once the British Suzerainty ceased. It was left to the leaders of the Indian freedom movement to motivate these rulers to join India. The process involved tough and long-drawn negotiations, assurances and promises of safety, status, income, and such other things. It is very important to understand that the process of integration was a cauldron of boiling contradictions, requiring deft handling. 

According to the information available in the public domain, states like Baroda, Bikaner, and others from Rajasthan were the first among princely states to join the Indian Union. Manipur and Jodhpur are said to have acceded to India on 11 August 1947, and Tripura on 13 August 1947. Piploda joined after March 1948, and Bilaspur on 12 October 1948. Interestingly, a few of the principalities that initially opted to join Pakistan were motivated and convinced to accede to India.  Some required a different motivation.

Sir, CP Ramaswamy Iyer, the Dewan of Travancore, the southernmost Kingdom within the boundaries of India, we now know, declared, on 11 June 1947, that Travancore would stay independent after the British left. The Indian National Congress launched the civil unrest protesting the ruler's decision. Travancore finally agreed to the accession on 30 July, but not before an assassination attempt on the Dewan. They finally ceded to India on 15 August 1947. 

Nawab Hamidulllah Khan, the Muslim ruler of Bhopal, a Hindu-majority state, reluctantly agreed to join after public unrest.  He signed the Instrument of Accession on 30 August 1947. Hyderabad, also a Hindu-majority state with a Muslim Ruler, opted for independence, but was annexed through Operation Polo in September 1948. 

Junagadh, a Hindu-majority state under a Muslim ruler, Nawab Muhammad Mahabat Khanji III, opted to join Pakistan. The choice did not please Delhi. There were severe protests in Junagadh. India imposed economic sanctions and cut off access to the state. On 24 October 1947, the Nawab fled to Pakistan, leaving the administration to the Dewan, Shah Nawaz Bhutto, father of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. On 7 November 1947, Shah Nawaz Bhutto, considering the deteriorating law and order situation, invited India to take over the administration of Junagadh. The Indian forces annexed Junagadh on 9 November 1947. In February 1948, when a plebiscite was conducted, 99% people wanted to join India. Separate polls in other areas too, found most opting in favour of India. It took many more years for India to reach the present boundary configuration. There was a lot more to consolidate.

In 1954, Indian nationalist volunteers, supported by residents, through a non-violent movement, wrested control of Dadra and Nagar Haveli from the Portuguese. These territories were administered by a local body under India’s oversight from 1954 to 1961. The Portuguese also refused to cede Goa, Daman, and Diu, the colonial territories on the western coast of India. Intense diplomatic efforts throughout the 1950s failed. India launched Operation Vijay on 18 December 1961 and annexed Goa, Daman, and Diu on 19 December 1961. After the annexation of Goa in 1961, Portugal relinquished claims, and Dadra and Nagar Haveli were formally integrated as a Union Territory in 1961.

The French agreed to cede Chandernagore, also called Chandan Nagar, a French colony, situated on the west bank of the Hooghly River, 35 km north of Kolkata, after the referendum on 19 June 1949, with 114 voting to stay with the French and 7473 voting to join India. The process was completed in 1950. In 1954, the French handed over de facto control of Pondicherry (now Puducherry), Karaikal, Mahe, and Yanam to India following negotiations and local referendums. The “de jure” (legal) transfer was formalised through the Treaty of Cession signed on May 28, 1956, and ratified by France in 1962 after parliamentary approval.

Sikkim remained an autonomous monarchy under the Chogyal, with special protectorate status under India as per the Indo-Sikkim Treaty of 1950, with external affairs, defence, and communication controlled by India. Dissatisfied with the monarchy, political unrest, led by the Sikkim National Congress and other democratic parties, erupted in Sikkim in 1973, demanding democratic governance. In 1974, elections were held after a new constitution was drafted. The Sikkim Assembly, now pro-India, passed a resolution seeking full integration with India.  This led to serious turmoil in the area. In April 1975, the Indian Army entered Sikkim, disarmed the palace guard, and placed the Chogyal (King) under house arrest. A referendum was held in Sikkim on 14 April 1975, in which over 97% of the population voted in favour of joining India. The Indian Parliament, on 16 May 1975, amended the Constitution (36th Amendment), making Sikkim a full-fledged state of India.

Territorial consolidation of India started earnestly in 1947 and, in the form we know now, was completed only in 1975. The process went far beyond the lives of many who initially led the freedom movement or the territorial consolidation immediately after independence. Irrespective of when it happened, it required a lot of negotiation, mediation, motivation, manoeuvring and even the military. Kashmir presented a different matrix altogether.

Kashmir

Kashmir, the territory between India and Pakistan, consisted of three distinct areas. The Jammu region was predominantly Hindu, the valley predominantly Muslim and Ladakh mostly Buddhist. The kingdom was ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh, a Hindu. He wanted independence from both India and Pakistan. He signed a standstill agreement with Pakistan, but India did not sign the agreement. Pakistan sensed that Maharaja Hari Singh could deliver Kashmir to India and went on the offensive on 22 October 1947. A careful reading of the history books of that time would give a clear picture of the complex and peculiar political situation Kashmir presented to Delhi. Some leaders who are now projected as having strongly wanted Kashmir in India are said to have initially told Lord Mountbatten otherwise. 

With the raiders almost at his doorstep, Maharaja Hari Singh fled Srinagar on the night of 25 October 1947 and reached his palace in Jammu. Aware of the territorial losses suffered, he signed the instrument of accession in the afternoon of 26 October 1947. A decision was immediately taken to airlift troops to Srinagar. The civil and military authorities were busy the entire night of 26 October, getting together the required number of planes, pilots, and supplies to be lifted. By the morning of 27 October, they managed to get about 100 planes. These big and small aircrafts were used for airlifting 329 soldiers of the 1 Sikh led by Lieutenant Colonel Ranjit Rai and the load required for the operation. They took off from Willingdon Airfield, Delhi, as and when each one was loaded. The authorities were not sure if the airfield at Srinagar had already fallen to the enemy.  The Colonel was therefore under instructions to circle the airfield and, in case of doubt, not land but return to Jammu. By 10:30 in the morning, Delhi received the much-awaited message that the planes had landed safely.

Meanwhile, Mohammed Ali Jinnah had already moved from Karachi to Lahore, waiting for a triumphant entry into Srinagar on 26 or 27 October, only to learn that Srinagar had been taken by the Indian forces. Jinnah immediately instructed Sir Francis Mudie, Governor of West Punjab, to telephone General Gracey, Acting Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani army, ordering him to move the Army towards Kashmir. Sir Francis Mudie obeyed Jinnah, but Gracy did not obey Mudie, telling him that he required the permission of General Auchinleck, the Supreme Commander, in Delhi, who remained in charge of all the British officers on both sides. On 28 October, General Auchinleck flew to Lahore and met Jinnah and told him that while India was entitled to send troops to Kashmir, a part of India, Pakistan could not. He also told Jinnah that if he sent troops, British nationals in the Pakistan Army would not participate. Meanwhile, Indian troops were bloodying the encroachers.  

The Elusive Answer

It is said that the military wanted permission to go ahead and capture the entire area of Kashmir that belonged to Maharaja Hari Singh before signing the instrument of accession. There are reasons to believe it, too. The battalion that landed at the airport after securing the airport advanced towards Baramulla to stop the raiders there. When they contacted the enemy, they realised that the raiders “had expert commanders, modern weapons and were in great numerical superiority.” He decided to withdraw to Pattan. Unfortunately, he was killed in action during the withdrawal.

Three more battalions of the Indian Army landed in Srinagar to defend the state's capital. About 700 raiders made a sneak attack on Srinagar on 3 November 1947. The Attack was repulsed, but not without losses. The locals also turned against the raiders because of the cruel loot, plunder, and rape they had inflicted on them. By December 1947, Indian forces were gaining ground against the tribals and Pakistani forces in Jammu and Kashmir. This led to serious discussion in Delhi about pushing the offensive further into Muzaffarabad, Mirpur and other areas held by the Pakistan forces. There were problems.

Both India and Pakistan had retained British officers in the top military positions when they gained independence. General Auchinleck was the Supreme Commander of both Indian and Pakistani forces. The supreme command was dissolved on 30 November 1947, and both countries had their own separate National commands from 1 December 1947. General Sir Francis Robert Roy Bucher, who was the Deputy Commander-in-Chief under General Auchinleck, became the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army on 1 January 1948 and served till 15 January 1949 to hand over the reins to General KM Cariappa, the First Indian Army Chief of free India.

Meanwhile, there were differences of opinion between Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and his Deputy Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel on how the state should be ruled. The issue became so intense that both Patel and Nehru offered to resign. The interaction between the two by way of letters was, however, dignified and with immense respect for each other. In the end, Vallabhbhai, as Minister of States, gave the reins of shaping India's Kashmir policy to Nehru. Nehru continued to take Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel's advice and consent on most issues regarding Kashmir. 

General Sir Francis Robert Roy Bucher advised Nehru against pursuing the offensive because he felt that the Indian Army was not yet logistically or organisationally ready for a full-scale war with Pakistan. He also cautioned the Prime Minister about the harsh winter in the Kashmir region and its impact on already-strained supply lines, which could prolong the operations and increase casualties. He advised the Prime Minister to stop the offensive and refer the case to the United Nations. It is possible that the advice was also to avoid the British officers from the unpleasant situation of being on both sides of the conflict.

Most of the negotiation with the ruler of Kashmir was based on the advice of Lord Mountbatten. The decision to approach the United Nations on the issue of Kashmir was also based on the Governor General’s prescriptions. Sardar Patel was against the reference of Kashmir to the UN and preferred timely action on the ground. While he held that idea, he did not insist because Kashmir was being handled by Nehru, who had the consent from Gandhi.

The Connected Question

Another question connected to the decision to stop the military offensive against Pakistan in 1947 is, “Why did Nehru take the Kashmir issue to the United Nations?”

The United Nations officially came into existence on 24 October 1945, following the end of the Second World War, with the noble aim of preventing future global conflicts. India, still under British colonial rule, was among the 51 founding members of the United Nations, which ratified the charter that came into force on 24 October 1945. It was those heady days when peace was romanticised and everyone thought that the UN would deliver peace from situations of conflict. There was a strong precedent suggesting effective conflict resolution by the UNSC. 

The first complaint to the United Nations Security Council came from Iran on 19 January 1946. Iran complained that the Soviet Union, which was supposed to withdraw its troops, had not done so and was interfering in its internal matters by supporting separatists. The dispute was resolved through discussion, and the Soviet Union withdrew troops in May 1946. In September 1946, Greece accused Bulgaria of a border attack and military aggression. This matter was also discussed and defused. In October 1946, the UK brought the case to the Security Council, the Corfu Channel incident, where British naval ships hit mines in Albanian waters. The UK accused Albania of laying the mines or failing to warn. It also took the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Incidentally, this became the first case ever heard at the ICJ.  ICJ ruled in favour of the UK in 1949, awarding compensation. In July 1947, the Netherlands launched a military action against Indonesian independence forces. When India and Australia raised the issue in the Security Council, the UN called for ceasefires and negotiations, eventually leading to Indonesia’s independence in 1949. With such strong precedence and India being a responsible nation, going to the UN seemed to be the right thing then. After all, the UN had not become the lifeless entity that it has become now.

On 1 January 1948, India submitted its complaint to the president of the Security Council, and it read,

“Under Article 35 of the Charter of the United Nations, any Member may bring any situation whose continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security to the attention of the Security Council. Such a situation now exists between India and Pakistan owing to the aid which invaders, consisting of nationals of Pakistan and of tribesmen from the territory immediately adjoining Pakistan on the north‑west, are drawing from Pakistan for operations against Jammu and Kashmir, a State which has acceded to the Dominion of India and is part of India. The circumstances of accession, the activities of the invaders that led the Government of India to take military action against them, and the assistance which the attackers have received and are still receiving from Pakistan are explained later in this memorandum. The Government of India request the Security Council to call upon Pakistan to put an end immediately to the giving of such assistance, which is an act of aggression against India. If Pakistan does not do so, the Government of India may be compelled, in self‑defence, to enter Pakistan territory to take military action against the invaders. The matter is, therefore, one of extreme urgency and calls for immediate action by the Security Council for avoiding a breach of international peace”

Ours to Judge

The crown of authority comes with the pain of accountability. Weighed down by fear of consequences and unimaginable imponderables, placed in an endless sea of ambiguity, and the possibility of having to eternally bear the cross for the outcome, decision-making is not easy. The hallmark of strong leaders is their ability to take bold decisions with the hope of success, knowingly pushing aside the fear of failure.  The agony of decision-making does not guarantee them kindness in judgment by future generations, especially when it is about political dividends. The toast of the town today could be burnt at the stake tomorrow, even in absentia. It is far easier to evaluate, criticise, and suggest a better way out, without having to bear the cross at all, many decades after a decision was taken. In hindsight, stopping the military advance or going to the UN did no good to us. But did they have the luxury of hindsight?

If the success of an operation is measured by outcomes, given the ambiguity and complexity of the prevailing situation, the First Kashmir War was a resounding success. If peace between India and Pakistan is still a mirage, there are other reasons. The decision to go to the UN is insignificant. In the process of understanding the evolution of modern India’s territorial boundaries, I also realised that knowledge humbles arrogance empowered by ignorance.

(Coming up in the next part -1962 Operations)

PS: 

1. The Picture  is representative of soldiers in 1947 and AI-generated.

2.  For those wanting to clarify dates and inference request post query in the comments section. I shall happily share the details and sources.