DISCOVERY OF THE DEADLY COCKTAIL - 1965 INDIA PAKISTAN WAR

 

In the previous part of the article, we dealt with the political situation in Pakistan in 1965. 

India Post-Independence

Despite the 1962 war, India's internal politics were generally peaceful. Attention was focused on the growth of the country. The country had inherited an economy in a dire state. Much of the population was living on farm-related income. Industrialisation was the need of the hour. Strong foundations had to be put in place. Political leaders of that time realised the necessity of long-term planning to ensure the nation's progress and prosperity. The concept of five-year plans was thus born. The first five-year plan (April 1951 to March 1956) was launched by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru.

Interestingly, the total outlay of the first 5-year project was ₹2,069 crores, which was later revised to ₹2378 crores. Irrigation and energy (27.2%), transport and communication (24%), agriculture and community development (17.4%), and social services, including education and health (16.6%) were the major heads for which funds were allotted. Industry and minerals received 8.4% and rehabilitation of landless farmers received 4.1% of the allocation. Everything else put together got the rest. The outcome of the five-year plan was that the economy achieved annual GDP growth of 3.6% against a modest target of 2.1%. 

The major projects that came up during this period were the Bhakra Nangal Dam, the Hirakud Dam, the modernisation of the Mettur Dam, and the expansion of the irrigation facilities. The areas of focus of the government are clear from the allocations. The second 5-year plan from April 56 to March 61 had a total outlay of 4,800 crores, a more than 100 per cent jump. In this plan, the focus shifted to developing industry and minerals, along with transport and communication, getting 65% of the total share. Agricultural and community development received 21%. Defence was not included in the allocation but was considered as a non-planned expenditure. Even today, it remains like that. War was not a planned item but a contingency forced on the country. 

The 1962 war inflicted serious injury on India's economy. The defence expenditure of ₹269.9 crore in 1959-60 increased to ₹ 310.17 crores in 60-61, ₹343.63 crores in 61-62 and jumped to ₹503.99 crores in 62-63. In 64-65, it jumped to ₹718 crores and in 66-67, it went up to ₹749 crores. This huge jump in expenditure is attributed to the direct and indirect costs of the war. Based on the recommendations of the Subrahmanyam committee after the 1962 war, defence allocations were increased. Those of us who feel that the planners and leaders misread the enemies around India and ignored the army must understand that the country was reeling under repeated droughts and failed crops. Between 1960 and 1964, India imported 17 million tonnes of food from the US. Food shortage was managed through institutionalised rationing systems. 

According to data available on educational sites, the per capita income of India in 1948-49 was ₹225, or ₹18.75 per month. In 1964-65, it was ₹481, or ₹40.09 per month. While in absolute value terms it may seem a pittance today, a growth of 114% had been achieved in 16 years; in economic terms, considering the conditions then, the growth was significant. However, there was no mistaking the fact that the country was poor and required attention for all-around development. On 1 December 1963, Nagaland became the 16^th state of India. 

Unrelated Events of Consolidation and Disruptions 

Ayub Khan, who had come to power through a bloodless coup in October 1958 and had declared himself field marshal in October 1959, assumed the presidency of the Pakistan Muslim League on 24 December 1963. With this, he consolidated his authority. There were protests, but he suppressed all the opposition.

Call it a coincidence, on 27 December 1963, a major disruption took place in Kashmir. The holy relic at Hazratbal Shrine was reported stolen. This led to a major public agitation that turned violent and threatened to spiral out of control. Radio Pakistan and Pakistani newspapers carried it as the main news and projected it as India’s deliberate disrespect for Islam and Kashmiris. One of the demands of the agitating crowd was a plebiscite. Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister, immediately stepped in and ordered an enquiry under the CBI head, Mr BN Mullick. Protests continued till the relic mysteriously reappeared on 4 January 1964. 

On 6 January 1964, the Governor of West Pakistan banned the opposition party Jamaat-e-Islami and arrested its leader, Abul Ala Maududi. Around the same time Anti anti-Hindu riots erupted in Khulna, East Pakistan. Why in East Pakistan? There was perceivable inequity in the economic growth of the GDP of East and West Pakistan. While the GDP of the West grew at 4.4% from 1960 to 1965, the East clocked in only at 2.6%. Famines and poverty were taking their toll. It was easy to turn the anger against the Hindus. Loss of the relic was just a ruse. The riots in Khulna triggered counter riots in Calcutta and other places.

Although the relic had been retrieved, crowds continued to protest. They raised doubts about the authenticity of the recovered relic. The Prime Minister immediately deputed Lal Bahadur Shastri to handle the issue. He ordered a public Deedar on 3 February 1964. Religious heads, trusted by the public, certified the authenticity of the recovered relic. It cooled tempers. 

Any sane mind would know that the relic had nothing to do with the plebiscite. The two were not even remotely connected. But the demands of the plebiscite, being raised along with the relic going missing, would not have been unintentional. Armed with the wisdom of hindsight, we can with conviction say that the first seeds of religious incitement had been sown, to be harvested, not once but again, at will and whenever it suited them. Rulers in Pakistan had discovered the easiest, cheapest, and most effective way of consolidating their position whenever domestic unrest troubled them. The deadly cocktail of religion and politics converging into covert or overt military operations was on its way.

Ever since the Hazratbal incident took place, communal and political disorder increased, and the law-and-order situation in Jammu and Kashmir deteriorated. Ghulam Mohammed, who had been the Prime Minister of Kashmir since 1953, resigned under pressure in January 1964. Khwaja Shamsuddin was sworn in as the new Prime Minister. His government fell in February 1964, and Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq, viewed as a reliable ally of the Government of India, was appointed the Prime Minister. He is believed to have played a significant role in bringing calm to Kashmir after the unrest over the Hazratbal incident. 

A Chapter in Indian Politics 

On 27 May 1964, Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru, the pivot of Indian politics since independence, passed away. He was 74 and had been in failing health after suffering a massive stroke in January 64. Nehru had been in various jails for his role in the struggle for Indian independence for a total of 3,259 days. The longest spell of his incarceration was from August 1942 to June 1945. It was during this stretch of 2 years and 10 months, in prison he authored “The Discovery of India,” one among the many he had written. An advocate of nonalignment in an era of superpower alignment, widely respected visionary statesman, prolific writer, and visionary, Nehru romanticised the concept of freedom and equality for people and laid the foundation of the country’s infrastructural growth. 

The Congress party chose Lal Bahadur Shastri as the next Prime Minister. He took office on 31 May 1964, beginning a new chapter in Indian politics. Government of India, with the concurrence of the Jammu and Kashmir State Government, as required by the Constitution, amended the 1954 Presidential Order. This political act extended the authority of the union government for the application of constitutional tools for emergencies, as it had in other states. The post of “Prime Minister” of Jammu and Kashmir was renamed as “Chief Minister.” This is considered a significant step in bringing Jammu and Kashmir more within the framework of the Constitution of India. A lot of things were happening in the neighbourhood around the same time. They all had a direct and indirect bearing on India.

Nuclear Ambitions

On 16 October 1964, China tested its first nuclear device at the Lop Nur test site in Xinjiang. The device codenamed "596" was a uranium-235 implosion fission bomb with an estimated yield of 22 kilotons. With this test, China became the fifth nuclear power. The United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France had already declared themselves nuclear powers.

At this point, it is important to bring out India’s progress in the field of nuclear technology. Homi Jehangir Bhabha, a professor at the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, had met Nehru sometime in 1944. Nehru believed that the country’s growth to be sustainable had to come from science and modernisation. Once India became independent and Nehru became the Prime Minister, he retained the Ministry of Science with him. Bhabha became the scientific advisor to the Prime Minister on atomic matters. 

The scientific policy resolution of 1948, which projected science as the tool for national development and self-reliance, is said to have been influenced by Bhabha. The Indian Atomic Energy Commission was established in 1948 with Bhabha as its first Chairman. Bhabha is said to have enjoyed near autonomous control over the atomic energy decisions under Nehru's government. In 1954, Bhabha drew up a 3-stage “nuclear power” plan. It envisaged using Thorium reserves to achieve long-term energy security. It was fully backed by Nehru. Once Nehru passed away, Bhabha did not receive the same patronage from Lal Bahadur Shastri. When China tested its nuclear device, Homi Bhabha is said to have approached the Prime Minister requesting approval for making nuclear bombs. However, Shastri did not heed the call and permitted only the pursuit of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Bhabha died in an air crash on 24 January 1966. 

Shape of Things to Come

Relations with Nepal also hit turbulence around that time. The 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship determined the contours of the bilateral relations. It ensured open borders, free movement of people between the two countries, and mutually beneficial security arrangements. However, some Nepali leaders sowed dissent, saying that the Treaty was unequal and India was dominating Nepal. India's defeat in the war with China encouraged people to look towards China. To make matters worse, King Mahendra of Nepal, who assumed direct control of the kingdom after dismissing the elected government in 1960, became close to China.

In 1965, Pakistan witnessed serious political agitations. The presidential election in January 1965 was widely considered to have been rigged in favour of Ayub Khan. The conditions called for an urgent diversion. Pakistan had already incited religious sentiments in the valley. It was time to harvest.

On 6 April 1965, Pakistani Rangers attacked the Sardar Post and the Kanjarkot Fort.  India, reeling under the defeat in the 1962 war, still in the process of reorganisation and regrouping, was caught unawares and lost ground in the beginning, but regained most of it. The clashes are believed to have peaked between 21 and 24 April. According to information available in the public domain, President Ayub Khan is said to have approached Prime Minister Harold Wilson of the United Kingdom for a ceasefire. Prime Minister Harold Wilson approached Lal Bahadur Shastri, who agreed, leading to the ceasefire on 01 May 1965. 

Once the ceasefire came into effect, both sides agreed to establish the India-Pakistan Western boundary case Tribunal, also known as the Kutch Tribunal, under the auspices of the United Nations. The Tribunal had three members, one each from India and Pakistan and one neutral member appointed in consultation with both members. Sir Huber Opperman, an Australian judge and diplomat, was selected over Sir Cyril Radcliffe, the man who drew the Radcliffe line! The Tribunal studied historical maps, various land records and the control of the ground before the operations to reach the verdict. On 19 February 1968, in one of those rare conclusive Tribunal awards, Pakistan was awarded 910 square kilometres of the 9000 square kilometres they had claimed in the Kutch.

The Kutch operations emboldened Pakistan. It would also have led India to believe that Pakistan would not wage war anytime soon. A ceasefire had just been reached, and the talks about border settlement were proceeding well. The Kutch operation strengthened Ayub Khan’s position in the country. He decided to take it further. Kashmir was the easiest way forward. The grounds had been prepared. President Mohammad Ayub Khan decided to wrest control of Kashmir. Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar in August 1965.

Rethink

Operation Gibraltar is considered by most people as the cause of the 1965 operations. While their wisdom cannot be questioned, the offensive launched by the Pakistani Army Rangers in April 1965 cannot be seen in isolation from the war that followed. In fact, it was the Kutch operations that led to Operation Gibraltar, though they were geographically distant.

Looking back into history, one can see that internal disturbances in Pakistan and a security issue in India are like Siamese twins. 

We will see more of it as we proceed…  

 

(To be continued)

 

ON OUR JOURNEY IN SEARCH OF THE UNPARALLELED – THE 1965 WAR

 

Ferocity, in battles on the land and duels in the air, was the hallmark of the second Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. Many books have been written, on both sides of the border, about the war and its battles, both in the air and on the land. Carefully researched facts, figures, and diagrams outlining the progress of operations lend an essence of authority to the work. Each story, replete with grit and valour, with all the attendant ghastly details finely woven in, makes compelling narratives that deify domestic military heroes and demonise the adversary. Straying from the truth while writing about battles is an honourable compulsion, soaked in nationalism. After all, war has never been about absolute truth, and history, the narrative of the victor. 

But what happens when both parties declare themselves victors? Deja Vu?

This article, like the previous three on India’s unparalleled wars, will not take us through individual battles. We will navigate mostly through the causes to understand what happened, briefly touching upon the war, in search of unparalleled aspects. The war is said to have begun on 6 September 1965 when India launched a full-scale counterattack across the international border and headed towards Lahore. It ended in a Soviet brokered ceasefire declared on 22 September 1965. Ironically, both countries declared themselves the winners in the war. Sensing parallels and the unparalleled?

The term “counterattack” clearly indicates that there was an attack by Pakistan on India, to which India responded. Why would Pakistan attack India in 1965, out of the blue? The obvious answer that everybody can easily peddle is that the unfinished Kashmir business had to be completed. After all, the previous war, fought in 1947, was about Kashmir.  The United Nations Security Council Resolution 47 of 21 April 1948 had brought the first war to a ceasefire operative on 1 January 1949. Resolution 47 was only an expansion of Resolution 39, adopted on 20 January 1948. Resolution 39, the second on the Kashmir dispute, was to investigate the issue, bring out the facts and recommend ways to settle the differences between the two parties. Resolution 47 now mandated the three-step process of ceasefire, withdrawal of troops and plebiscite. Both parties were to withdraw all their military forces from the area. Claims and counterclaims aside, demilitarisation never happened. The first step was never taken. There were 12 resolutions on Kashmir before the war, mostly on issues brought up by Pakistan. All these resolutions either set conditions for the process to move forward or reaffirmed what had already been said. Interestingly, the last resolution on Kashmir before the 1965 was Resolution 209, adopted on 4 September 1965 was passed after the Pakistani Troops had crossed into the Rann of Kutch. 

Was the 1965 war, therefore, the result of Pakistan’s frustration with 16 years of waiting? 

Well, let us explore a little more before we form an opinion.

On 28 September 1965, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in his speech in the United Nations General Assembly, complained that Pakistan had repeatedly approached the Security Council since 1948 for a solution and that it had exhausted peaceful diplomatic means. That speech certainly said nothing about their efforts to demilitarise the area. Delivered after the war, it was more of a justification of the misadventure. Only the gullible would fall for this explanation. If military action was the way out, it could have happened just after 1962. India was at its weakest militarily and economically. If Pakistan had launched an attack simultaneously with the China war, it would have had a major impact on India. Politically, India was also weak at that time.

War is the military implementation of a political decision. Wars do not originate out of nothing. It commences when one country feels that either the conditions of the adversary are conducive or favourable enough to launch an offensive, or when domestic conditions warrant a move against the adversary.  When the military leader is himself the political head, the distance between decision and execution diminishes. Waging war then becomes the first and easiest option. While the conditions within India would have been favourable for Pakistan to launch an attack then, it did not happen. Certainly, something else would have been the reason.

Let us look for it.

The post-independence march of the country with Mohammad Ali Jinnah as its first Governor General ceased in 1948 with his death. Said to have been diagnosed with tuberculosis in 1930, he developed lung cancer and died on 11 September 1948, barely a year after Pakistan had won independence. Pakistan plunged into a very turbulent period of power transfer. Khawaja Nazimuddin became the second Governor General of Pakistan, and Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, already the prime minister, with Mohammed Ali Jinnah, continued in office. On 17 January 1951, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan made Mohammad Ayub Khan a general and the first commander-in-chief of the Pakistan army, replacing General Sir Douglas Gracy. Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated on 16 October 1951.

The assassin, Saad Akbar Babrak, an Afghan National, was shot dead immediately, and the reasons for the assassination, undiscovered or undisclosed, were buried with him. Incidentally, Liaquat Ali Khan had survived an attempted coup in March 1951. Khwaja Nazimuddin, the Governor General of Pakistan, became the Prime Minister. Gulam Mohammed, the finance minister, was appointed as the Governor General. On 23 March 1956, Pakistan became an Islamic Republic, and the office of the Governor General was replaced with that of the President. Major General Iskander Mirza (retd) became the first President of Pakistan. Meanwhile, governance had deteriorated, and the common man had started feeling the impact. The divide between various regions of the country aggravated, leading to political instability.

Meanwhile, Pakistan exploited the Cold War conditions to beef up its military hardware. On 19 May 1954, it signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement (MDAA) with the USA in Karachi. The USA, in pursuit of the Truman Doctrine to contain communism, found the geographical proximity of Pakistan suited to its plans against the Soviet Union and China. India was not willing to play second fiddle to the US in their Cold War efforts. MDAA fetched Pakistan tanks, fighter planes, transport planes, radar systems and naval ships. Pakistani military officers went to the US for training. 

Pakistan received more than $900 million worth of military equipment, effectively bridging the military hardware disparity it faced after partition. Interestingly, all this military hardware, according to the agreement, was to be used exclusively for internal security, legitimate self-defence or participation in the United Nations’ duties. (Rings a familiar bell? The USA did that again later. Starting January 1983, Peace Gate 1 Program delivered 28 F-16 A, 12 F-16 B, besides other military hardware to Pakistan, all for counter terrorist and counterinsurgency operations. In February 2025, the Trump administration released $ 300 out of the $ 450 million funds sanctioned by the Biden Administration in September 2022.) 

On 7 October 1958, the President of Pakistan abrogated the constitution, dismissed the central and provincial governments, declared martial law and appointed General Mohammed Ayub Khan, then the army commander-in-chief, as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. On 27 October 1958, hardly a fortnight later, Ayub Khan removed Mirza, in a bloodless coup, exiled him to London and became President himself. He also retired from the army that day! Since the public was already dissatisfied with how the country was run, the coup seems to have been welcomed. President Ayub Khan introduced many land reforms and strengthened the relationship with the United States.

On 27 October 1959, Ayub Khan’s presidential government declared him a Field Marshal. On that same day, the government also introduced a system called “Basic Democracy”. The country was divided into 80,000 “Basic Democratic” units, and each such unit was to elect one representative called the “Basic Democrat.” Pakistan now had 80,000 local representatives to ensure grassroots governance. In 1962, through the newly promulgated constitution that advocated a presidential system, Ayub Khan consolidated power in his hands. Despite curbs on political freedom, Pakistan under Field Marshal Ayub Khan achieved significant economic growth. The benefits of the modernisation and industrial growth seemed to favour West Pakistan. East Pakistan felt politically and economically marginalised, and the divide between the two became glaring. 

On 13 October 1962, one week before China attacked India, Pakistan commenced negotiations with China over disputed territories. The talks culminated in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Chen Yi, the two foreign ministers, signing the Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement on 2 March 1963. China ceded about 750 square miles while Pakistan gave away more than 2,050 square miles, mostly in the Gilgit-Baltistan area that India claimed ownership. China also gave $60 million interest-free loan to support Pakistan’s economy and strengthen military cooperation.

On 2 January 1965, Pakistan went in for a presidential election. The electoral college of 80,000 Basic Democrats voted. The public had nothing to do with the election. The main contestants were Mohammad Ayub Khan and Fatima Jinnah, the sister of the founder of Pakistan, backed by a coalition of all the opposition parties. Ayub Khan is said to have polled 49,951 votes. Fatima Jinnah, who contested as the mother of the nation, gathered only 28,691 votes. The other two contestants, both independents, Mahmud Ali Kasuri, polled 2,847, and Ghulam Muhammad Sadiq got 1,106.  The total number of votes polled exceeded the official electoral college by 2,595. Naturally, there were complaints of vote manipulation in favour of the sitting president. This led to widespread agitation alleging rampant vote rigging. The urban areas of West Pakistan and most areas of East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh) saw protests. The public turned against the ruler, and Ayub Khan's legitimacy as the President took a severe blow. Something was required to quell the rising discontentment and opposition and redeem the trust of the public in the presidency. Uniting the country against an existential threat was the best way forward.

Meanwhile, India had already lost a war with China. Conditions were perfect now.

Would Kashmir be the objective? We will find out in the next part.

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(To be continued…)

 

Part 1: India's Unparalleled Military Operations

 

The Many Roads to Rome 

Operation Sindoor continues to be a popular topic of discussion among military thinkers, policymakers, arms manufacturers, and the self-proclaimed vocal strategic affairs experts proliferating over the equally expanding audio-visual modes of communication. Every aspect of the operation continues to be flogged emotionally with  intentional or inherent bias, but with louder claims of being bias less. The common refrain in all these discussions and analyses is that Operation Sindoor was a multidomain operation combining military precision with diplomatic and strategic messaging, unparalleled in the history of independent India. 

Let us first be on even keel on ‘multi-domain’ that experts now endlessly talk about. According to me, ‘multi domain’ typically includes the well-known conflict domains of land, maritime, air, and the recently evolved realms of cyber, information, space, electromagnetic spectrum, intelligence, and now the all-pervasive narrative and optics management. The presence of so many individual domains matters, but their amalgam becomes a force to reckon with only when there is interoperability among them, ensuring synchronised application before and during the operation. Each expert adds his or her own set of arguments to arrive at the destination many others have already reached. Finally, everybody agrees that OP Sindoor was exceptional and unparalleled. All roads lead to Rome.

Could there be another road, one not leading to Rome?

The Comparison Matrix

How do we describe any event as unparalleled? We compare other events and find nothing similar, or when there are similar events, the unparalleled one stands far beyond comparison. How do we describe a specific military operation as unparalleled in the history of independent India? The verdict must come after a comparison with all the other military operations independent India has undertaken. How do we compare operations? What should be the comparison matrix? Should it be on the range of weaponry used or the modes of delivery? Should it be on the superiority of the means used? Should it be on the length of the operation or its geographical reach? Should it be based on a specific aspect like surprise? Should it be on the quantum of destruction caused to the enemy? Should it be based on what the political or strategic aim of the operation was?

A mission is successful if all the aims for which it was launched have been achieved. Everything else, plans, tactics, targets, weaponry, logistics, innovations, inventions, and technology available and employed are mere means to the end. Means do not matter in war, where anything but success is meaningless. It is the outcome and outcome alone that matters. Comparison should therefore be done on a common denominator of the outcomes of the operations weighed against the intentions with which they were launched. In other words, have the political and strategic aims set for the operation been achieved?  Everything else remains secondary. But there are problems associated with this approach. 

It would be easy if political and strategic aims were explicitly enunciated or declared before the commencement of an operation. It seldom happens. However, when an operation is in progress, political and military authorities make announcements for the consumption of both domestic and foreign audiences. Some announcements are meant specifically for the adversary. The academia or strategic affairs experts can deduce the political and military aims from the maze of these public utterances. Military aims can be deduced from the objectives or targets chosen. Experts can reverse-link military objectives to reasonably assume the political aim behind an operation. Luckily, in the case of some of the recent operations, political aims were enunciated.  

What about comparing military capabilities and technologies employed? Don't they matter?

If we have a capability, it is meant to be used. Otherwise, the presence of such capability, like nuclear warheads, must ensure deterrence. Capability in the stable with no impact is as good as not having it. Comparison of capabilities employed in operations separated by a long period may not be an objective evaluation. Exponential growth of technology measured over an incremental linear scale of time can be brutally biased against the past. To make the statement easy to visualise, imagine telling Gen Z about a time when people normally stood in lines at night to make an STD call. They may not call us primitive or laugh in our face out of respect. Likewise, given the evolution of technology, adaptation, aggregation, and weaponisation, the array of weapons deployed will remain incomparable. On the technology front, the next operation will be ages ahead of the last operation. Comparison, therefore, would be best served by analysing the political and strategic aims and checking if those have been achieved by diplomatic or military means. Knowing the context of the operation will aid in understanding the political and military aims of that operation.

Operations of Independent India

The military operations India has undertaken can be divided into two specific groups. The first one consists of all the wars starting with the First Kashmir War and ending with the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971. All these were full-fledged wars or those that led to full-fledged wars. The second group consists of military operations, starting with Operation Meghdoot and ending with Operation Sindoor, which were limited operations. Irony or coincidence, Operation Meghdoot has not been officially declared closed, but the military face off continues with ceasefire conditions in place, whereas Operation Sindoor has officially been declared, suspended, and NOT terminated, but without any military actions.

Each of the operations will be taken up to evaluate how well the political and military aims that drove the operation were achieved.  Let us start from the first operation of Independent India.  

First Kashmir War. 

When India gained independence in 1947, the British gave the rulers of the princely states the freedom of choice to join India, Pakistan, or remain independent. On 12 Aug 1947, the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir under Maharaja Hari Singh sent a telegram to the authorities of Pakistan and India seeking a ‘standstill agreement’, hoping to remain independent from India and Pakistan. Pakistan responded positively on 14 /15 August. India did not reply, as parleys were on to motivate him to join the Union of India. Legally and technically, Kashmir was still not a part of Independent India. Unknown to the ruler, in breach of the standstill agreement, Pakistan planned to invade and capture Kashmir. On 12 September 1947, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, permitted the launch of Operation Gulmarg. 

About 20,000 tribal fighters, organised into lashkars or militias of 1000 men each, trained and armed by the Pakistani army, crossed the border into Kashmir. They attacked, looted areas on the way and on 22 October 1947, captured Muzaffarabad. Meanwhile, one group of raiders had already occupied the commanding heights of Zojila. The only access to Leh-Ladakh was also threatened. On 26 October, they attacked Baramulla. Srinagar was their intended destination. It is very important to understand this context of the operation. Maharaja Hari Singh was still the ruler of the sovereign Princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, consisting of regions of Jammu, Kashmir Valley, Ladakh, Gilgit Baltistan and many parts of the currently Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. With the enemy fast approaching the gates of his capital and fearing his capture and a certain end at the hands of the marauders, Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947, officially making Jammu and Kashmir and all parts of his Kingdom, including those under the control of the raiders, an integral part of India. 

The moment Maharaja Hari Singh signed the instrument, the entire geographical area that was once the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir became part of India. The Government of India now had to do everything possible to safeguard the integrity and sovereignty of the country. The army airlifted two companies of the 1st Battalion, The Sikh Regiment and landed them at the Srinagar airport on 27 October 1947. They immediately went about the counteroffensive. In a historic first in the history of warfare, the 13-tonne Stuart tanks from the 7th Light Cavalry were most audaciously deployed to engage the enemy entrenched in Zojila heights. The tanks moved to their operational location through equally audacious innovation in transportation. A series of operations were launched across Kashmir by the Indian Army, and the enemy was beaten back. The war ended with a ceasefire brokered by the United Nations. The concept of the “Line of Control” came into being.

What would have been India’s political aim?  

There are no documents in the public domain that can give an official version of the strategic or political aims. At best, we can deduce from the events that took place.

Was it about saving Maharaja Hari Singh? He, having chosen to remain away from India, had asked for a standstill agreement.

Defending India’s territorial integrity? Purely in legal terms, India’s sovereignty had not been threatened directly since that area technically became India only on 26 October 1947. We took over what was available after what the ruler lost to Pakistan. 

Prevent the expansion of the Pakistani estate? Certainly. 

Expand the Indian borders beyond what was handed over and consolidate geographically? Likely, though still undeclared.

Saving Kashmiris from the plunderers? Yes, maybe.

There can be differing versions of defining success or failure, especially in connection with this operation. Expecting the political masters of those times, having won freedom through nonviolence, to militarily annexe the princely state immediately after gaining independence goes against logic. It will be fair to the people then to grant them the credit for adding real estate, redrawing the geographical boundary of the country, and enhancing our strategic depth, through negotiation and diplomacy. They did it at the first possible moment, even when the embers of the biggest human migration in history were still alive. It will be illogical to blame them for the loss of territory that Maharaja Hari Singh brought upon himself. This is one narrative that filled its sails with the contemporary political winds. Why did the army not capture the entire geographical territory that was under Maharaja Hari Singh? The geographical boundary in the above question can be shifted West or North, depending on the convenience. The answer, on the strength of hindsight, lies in the fact that the further West or North we added, that much more chaos, lawlessness, and poverty would have been added to the country. 

To be just and fair, the planners must be credited for their foresight and quick response. They gathered adequate intelligence and prepared the troops and tanks to be moved. Imagine airlifting two companies from Delhi hours after signing the Instrument of Accession. Imagine moving a column of tanks by road, over rickety bridges from Jammu to Zojila without losing surprise. Looking at the operation dispassionately, it is evident that the operation was guided by clear political and strategic aims of territorial gains and holding on to them. To that extent, the military aims were achieved too. That operation remains unparalleled in Indian History, not because it was the first one in independent India, but for the foresight, well-prepared contingencies, audacious aims, quick planning, courageous execution, and for achieving the political and operational aims.

Locked with inimical neighbours ever willing to needle, India was destined for more.

To be Continued in Part 2

Pixels of an Emerging Picture: Understanding Operation Sindoor (Part – 3)

 

A Dissection

 

The terrorist incident and India’s response, in time, will become statistics, like the previous ones. However, the objectives of the operation and the modus operandi adopted will become the subject of intense scrutiny by the militaries of the world. When two militaries come face to face, the optics of the hardware array and application strategy can be captivating. The social media, print and visual media are sizzling with conspiracy theories, propaganda in favour of one and against the other, depending on who is initiating it. But beyond the brute force, chest thumping, media carnage and the fleeting exuberance of public euphoria fanned by politicians, exists the reality of strategic victory. It is worthwhile to analyse the entire event to understand the long-term impact it has on each country.  

Pakistan's army has led Pakistan to comprehensive defeats against India in all the confrontations between the two countries. No country, however irrational, initiates an adverse action against another without political reasons. Therefore, it is logical to believe that the Pakistan army must have drawn up some objectives while strategising the attack. What could those have been? How successful were they in achieving them? While time will tell us the truth, we can make some intelligent assumptions, with as much objectivity as possible.

Pak Objectives and Evaluation of Success

Win or Lose – Regain Relevance.

Pakistan was created using the Two-Nation theory, which identifies, differentiates, and discriminates against human beings based on religion. General Asim Munir’s speech leaves no room for doubt about the deep divide that Pakistan holds about other religions. It is well established that anti-India sentiments not only unite Pakistanis but also help drive the country. The Pakistan army runs that country. However, if the recent developments within the country were any indication, the stock of Pakistan’s armed forces had plummeted. They needed something worthwhile to shore up their image. Clear prospects of a military defeat notwithstanding, there is nothing better than a direct military confrontation with India to come out as Pakistan’s saviour once again.

Victory and defeat in battle can be debated. Despite the irrefutable military losses suffered by them this time again, Pakistan's social media peddles the myth that Pakistan has decimated India. The domestic audience seems to believe that their army saved them from India. Believe or dispute anything you want to, but there can be no disputing the fact that the Pak Army has once again succeeded in positioning itself as the saviours of Pakistan. Pakistan Army has regained relevance despite an irrefutable military loss. Immediate objective achieved!

Resumption of Dialogue with India.

When two countries go into conflict, only a dialogue between the two can conclude or halt the conflict. Since 2016, India has refused Pakistan an opportunity for any formal dialogue. Whether bilaterally agreed or through a third-party mediation, India agreeing to a talk between two government functionaries, this time the respective DGMOs, has essentially obtained for Pakistan what India had been denying it all this while. The outcome of the discussion might be anything, but Pakistan has wrested from India what India had been steadfastly denying Pakistan.

Immediate objective achieved! 

Indo-Pak Hyphenation.

It was common practice for the world at large to hyphenate Pakistan with India. However, growing economic disparity, vastly different internal security situations, ease of doing business, and safety of foreign investments have, over the years, reduced the instances of the Western world hyphenating the two adversaries. With Ms Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, explicitly articulating the de-hyphenation policy in 2005, and an aggressive strategy followed by the BJP Government since 2014, India had achieved a great degree of de-hyphenation. However, with this one terrorist attack, Pakistan has succeeded in slowing the process and, to an extent, re-hyphenating the two adversaries despite India’s overwhelming response.

Short-term objective achieved! 

Kashmir to Fore again.

Pakistan had been attempting to internationalise the Kashmir issue in every possible forum and whenever possible. India had been successful in thwarting their attempts almost every time. However, the armed conflict and the likelihood of a military flare-up between two nuclear neighbours have brought Kashmir to the fore again, raising a new challenge to Indian Diplomacy.

Immediate objective achieved! 

Deepen Religious Divide in India. 

India has been going through some amount of inter-religious turmoil.  The selective targeting of Hindu males immediately sent a deeply disturbing and provocative message across the country. It could easily have spiralled out of control, deepening the divide and sowing the seeds of civil unrest. While there were some untoward incidents of targeted attack against the minority community, the country, by and large, remained peaceful and united.  The local population of Kashmir displayed a brilliant example of National Unity, coming out in large numbers against the terrorists.

The objective was not achieved.

Spinoffs 

Terrorism as an Instrument of Foreign Policy.

The terrorist attack and the funeral of known terrorists attended by senior civil and military functionaries have once again confirmed that Pakistan considers terrorists an extension of its military and pursues terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy. Not only has the attack confirmed the efficacy of its strategy, it succeeded in garnering the requisite traction in its favour. As the cradle and fountainhead of terrorism, the attack in Pahalgam also serves as a message to the other countries in the world about Pakistan’s capability to wage this mode of warfare anywhere. Distances may be a source of comfort for many, but it does serve one well to remember that plague spreads. 

Reaffirmation of International Support.

China and Turkey came out in open support of Pakistan; so did Bangladesh. India received support from some, but couched in diplomatic semantics and nuances. It is impossible that Pakistan planned this operation without the intelligence services of the developed countries getting wind of it. While no accusations are being made against any agencies for having given tacit support or approval to the Pakistani plan, the failure of those intelligence agencies to alert Indian Agencies, which anyway did not get even a whiff of it, does not augur well for India. 

Milking Geographical Advantage

Pakistan has its borders with Iran, Afghanistan, and China, making it a springboard for those with close ties with it. Despite its double game and terrible ways, Pakistan is still sought after by the Western world and China because of its strategic location. They all need Pakistan’s real estate for their strategic purpose. Therefore, the world does not want to see a failed state descending into disintegration. That is one reason, no major Western power openly came in support of India. 

Indian Objectives

The Indian response to the terrorist attack, prima facie, had one political objective: “message Pakistan and all the terrorist organisations within Pakistan and POJK, that India will not hesitate to reach any place in Pakistan to get them.” The military aims, therefore, were in pursuance of this political diktat. This message has amply been driven home unambiguously to Pakistan and to the whole world.

Objective achieved.

Spinoffs

Redefining the response threshold. Now on, India does not differentiate between acts of terrorism and military action against it. It has bracketed nonstate actors, state, and terror proponents, all into one. The threshold for retaliation has been redefined, at least for now. We also demonstrated our willingness to use our military across the IB and LoC and accept the risks involved.

Unity in diversity. With the country facing adversity, all political parties buried their differences and supported the ruling party. Unity is possible even against odds.

Make-in India Competency. The response gave India the room to war-test its homegrown armoury and technology, and prove the efficacy of its AD shield. It proved to the world that the Indian arsenal is world-class. Considering the accuracy and extent of damage inflicted on targets by the Indian missiles, it is reliably learned that many countries are seeking to purchase ‘Made in India” weapons, especially missiles.

Digital shaping the battlefield. The conflict had a huge segment of digital warfare that both sides used to shape the battlefield in their own favour. Over the 48 hours since 7 May, India had gradually gained dominance and held sway over the adversary.

Joint Manship. The three services gave an exemplary demonstration of jointness through the seamless interoperability of various platforms. Planners can now sit to refine them.

Nuclear bluff. Exposing the Nuclear bluff, Operation Sindoor created a space to conventionally tackle a nuclear Pakistan and yet keep it under the nuclear threshold. It will be irrational to expect Pakistan to adhere to reason. One can never rule out a desperate Pakistan resorting to a nuclear launch. The planners will do well to strategise how that threat can be managed.

AD Resources. In the 48 hours of military engagement, India successfully laid to waste most of the launching pads and the air defence resources of Pakistan. Though all that will be repaired and made usable, it will cost Pakistan a lot. It will also force Pakistan to commit more resources to them. One school of thought says that India had destroyed Pakistan’s war-waging capability.

Forcing the enemy to move troops. With troops being diverted to the Indian front, the western part of Pakistan became more vulnerable.  This indirectly helped the Baloch freedom fighters to exploit the gaps in Pakistani defences. This has helped India militarily. 

Days Ahead 

One of the most repeatedly asked questions is, “Will the ceasefire hold? How long will it last?”

It is one of the easiest sets of questions to answer. History will repeat itself, and Pakistan cannot help but violate our borders. The only question left to answer is, when would that be? The objectives that they had in mind when they started the terrorist attack remain relevant and current. It will force Pakistan to strike again.

In the meantime, it will do well for India to publicly define which terrorist activity would be considered an act of war. It would also serve the country well if the required responses were well defined, tasked, and resources kept ready for instant retribution. This becomes very important because we have already progressively ratcheted up our responses.

Now, if Pakistan does something, they would have already prepared themselves for the Indian responses. Our retribution will have to be few screws tighter and yet keep the region safe.

The situation that has evolved from the combat situation presents a fresh set of challenges to the strategists. But isn’t it easier to follow the time-tested saying, “prevention is better than cure?” The sudden call to action must have also thrown up many challenges. Planners must have taken note of it, too. Without getting blown away by the euphoria of success, it may serve India well if all the lessons are faithfully and truthfully recorded, studied and remedials determined.

Operation Sindoor has not officially been concluded.

Pixels of an Emerging Picture: Understanding Operation Sindoor (Part – 2)

 

Anatomy Of The Act And Its Retribution

 

The Pahalgam Carnage and Its Retribution

Only on 15 April 2025, General Asim Munir, Pakistan’s Army Chief, speaking at the first annual convention of Overseas Pakistanis in Islamabad, reminded the audience of the two-nation theory that brought Pakistan on the map of the world and the unbridgeable gap between Muslims and Hindus.  In his speech, filled predominantly with anti-India rhetoric, he called Kashmir the jugular vein of Pakistan. Whether Munir’s remarks triggered the incident or it was the go-ahead signal for a preplanned carnage will remain debatable, but it was a sign of something sinister cooking. In just seven days, it became visible.  

On 22 April 2025, four terrorists appeared from the shadows, in Baisaran Valley near Pahalgam in J&K, approached unarmed tourists enjoying the time of their lives, asked them to recite the Kalma, the Islamic declaration of faith, and shot point blank those men who could not, and told the shocked ladies accompanying them to tell the authorities what happened. The terrorists vanished into the shadows after taking the lives of 26 innocent Indian men, 25 of them non-Muslims. The lone Muslim, a local, who resisted them was killed. 

Shocked beyond words, and emotions flaring, Indians called for retribution. The Government of India, having delivered what was considered an “appropriate military response” on two occasions before, had no option but to deliver an even more spectacular, visible, and harsher response. The Prime Minister promised the Nation the Government’s resolve to pursue each man involved in the act and those who abetted or aided ‘to the ends of the earth,’ and bring them to suffer the consequences. The Resistance Front (TRF), an offshoot of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), claimed responsibility and cited its opposition to India allowing non-local settlements in Kashmir. Pakistan immediately washed its hands of the incident, calling it a freedom struggle. Pakistan reminded the Indians and the world at large that they were a nuclear power and ready to face any military challenges. The TRF retracted their claim, saying that their account had been hacked. The nation waited eagerly for the retribution to unfold. Meanwhile, television channels and social media were on fire with propaganda and counterpropaganda from both sides. A showdown was inevitable. 

Indian response was measured, proportional, and calibrated with increasing severity. The first ones came in the form of diplomatic moves. India suspended the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 until Pakistan stopped its support for cross-border terrorism. The treaty had survived all the wars and turbulence between the neighbours till then, and its suspension had the colours of a military-like swift counterattack.  India also imposed a travel ban for Pakistani nationals under the SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme, cancelled all existing visas, and issued a 48-hour departure order for Pakistani nationals in India. It also expelled Pakistan's defence attachés from the Pakistani High Commission in India and reduced the diplomatic staff strength from 55 to 30. On their part, Pakistan asked India to share the evidence to support the allegations and proposed an international inquiry by a third party. India rejected the call.  

In response to the Indian action, Pakistan suspended the Shimla agreement (1972), closed its air space to Indian Airline companies, reduced the Indian diplomatic strength, suspended all trade with India even through third countries, and declared that any diversion of water from the Indus water would be considered as an act of War. In the meantime, the two armies started to exchange heavy artillery fire at the border. Thereafter, events unfolded one after the other, unlike ever before. 

India imposed a temporary lockdown in Pahalgam, deployed army helicopters to track militants in the Pir Panjal range, and demolished the residences of two suspects linked to the attack. On 27 April, the local media in Muzaffarabad, PoJK reported flooding in the Jhelum River due to India’s unannounced release of water from the Uri Dam. The Chenab River in Sialkot, Pakistan, also saw a sharp decline in water levels, with satellite imagery showing a drying riverbed. Independent observers called it the first water war between the two neighbours.

As temperatures between the two rivals rose, the United Nations and the USA, besides other countries, called for restraint. India rejected mediation offers made by other countries. With each passing day, the call for military action against Pakistan became louder in India. The military response took time. On 5 May, India’s Ministry of Home Affairs announced a nationwide civil defence drill for May 7 across 244 districts, the first since 1971, involving air raid sirens, blackout measures, and civilian evacuation training. Pakistan closed schools in its Kashmir region and Punjab province. Pakistan announced that an Indian military action was imminent and vowed to teach India a lesson if it dared to. The element of surprise in any military action revolves around the quantum and type of force, geographical point of application, the mode and precise time of its delivery. 

Some experts opine that, by giving reaction time to Pakistan, India allowed the adversary to move its vulnerable terrorism assets away from all the likely points of response. The optics around the intended countermeasures certainly raised hopes amongst the domestic audience, but some experts feel that it gave away the surprise. If the initial advantage was with the aggressor, the respondent had the choice of time on targets. Armchair experts from the comforts of their cocoons debated for and against every aspect of the likely response while those in the real hot seats busied themselves shaping the response. Surprise was the key, and surprise was achieved.

On 7 May, Indians woke up to Operation Sindoor, the name conspicuous enough to indicate revenge for the lost vermilion of widowhood. Past midnight of 6 May, India rained missiles on 24 targets in nine locations, all in a matter of 25 minutes. India targeted the terrorist infrastructure in Muzaffarabad, Kotli, Bhimber, Gulpur, Chak Amru and Bag, located in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Indian munitions also reached mainland Pakistan. In Pakistan’s Punjab province, India targeted Markaz Subhan Allah, the JeM headquarters, and a significant economic hub in Bahawalpur, besides Markaz Taiba, a critical operational base for LeT located in Muridke, Mahmoona Joya facility linked to Hizbul Mujahideen in Sialkot, and a JeM facility in Sarjal Tehra Kalan. 

Indian missiles, glide bombs, and loitering munitions penetrated Pakistan’s elaborate air defence cover to find and decimate designated targets. India declared that its response was categorically against terrorist infrastructure, and claimed no Pakistani military facilities were hit. India also made it clear that the conflict would not escalate if Pakistan did not climb the escalatory ladder. That was not to be.

Pakistan called the Indian retaliation a “violation of international law.” It reported more than 30 civilian deaths, including a three-year-old girl and alleged that India targeted civilian areas, including mosques and a hydroelectric dam. Pakistan also claimed that it shot down three Indian Rafale jets, one Mig-29, one Su-30 MKI, and 77 Israeli-made Harop drones. India denied losses, claiming Pakistan’s jets were intercepted outside Indian airspace. This engagement was unlike any before. The military hardware mostly remained within its own borders, but payloads went deep within. Drones swarmed the skies at night from both sides, luring the adversary to expend valuable air defence resources. On 8-9 May night, Pakistan launched Operation Bunyan al-Marsus targeting Indian cities, including Amritsar, with drones and missiles. India successfully neutralised all of them. India successfully carried out SEAD/DEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defence / Destruction of Enemy Air Defence) operations targeting deep into Pakistan and crippling its air defence resources and airfields.  

Claims, counterclaims, threats, and counter-threats flooded the entire spectrum of media. Citizens from both sides joined the battle with fake videos and propaganda on their own. While the armies fought for military supremacy, common people, skilled in the use and misuse of the internet, lugged it out against each other in web space. The mere scale of web activity might turn one day be reported as unprecedented. Prolongation of the battle would have turned Pakistani airspace unusable for its own air force. An even bigger surprise was in store!

Mr Donald J Trump, the President of the USA, suddenly announced on Truth Social, his own SM platform handle, that the two countries would stop hostilities and cease fire. Soon after that, both countries announced cessation of military activities with effect from 5 PM IST that day. India made it clear that Operation Sindoor has not been concluded, but it was merely a cessation of military activities, subject to how Pakistan conducted itself, adding a caveat that any further acts of terror would be considered an act of war. India also categorically stated that the agreement was bilateral and initiated with the call of the Pakistani DGMO. However, it is widely believed that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia played a major role in the cessation of military activities. 

One group of defence analysts feel that the USA intervened after Pakistan raised concerns about India potentially targeting its nuclear command infrastructure. Some analysts feel that Pakistan had significantly lost its war-waging capability and  requested the USA to intervene. Many theories, including a few rooted in conspiracy, are floating around on social media. The media is full of debate on what prompted Trump to do it and what events led to it. The truth might emerge later in time. Everything in the realm of conjecture, the only thing certain is that the ceasefire was the answer to the prayers of people at the border. 

(To be continued in Part 3)

 

Pixels of an Emerging Picture: Understanding Operation Sindoor (Part -1)

 

Terrorism in Kashmir 

India saw the horror of terrorism once again when the face of a newly married lady sitting desolate next to the body of her husband, shot dead in Kashmir, because he could not recite the Kalma, filled the TV screens. 22 people died there. Operation Sindoor was the reply, the retribution India had promised in revenge. The killing was not the first and might not be the last. The revenge was not the first and might not be the last. It was a new, horrific chapter with roots from the past and tentacles into the future. Let us delve into the past and crystal-gaze and attempt to understand a picture with ever-evolving pixels.

Background

Pakistan-sponsored terrorism visibly infected Kashmir first in 1987. How can anyone conclusively accuse Pakistan of complicity in terrorist violence in Kashmir? India has presented proof on multiple occasions to establish the complicity of the state of Pakistan in terror activities inside India. It has been of no use since no amount of effort can awaken one who is pretending to sleep. However, Pakistan itself has on many occasions made it publicly clear that it supports, finances, and provides logistics for terrorism in Kashmir.

Since 1987, Kashmir has swayed between flare-ups and Army intervention-induced lows, the lull, giving time and opportunity to terrorists to regroup and replan. The local population, always part of it, were victims, collateral damage, not-so-silent spectators, and facilitators. Successive governments focused on ‘Winning the Hearts and Minds’ (WHAM) of the local population through Operation- Sadbhavana, building infrastructure, schools, and providing means to earn steady incomes. When the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), promising stronger measures to curb terrorism,  rode to power at the Centre, with Mr Narendra Modi being sworn in as the PM on 29 May 2014, India looked forward to finding an end to terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). 

Political Process

Elections to the Legislative Assembly of J& K were conducted in five phases, from 25 November 2014 to 20 December 2014. The election, marked by high-decibel emotions, saw 65.23% voter turnout. The results declared on 23 December 2014 did not allow any party to form the government independently. Protracted political negotiations between various parties continued until the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the BJP, two fierce political rivals, formed an unexpected coalition government to rule the state based on a Common Minimum Programme (CMP). On 01 March 2015, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed of the PDP became the CM for the coalition. However, he passed away on 07 January 2016. After a brief spell of President’s rule, Ms Mehbooba Mufti, daughter of late Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, took over as the CM on 04 Apr 2016 and continued till the BJP withdrew its support on 19 Jun 2018.

In the meantime, Jaish-e-Mohammed, a terrorist organisation based in Pakistan, had started finding supporters in the Kashmir Valley. They recruited a social media-savvy young local lad named Burhan Wani. He exploited the power of social media, appearing without any hood or mask, and publicly called on the Kashmiri youth to rise against the Indian state. A neighbourhood lad for many, he became the new identifiable and relatable face of homegrown terrorism. Wani helped his handlers across the border find more local unemployed and disillusioned lads willing to be recruited, radicalised and used for terrorist activities in Kashmir. Kashmir now witnessed a new face of insurgency. 

The locals, in open defiance of law and seemingly unafraid of consequences, uncovered their faces while throwing stones at the army convoys and patrols. They even actively participated in facilitating the escape of terrorists trapped in the cordons established by the Army. 

Fresh Wave of Attacks

Belying expectations, terrorist attacks started getting more audacious.  On 5 December 2014, militants attacked an army camp in J&K, killing 11 security personnel. On 20 March 2015, two LeT militants attacked the Rajbagh police station in Kathua, Jammu. India accused Pakistan of supporting cross-border terrorism; however, showing restraint, India did not initiate any direct military action against Pakistan in either incident.  On 30-31 December 2015, a group of 6 JeM terrorists from Pakistan entered India, hijacked a Police officer's SUV, and reached Pathankot. On 2 January 2016, they attacked the air base at Pathankot. All of them were neutralised in due course.  India, asking Pakistan for action against the perpetrators, shared dossiers of the attackers and demanded action from Pakistan. Unhappy with the response, India suspended peace talks with Pakistan till they took visible measures to contain terrorism. The Prime Minister promised a strong response, and the Home Minister assured the country of a befitting reply to the terrorists. However, India demonstrated restraint, and no military action was taken against Pakistan. Terrorism is a persistent ailment, but terrorists, however smart they might be, cannot persist for long. They have a short shelf life. Burhan Wani met his bullets on the 8th July 2016, in an encounter with Indian security forces in Kokernag of Anantnag. The Valley saw violent protests. 

Crime and Punishment

On 18 September 2016, four heavily armed terrorists of the Jaish-e-Mohammed attacked an Indian Army Brigade headquarters in Uri, killing 19 soldiers. India accused Pakistan of supporting the terrorist organisation, boycotted the SAARC meeting, and retaliated with pre-emptive military strikes across the line of control in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir on the intervening night of September 28-29, inflicting death on more than 150 terrorists. Even though it was widely believed that India had undertaken cross-border actions before, this was the first time that the Government of India publicly declared military action against Pakistan across the LoC. The Indian establishment believed that the publicised military action, widely known as the “Surgical Strike”, across the LoC would deter Pakistan from further sponsoring terrorism in India. The action satisfied the Indian public and bolstered the strong image of the Prime Minister, Mr Modi, who had vowed an appropriate response to the Uri attack. It also set a new benchmark for India's response to terrorist attacks on its soil. Pakistani soil, however, continued to nurture and promote cross-border terrorism relentlessly.

On 03 October 2016, terrorists attacked a Border Security Force camp in Baramulla, killing one BSF Soldier. On 29 November 2016, terrorists mounted an attack on an Army base in Nagrota, killing seven soldiers.  India did not take any military action across the border but intensified the counterinsurgency operations within Jammu and Kashmir. India accused Pakistan of fostering terrorism. Pakistan steadfastly refused its involvement in terrorist activities and stonewalled investigations into terrorist incidents in India, attributing those to non-state actors and calling themselves victims of terror. On 10 July 2017, militants attacked the Amarnath pilgrims, killing seven. Worse was yet to come.  

On 14 February 2019, Adil Ahamed, a Local Kashmiri youth and a Jaish-e-Mohammed operative, drove a Mahindra Scorpio SUV loaded with approximately 350 kg of explosives that included RDX and other high-grade explosives into a bus that was part of a CRPF convoy, killing 40 CRPF personnel. It was the deadliest terrorist attack since terrorism raised its head in Kashmir. The Government of India had no option but to respond. Having set the benchmark in the Uri incident with the Surgical Strike, the response had to be more severe and more visible than before. 

On the 26th February 2019, the Indian Air Force swung into action with what India called a non-military pre-emptive Strike, targeting terrorist facilities and taking care to avoid civilian and military assets. The attack resulted in the killing of 300 to 350 terrorists, mostly recruits being prepared for fidayeen attacks, their trainers and even senior terrorist commanders. Pakistan, however, denied having suffered any such losses. The Government of India, in one of the boldest political moves in Kashmir, revoked Article 370 through a Presidential order on 05 August 2019 and followed it with the passage of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act 2019 in the Indian Parliament, effectively trifurcating J&K. India revoked the most favoured Nation status of Pakistan, imposed a 200% custom duty on Pakistani goods, and suspended cross LOC trade and bus services. 

Experts felt that India had finally established a credible deterrence against its persistent adversary, Pakistan and was seen to be willing to use it without remorse or hesitation. The red lines for India had been redrawn, and the threshold for retaliation redefined. It is widely believed that the incidents of terror have come down ever since. The Government declared that normalcy had finally been restored in Kashmir. While facts and figures provided by the Government may be contested, the fact that the tourism industry picked up and gained momentum in Kashmir remains unequivocal and uncontested, even by the government's harshest critics. The thriving tourism industry provided assured income to locals and largely weaned the youth away from becoming terror fodder. Peace seemed to have finally descended on Kashmir.

(To be continued in Part 2)