PART 2: First War of Kashmir 1947
Change in Mind
When I first sat down to write
the article, I believed I could finish it in three parts. After all, I had
studied these military operations, and all it needed was putting things in an
easily readable form. Once I started reading up on the material I collected, I
realised, my knowledge had been confined purely to the military perspective.
The canvas on which each of the military operations was conducted stretched far
beyond matters of arms. Their beginnings rested in complex geopolitical
vortices, and the battlefields stretched far back and far ahead. To my horror,
I also realised that we find ourselves repeatedly in a state of déjà Vu, moving
forward linearly but in circles. This aspect shall be discussed in the
concluding part of the article, dealing with “what lies ahead for us.”
Each operation India has
undertaken demands deference. It is that deep respect and admiration for those
involved in the operations that compelled me to discuss major operations one by
one and share with my readers across the world the political events that led to
the military interventions and outcomes.
Keeping in line with the
enhanced scope and coverage, I took the liberty of changing the title of the
article from “Operation Sindoor and Other Unparalleled Operations” to “Future
of India’s Military Operations: Lessons from the Past.”
A Lingering Question
The spectrum of political
issues behind the First Kashmir War is seldom discussed and therefore remains
hidden. Whenever the First Kashmir War comes up for discussion nowadays, it is
always served on politically coloured plates, to serve the needs of the
election hour. The WhatsApp university does the rest, providing fertile grounds
where half-truths, hearsay, assumptions, and lies thrive, infecting anyone in
the proximity. Reluctance or inability to do serious reading, aided by the
rampant presence of visuals ridden with political messaging, helps proliferate
untruths, burying truth in fathomless depths.
The question that resonates
most in highly charged contemporary political debates, in an ignorant,
ill-informed, or misinformed environment, with outcomes on expected lines, is “Why
was the military operation against the raiders in Kashmir not allowed to
continue till the entire territory of Kashmir under Maharaja Hari Singh was
retrieved?” The question is invariably followed up with the expression,
“if only…”
To answer that all-important
question, we must understand the complex political events leading up to the war
and those that unfolded thereafter on both sides of the border. Armed with
hindsight, seated accusingly in the knowledge of the present, and ignorant of
the compulsions of the past, it is easy to judge. To be fair to the people who
led the government then, I have relied on works published by authors whom I
consider unbiased academics, unfettered by political compulsions, to bring to you
the conditions under which the leaders of India, emerging into independence,
took decisions.
Consolidation of Territory
The years preceding or
succeeding independence were unbelievably tough on the administration.
According to information available in the public domain, India in 1947 had
about 565 princely states within the current geographical limits of India.
These states/regions were not part of British India but were semi-autonomous
territories ruled by local leaders under British Suzerainty. A
sovereignty, where a state had absolute authority over all its affairs without
any external interference, is different from a suzerainty, where the state and
the ruler could only make local laws and were under the rule of another state
or ruler for all major decisions.
The Indian Independence Act
1947, as interpreted then, gave these states the freedom to join India or
Pakistan or even remain independent, once the British Suzerainty ceased. It was
left to the leaders of the Indian freedom movement to motivate these
rulers to join India. The process involved tough and long-drawn negotiations,
assurances and promises of safety, status, income, and such other things. It is
very important to understand that the process of integration was a cauldron of
boiling contradictions, requiring deft handling.
According to the information
available in the public domain, states like Baroda, Bikaner, and others from
Rajasthan were the first among princely states to join the Indian Union.
Manipur and Jodhpur are said to have acceded to India on 11 August 1947, and
Tripura on 13 August 1947. Piploda joined after March 1948, and Bilaspur on 12
October 1948. Interestingly, a few of the principalities that initially opted
to join Pakistan were motivated and convinced to accede to
India. Some required a different motivation.
Sir, CP Ramaswamy Iyer, the
Dewan of Travancore, the southernmost Kingdom within the boundaries of India,
we now know, declared, on 11 June 1947, that Travancore would stay independent
after the British left. The Indian National Congress launched the civil unrest
protesting the ruler's decision. Travancore finally agreed to the accession on
30 July, but not before an assassination attempt on the Dewan. They finally
ceded to India on 15 August 1947.
Nawab Hamidulllah Khan, the
Muslim ruler of Bhopal, a Hindu-majority state, reluctantly agreed to join
after public unrest. He signed the Instrument of Accession on 30 August
1947. Hyderabad, also a Hindu-majority state with a Muslim Ruler, opted for
independence, but was annexed through Operation Polo in September 1948.
Junagadh, a Hindu-majority
state under a Muslim ruler, Nawab Muhammad Mahabat Khanji III, opted to join
Pakistan. The choice did not please Delhi. There were severe protests in
Junagadh. India imposed economic sanctions and cut off access to the state. On 24
October 1947, the Nawab fled to Pakistan, leaving the administration to the
Dewan, Shah Nawaz Bhutto, father of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. On 7 November 1947,
Shah Nawaz Bhutto, considering the deteriorating law and order situation, invited
India to take over the administration of Junagadh. The Indian forces annexed
Junagadh on 9 November 1947. In February 1948, when a plebiscite was conducted,
99% people wanted to join India. Separate polls in other areas too, found most
opting in favour of India. It took many more years for India to reach the
present boundary configuration. There was a lot more to consolidate.
In 1954, Indian nationalist
volunteers, supported by residents, through a non-violent movement, wrested
control of Dadra and Nagar Haveli from the Portuguese. These territories were
administered by a local body under India’s oversight from 1954 to 1961. The
Portuguese also refused to cede Goa, Daman, and Diu, the colonial territories
on the western coast of India. Intense diplomatic efforts throughout the 1950s
failed. India launched Operation Vijay on 18 December 1961 and annexed Goa,
Daman, and Diu on 19 December 1961. After the annexation of Goa in 1961,
Portugal relinquished claims, and Dadra and Nagar Haveli were formally
integrated as a Union Territory in 1961.
The French agreed to cede
Chandernagore, also called Chandan Nagar, a French colony, situated on the west
bank of the Hooghly River, 35 km north of Kolkata, after the referendum on 19
June 1949, with 114 voting to stay with the French and 7473 voting to join
India. The process was completed in 1950. In 1954, the French handed over de
facto control of Pondicherry (now Puducherry), Karaikal, Mahe, and Yanam to
India following negotiations and local referendums. The “de jure” (legal)
transfer was formalised through the Treaty of Cession signed on May 28, 1956,
and ratified by France in 1962 after parliamentary approval.
Sikkim remained an autonomous
monarchy under the Chogyal, with special protectorate status under India as per
the Indo-Sikkim Treaty of 1950, with external affairs, defence, and
communication controlled by India. Dissatisfied with the monarchy, political
unrest, led by the Sikkim National Congress and other democratic parties,
erupted in Sikkim in 1973, demanding democratic governance. In 1974, elections
were held after a new constitution was drafted. The Sikkim Assembly, now
pro-India, passed a resolution seeking full integration with India. This
led to serious turmoil in the area. In April 1975, the Indian Army entered
Sikkim, disarmed the palace guard, and placed the Chogyal (King) under house
arrest. A referendum was held in Sikkim on 14 April 1975, in which over 97% of
the population voted in favour of joining India. The Indian Parliament, on 16
May 1975, amended the Constitution (36th Amendment), making Sikkim a
full-fledged state of India.
Territorial consolidation of
India started earnestly in 1947 and, in the form we know now, was completed only
in 1975. The process went far beyond the lives of many who initially led the
freedom movement or the territorial consolidation immediately after
independence. Irrespective of when it happened, it required a lot of
negotiation, mediation, motivation, manoeuvring and even the military. Kashmir
presented a different matrix altogether.
Kashmir
Kashmir, the territory between
India and Pakistan, consisted of three distinct areas. The Jammu region was
predominantly Hindu, the valley predominantly Muslim and Ladakh mostly
Buddhist. The kingdom was ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh, a Hindu. He wanted independence
from both India and Pakistan. He signed a standstill agreement with Pakistan,
but India did not sign the agreement. Pakistan sensed that Maharaja Hari Singh
could deliver Kashmir to India and went on the offensive on 22 October 1947. A
careful reading of the history books of that time would give a clear picture of
the complex and peculiar political situation Kashmir presented to Delhi. Some
leaders who are now projected as having strongly wanted Kashmir in India are
said to have initially told Lord Mountbatten otherwise.
With the raiders almost at his
doorstep, Maharaja Hari Singh fled Srinagar on the night of 25 October 1947 and
reached his palace in Jammu. Aware of the territorial losses suffered, he
signed the instrument of accession in the afternoon of 26 October 1947. A
decision was immediately taken to airlift troops to Srinagar. The civil and
military authorities were busy the entire night of 26 October, getting together
the required number of planes, pilots, and supplies to be lifted. By the
morning of 27 October, they managed to get about 100 planes. These were used
for airlifting 329 soldiers of the 1 Sikh led by Lieutenant Colonel Ranjit Rai
from Willingdon Airfield, Delhi. The authorities were not sure if the airfield
at Srinagar had already fallen to the enemy. The Colonel was therefore
under instructions to circle the airfield and, in case of doubt, not land but
return to Jammu. By 10:30 in the morning, Delhi received the much-awaited
message that the planes had landed safely.
Meanwhile, Mohammed Ali Jinnah
had already moved from Karachi to Lahore, waiting for a triumphant entry into
Srinagar on 26 or 27 October, only to learn that Srinagar had been taken by the
Indian forces. Jinnah immediately instructed Sir Francis Mudie, Governor of
West Punjab, to telephone General Gracey, Acting Commander-in-Chief of the
Pakistani army, ordering him to move the Army towards Kashmir. Sir Francis
Mudie obeyed Jinnah, but Gracy did not obey Mudie, telling him that he required
the permission of General Auchinleck, the Supreme Commander, in Delhi, who
remained in charge of all the British officers on both sides. On 28 October,
General Auchinleck flew to Lahore and met Jinnah and told him that while India
was entitled to send troops to Kashmir, a part of India, Pakistan could not. He
also told Jinnah that if he sent troops, British nationals in the Pakistan Army
would not participate. Meanwhile, Indian troops were bloodying the
encroachers.
The Elusive Answer
It is said that the military
wanted permission to go ahead and capture the entire area of Kashmir that
belonged to Maharaja Hari Singh before signing the instrument that accession.
There are reasons to believe it, too. The battalion that landed at the airport
after securing the airport advanced towards Baramulla to stop the raiders
there. When they contacted the enemy, they realised that the raiders “had
expert commanders, modern weapons and were in great numerical superiority.” He
decided to withdraw to Pattan. Unfortunately, he was killed in action during
the withdrawal.
Three more battalions of the
Indian Army landed in Srinagar to defend the state's capital. About 700 raiders
made a sneak attack on Srinagar on 3 November 1947. The Attack was repulsed,
but not without losses. The locals also turned against the raiders because of
the cruel loot, plunder, and rape they had inflicted on them. By December 1947,
Indian forces were gaining ground against the tribals and Pakistani forces in
Jammu and Kashmir. This led to serious discussion in Delhi about pushing the
offensive further into Muzaffarabad, Mirpur and other areas held by the
Pakistan forces. There were problems.
Both India and Pakistan had
retained British officers in the top military positions when they gained
independence. General Auchinleck was the Supreme Commander of both Indian and
Pakistani forces. The supreme command was dissolved on 30 November 1947, and
both countries had their own separate National commands from 1 December 1947.
General Sir Francis Robert Roy Bucher, who was the Deputy Commander-in-Chief
under General Auchinleck, became the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army on 1
January 1948 and served till 15 January 1949 to hand over the reins to General
KM Cariappa, the First Indian Army Chief of free India.
Meanwhile, there were
differences of opinion between Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and his Deputy
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel on how the state should be ruled. The issue became so
intense that both Patel and Nehru offered to resign. The interaction between
the two by way of letters was, however, dignified and with immense respect for
each other. In the end, Vallabhbhai, as Minister of States, gave the reins of
shaping India's Kashmir policy to Nehru. Nehru continued to take Sardar
Vallabhbhai Patel's advice and consent on most issues regarding Kashmir.
General Sir Francis Robert Roy
Bucher advised Nehru against pursuing the offensive because he felt that the
Indian Army was not yet logistically or organisationally ready for a full-scale
war with Pakistan. He also cautioned the Prime Minister about the harsh winter
in the Kashmir region and its impact on already-strained supply lines, which
could prolong the operations and increase casualties. He advised the Prime
Minister to stop the offensive and refer the case to the United Nations. It is
possible that the advice was also to avoid the British officers from the
unpleasant situation of being on both sides of the conflict.
Most of the negotiation with
the ruler of Kashmir was based on the advice of Lord Mountbatten. The decision
to approach the United Nations on the issue of Kashmir was also based on the
Governor General’s prescriptions. Sardar Patel was against the reference of
Kashmir to the UN and preferred timely action on the ground. While he held that
idea, he did not insist because Kashmir was being handled by Nehru, who had the
consent from Gandhi.
The Connected Question
Another question connected to
the decision to stop the military offensive against Pakistan in 1947 is, “Why
did Nehru take the Kashmir issue to the United Nations?”
The United Nations officially
came into existence on 24 October 1945, following the end of the Second World
War, with the noble aim of preventing future global conflicts. India, still
under British colonial rule, was among the 51 founding members of the United
Nations, which ratified the charter that came into force on 24 October 1945. It
was those heady days when peace was romanticised and everyone thought that the
UN would deliver peace from situations of conflict. There was a strong precedent
suggesting effective conflict resolution by the UNSC.
The first complaint to the
United Nations Security Council came from Iran on 19 January 1946. Iran
complained that the Soviet Union, which was supposed to withdraw its troops,
had not done so and was interfering in its internal matters by supporting separatists.
The dispute was resolved through discussion, and the Soviet Union withdrew
troops in May 1946. In September 1946, Greece accused Bulgaria of a border
attack and military aggression. This matter was also discussed and defused. In
October 1946, the UK brought the case to the Security Council, the Corfu
Channel incident, where British naval ships hit mines in Albanian waters. The
UK accused Albania of laying the mines or failing to warn. It also took the
case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Incidentally, this became the
first case ever heard at the ICJ. ICJ ruled in favour of the UK in 1949,
awarding compensation. In July 1947, the Netherlands launched a military action
against Indonesian independence forces. When India and Australia raised the
issue in the Security Council, the UN called for ceasefires and negotiations,
eventually leading to Indonesia’s independence in 1949. With such strong
precedence and India being a responsible nation, going to the UN seemed to be
the right thing then. After all, the UN had not become the lifeless entity that
it has become now.
On 1 January 1948, India
submitted its complaint to the president of the Security Council, and it read,
“Under Article 35 of the
Charter of the United Nations, any Member may bring any situation whose
continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security to the attention of the Security Council. Such a situation now exists
between India and Pakistan owing to the aid which invaders, consisting of
nationals of Pakistan and of tribesmen from the territory immediately adjoining
Pakistan on the north‑west, are drawing from Pakistan for operations against
Jammu and Kashmir, a State which has acceded to the Dominion of India and is
part of India. The circumstances of accession, the activities of the invaders
that led the Government of India to take military action against them, and the
assistance which the attackers have received and are still receiving from
Pakistan are explained later in this memorandum. The Government of India
request the Security Council to call upon Pakistan to put an end immediately to
the giving of such assistance, which is an act of aggression against India. If
Pakistan does not do so, the Government of India may be compelled, in self‑defence,
to enter Pakistan territory to take military action against the invaders. The
matter is, therefore, one of extreme urgency and calls for immediate action by
the Security Council for avoiding a breach of international peace”
Ours to Judge
The crown of authority comes
with the pain of accountability. Weighed down by fear of consequences and unimaginable
imponderables, placed in an endless sea of ambiguity, and the possibility of
having to eternally bear the cross for the outcome, decision-making is not
easy. The hallmark of strong leaders is their ability to take bold decisions
with the hope of success, knowingly pushing aside the fear of failure. The
agony of decision-making does not guarantee them kindness in judgment by future
generations, especially when it is about political dividends. The toast of the
town today could be burnt at the stake tomorrow, even in absentia. It is far
easier to evaluate, criticise, and suggest a better way out, without having to
bear the cross at all, many decades after a decision was taken. In hindsight,
stopping the military advance or going to the UN did no good to us. But did they
have the luxury of hindsight?
If the success of an operation
is measured by outcomes, given the ambiguity and complexity of the prevailing
situation, the First Kashmir War was a resounding success. If peace between
India and Pakistan is still a mirage, there are other reasons. The decision to
go to the UN is insignificant. In the process of understanding the evolution of
modern India’s territorial boundaries, I also realised that knowledge humbles
arrogance empowered by ignorance.
(Coming up in the next part
-1962 Operations)
PS: The Picture is representative of soldiers in 1947 and AI-generated
