Background
Defence ministers, do address the press. But the one on 14th of June
2022 will remain indelibly etched in history of modern India. The RM, flanked
by his service chiefs unveiled the new recruitment policy for ‘Personnel Below
Officer Rank’ (PBOR) of the Indian defence forces. They named it ‘Agnipath’
(the path of fire) and called those to be recruited under this scheme ‘Agni
Veer’ (fiery warriors). It is claimed to be the boldest and most transformative
intervention the Indian defence forces has ever had in its lifetime.
Officially, it is claimed that the scheme would achieve “National Integration providing equal opportunity”
and nation building nation “through
empowered disciplined youth with military ethos in civil society”. For the
Army it is supposed to “improve battle preparedness through transformative
evolution”, select the best “with rigorous
and transparent selection process”, achieve
“youthful profile through optimal balance of youth and experience”, and
help Army become tech savvy through “induction (of individuals) from
technical institutes”. Quantitatively put, lower the age profile of the
Indian army.
There are six specific promised takeaways for individuals. Barely put,
the scheme envisages recruiting 46,000 youth between the years 17 1/2 to 21
every year to the defence forces for a period of 4 years on a “customised” monthly
compensation of Rs 30,000 in the first year, Rs 33,000 in the second, Rs 36,500
in the third and Rs 40,000 in the fourth year. 30% of it will be retained by
government to be returned to the individual at the end of the four year term
with equal contribution from it along with interests, totaling to 10.04 Lakhs (excluding
interests) as Seva Nidhi package. On completion of the term, 25% Agni Veers would
be retained based on merit and others released, into a eagerly waiting civic society ready to absorb them and give them a great start to a second innings in life.
Rosy in deed.
A very attractive package especially considering the current unemployment
rate. The youth should have lapped it
up. However, as soon as the scheme was unveiled, all hell broke loose. Regardless
of opinions, the Government is adamant in seeing Agnipath through the ‘Agni Pareeksha’ (Trial by Fire).
Ripples
The political and social environment of the country has not remained
same ever since. Opposition called it murder of democracy because the
government did not consult them on such a far reaching reform. With a brutal
majority in executive, niceties were not required. When opposition
representatives became loud on prime time discussions, they were met with even
louder shriller government supporters, drowning reasons in din.
Many veterans were aghast because, they believed that Agnipath sounds
the death knell for Indian army, destroying the ethos and culture evolved over
times and many an adversity. Most of them went public, in print, visual and social
media against the scheme. Few applauded the scheme and called it yet another
masterstroke and claimed it to be the timeliest intervention capable of
creating tech-savvy, efficient lean mean defense forces, capable of handling
future military challenges. Never has the veteran community been so vociferous
against a government scheme that affected the forces yet felt so
inconsequential. Never has the veteran community been so divided professionally
and politically.
No one seemed to give any credence or attention to either opposition
parties or veterans who disagreed.
But it was different when the youth rose in opposition. The government clearly had not anticipated the scale and
intensity of nationwide agitation youth would launch. They decided to take matters
into their hands. Their ire, was targeted against public property, laying it
waste, vandalized destroyed or burnt. Agnipath
protests spread and raged across states, literally setting streets on
fire.
No amount of injustice real or perceived can justify or condone violence
of any sort. For a country that won its independence through nonviolence or
ahimsa, this was a stark departure from the most powerful weapon of Indianness.
The violence and manner of protest adopted need to be condemned in the strongest
possible manner. Action deemed appropriate must be taken against the
perpetrators of violence. Some state Governments had earlier shown that it is
capable of instant retribution but that resolve seemed to be missing in
handling Agnipath protests.
The government immediately announced a slew of measures to allay fears
of the youth and make it more attractive, despite its claim of deep research over
all the aspects of the scheme. It included one-time age relaxation, higher
insurance cover and reservations in other government jobs.
The official attempting to be as convincing as a convinced can be, clarified
that these measures were not a consequence of the violent protests but we're
already in the pipeline. He also categorically
stated that the scheme will not be rolled-back. Soon, industrialists, industries and state governments joined the bandwagon with
post contract job offers.
Contest or Comply
Change is the only constant in life. But change,
especially those with long term ramifications, must not be undertaken just for
the sake of change. Contesting change merely for the sake of opposing or just
because it questions status quo isn't productive. Unquestioningly complying
with anything pushed down from top, in the name of change, also does not augur
well for progressive civic societies. Change must be for valid reasons. With no
options other than complying, one has to comply and bear the consequence, good bad
or ugly.
Yet, the proposed scheme can certainly be dissected
objectively to be understood from differing perspectives, even if it may not
end up of being any use.
Profile Correction
One of the major takeaways from the scheme, it is
claimed, is that it will, in few years, lower the age profile of the army from
the existing average above 30. Prima
facie it looks true too.
But is it? If yes; how? If No; why?
To statistically reduce age profile of a sample
under study, there is only one sure way. Increase the numbers in lower
age group and decrease the numbers in higher age group. Isn’t that what
Agnipath is doing? No.
It quantitatively reduces induction, from 60,000 to
46,000 every year. Moreover, the rate
of attrition at the lower age group is designed to be 75% as against 5%
normal attrition at at the top. Thus, as the ‘oldies’ wither away slower in
comparison to the Agni veers, the age profile will NOT reduce dramatically as
picturised. In absolute terms, keeping the current figures as the constituents,
it will be only in 2042, twenty years from now, that Agni veers
constitute over 50% of the force.
{Caveat - The figures 46,000 as annual intake of Agni veers as well as the attrition rate of 5% considered for old school combatants are as on date. when these figures change, much like the EMI and term of loans change with change in interest rates, the figures for manpower will change too.}
By that time, at the rate now decided, 9, 66,000
youth would have joined the scheme from which 5, 86,500 would have been asked
to leave, a whopping attrition of 60.71% at the bottom. The existing regular
combatants at 5% attrition would have shrunk from 10,65,150 to 3,81,841 a
reduction of 6,83,309 combatants putting it at 64.2%. By that time the youngest
Agni veer joining the forces now, if he or she decides to stay, would be 37.5
years.
Are we merely creating a
turbulent vortex at the bottom that offers no credible advantage? Have planners missed the real math?
NO. The math is different. In long term
perspective, age
profile will slowly reduce due to the attrition at the top
through releases but mostly through reduced induction of regular
combatants and the high turnover of Agni veers. Essentially unnoticed,
there is a significant overall reduction of force strength.
Yes; Agnipath essentially extinguishes the existing
vacancy and restricts future intake to 46,000 a year. Dramatic short
term take-away and infinitesimal erosion over long term. But, what is wrong in reducing army strength?
Doctrinal Diktats
Many influencers feel that Indian army is too big,
unwieldy and needs to be trimmed. How this opinion has taken roots in the
society and on whose behest is unknown. This narrative has garnered traction
enough to be considered an unquestionable imperative. If nothing else, Agnipath
certainly addresses this concern. But there is a flipside and a grave one too!
Size of a country’s defense forces and how it
should be equipped is dictated by threats it perceives and how it plans to deal
with it. Most countries document it in their national security doctrine. There
is no information in the public domain to suggest that India has such a
doctrine. In the absence of such a document-stipulated force level, numbers
could remain subjective and ambiguous. Considering our friendly neighbourhood what should be India's force
levels?
Numbers
According to information available, India has an
authorized army strength of over 12 lakhs. The attrition rate of the Indian
army under normal circumstances is about 5% and therefore the annual
recruitment intake is about 60,000 balancing attritions with accretions.
However, depending on actuals, figures get corrected. Every year depending on
the adjusted requirement, vacancies are allotted to states depending on its Male
Recruitable Population (MRP). With induction of female PBOR appropriate
modifications would have been done.
The current sanctioned strength of Indian Army is
believed to be 12, 23,380. How we arrived at this figure, is not available in
the public domain. Certainly, we can presume that it is based on the deployment
requirements of Northern, Eastern and Western borders as also for counter-
insurgency. NOT one man can be added without approval of the government and
government approvals irrespective of who helmed it, was never easy.
In 2019, India had only 11, 85,150 PBOR.
Recruitments did not happen during the two COVID years, accumulating a
deficiency of approximately 1, 20,000. Taking all that into account, the
strength of PBOR in Indian army now is only about 10, 65,150, already
deficient by 1, 58,230.
It has been announced that, henceforth all
recruitments to Defence Forces will be only through Agnipath. This will further
increase the deficiency every year by 14,000. Yes; every year! So in ten years (by 2032),
even if nobody retires from army, the strength will automatically deplete by 1,
40,000 more bringing down the strength to 8, 71,893.
Considering inherent attritions even at 5% to the
existing cadre, numerical strength of Army will fall to 8,70,357 by 2032 and to
7,42,249 in 2042, out of which 3,62,749 could be 'old school' combatants and 3,79,500
would be the Agni Veer category. The senior most amongst them would have 16 years’
service, barring the four year contract period. Stretching it theoretically a
bit more, the last of the old school combatants would have left Army in 2062
having attained the age of 60 and four years later the Army would reach the theoretical maximum strength of 6, 55,500!
Given the geographical diversity of India and the
military challenges it faces, in addition to the widespread deployment now
obtaining, the questions that we should be asking ourselves are: -
What should be the strength of the defence forces
and how should it be equipped to be a credible deterrent?
Have we drawn up a national security doctrine?
Are we visualizing significant reduction in
external threats?
Have we finalised an approach that reduces military
manpower from the exiting 12 lakhs to about six lakhs and yet ensure national
security?
Diplomacy is a great mode of power projection. We have very articulate effective and highly respected diplomats to represent us abroad. However suave,
articulate and efficient be diplomats, their bargaining strength depends on the
ability of the country's military, back home, to project and deliver decisions when and
where required.
What does this year on year reduction mean to us?
Fiscal Savings??
Penny-wise
One of the reasons believed to have fuelled this
master stroke, is that bulk of the defense allocation is consumed as pay,
allowances and pensions leaving pittance for modernization.
It is said, that a lie repeated a hundred times
ends up being the truth. This seems to be the case here too. A large chunk of
the allocations for pay and pensions actually goes to civilians drawing from
the defense estimate. The fact remains that the lesser non-uniformed chunk
consumes more of the pay and pension chunk.
That apart, there is a cost that the country must
incur for its security. Cost cutting is important. Even If the economy is ailing, should sacrificing sovereignty be the first
choice?
Tech Savvy Army
One of the declared aims of Agnipath is to make
Indian army tech savvy by ‘harnessing benefits of skill India by induction
from technical institutes’. If this is translated to recruitment QR, only
those who have got some ‘Skill-India’ certification and are piped through a
recognised ‘technical Institute’ can find their way in! If implemented, it
could exclude millions of otherwise eligible youths from being enrolled.
Certainly, the slogan couldn’t be meaning what it says!
Just being acquainted with technology in a
‘Skill-India programme’ outside the military domain doesn't make a person fit
enough to handle military technology. Competency to handle militarized
technology and acquire mastery over it to achieve combat aims is a long way of,
far beyond the glitz and glamour of catchy slogans, unless we equate video
games to military actions. What is important is to induct weapon systems that
use the latest military technologies, the fastest possible. Yes; it costs.
Survival demands investments.
Once individuals are inducted into the forces, it
has inherent competencies to impart the required training so as to
make combatants competent enough to achieve operational aims.
Agnipath essentially doesn’t deliver on this aim
too.
Future of the Unselected
Agnipath essentially sowed uncertainty amongst the
youth. Youth in lakhs had undergone various tests and were waiting to be
called for the written examination for recruitment. With one stroke of a pen,
all their efforts over the last few years were wiped out. Anger was the
response. Reasons that triggered spontaneous unrests across the country needs
to be understood.
A job with the defense forces offers great amount
of security. Pride and dignity the uniform provides and the romanticism
associated with it apart, job security it provides is what attracts the not-so
studious and academically bright youngsters mostly from villages flocking to
join the armed forces. Take that away, a job in uniform loses all its attractiveness.
Agnipath precisely did that.
A lot has been said about the financial package the
scheme offers. People seemed to have read through the fine print. People also
realised that the ‘huge amount’ of Rs 11.71 Lakhs, promised as severance
package, is half their own contribution and its interest, much like a
contributory scheme.
Promises!
A number of guarantees of job offers suddenly came
from all over.
People seem to attach little credibility to promises
of lateral induction into other police organizations and reservation in
jobs in the central and state governments. There is a specific chapter titled “Lateral
Movement of defence Force personnel” in the recommendations of the 6th Pay
Commission. How much of these have fructified is a question those making guarantees
now must ask. The number of vacancies for ex-servicemen lying unfilled
across the country and in many states could jolt conscience if there is any.
The last nail on the coffin of credibility was
driven when the highest court while hearing the case on OROP said that “A
minister's statement given during a budget speech is not enforceable”. If
that is the legal position on statements made by the government on the floor of
the house, what credibility can one assign to open air proclamations?
May be, a concerted drive can be undertaken even
now to restore what was lost.
Emotional Industrialists
Industrialists with large followers on social media took to emotional
posts and tweets promising jobs. Some industries also suddenly sprung up
promising jobs to Agni Veers after four years. They may do good to themselves
and their conscience if they review what they have done over the last decade or
more to alleviate unemployment amongst young veterans coming out after
15-20 years of color service. It isn’t late still to make amends.
Gullible people may appear; gullible they may
not be.
For & Against
Many reasons have been put forth in support and
against the proposed scheme. Proponents of the scheme have given examples of
conscription across the world as against the form of recruitment in the
country. Flaws in that argument have been in public domain. Some veterans have
highlighted the serious damage it could inflict on operational efficiency,
tactical cohesion and the much-revered regimentation. For every point
in support of the scheme there are equally compelling reasons against it. Some critics have gone to the extent of comparing customs and traditions of Indian Army with remnants of British Raj and the insistence to hold on to them as colonial hangover. Contesting such arguments gives ignorance a place on the high table.
Some veterans have gone to the extent to saying
that the government has promulgated the scheme and there is no going back and
therefore it must be tried out. Under the given circumstance, is there another
option?
Yes; we may save a lot of money in pay and
allowances in the next five years or even a decade. But if it weakens the
very sovereignty of the country would that be acceptable? That is for
those in power to ask. That is for each citizens to contemplate.
Forward
Even well thought-out initiatives have bitten
dust. Certainly most ill-conceived ones have played havoc and wreaked terrible
consequence. History hosts both differently. These are times when everyone
everywhere is re-examining and rewriting history to suit contemporary
socio-political needs. Those who scripted events then, we now know as history, are not
around to explain what actually happened, why and how.
Agnipath is certainly a significant event in the history
of Indian Military.
How it will be perceived when it becomes history is not for
us to decide. Yes; we can now decide what comes out of it in the near future.
.
