Future of India’s Military Operations: Lessons from the Past - Part 2

 

PART 2: First War of Kashmir 1947

Change in Mind

When I first sat down to write the article, I believed I could finish it in three parts. After all, I had studied these military operations, and all it needed was putting things in an easily readable form. Once I started reading up on the material I collected, I realised, my knowledge had been confined purely to the military perspective. The canvas on which each of the military operations was conducted stretched far beyond matters of arms. Their beginnings rested in complex geopolitical vortices, and the battlefields stretched far back and far ahead. To my horror, I also realised that we find ourselves repeatedly in a state of déjà Vu, moving forward linearly but in circles. This aspect shall be discussed in the concluding part of the article, dealing with “what lies ahead for us.” 

Each operation India has undertaken demands deference. It is that deep respect and admiration for those involved in the operations that compelled me to discuss major operations one by one and share with my readers across the world the political events that led to the military interventions and outcomes.

Keeping in line with the enhanced scope and coverage, I took the liberty of changing the title of the article from “Operation Sindoor and Other Unparalleled Operations” to “Future of India’s Military Operations: Lessons from the Past.”

 

A Lingering Question

The spectrum of political issues behind the First Kashmir War is seldom discussed and therefore remains hidden. Whenever the First Kashmir War comes up for discussion nowadays, it is always served on politically coloured plates, to serve the needs of the election hour. The WhatsApp university does the rest, providing fertile grounds where half-truths, hearsay, assumptions, and lies thrive, infecting anyone in the proximity. Reluctance or inability to do serious reading, aided by the rampant presence of visuals ridden with political messaging, helps proliferate untruths, burying truth in fathomless depths.

The question that resonates most in highly charged contemporary political debates, in an ignorant, ill-informed, or misinformed environment, with outcomes on expected lines, is “Why was the military operation against the raiders in Kashmir not allowed to continue till the entire territory of Kashmir under Maharaja Hari Singh was retrieved?” The question is invariably followed up with the expression, “if only…”

To answer that all-important question, we must understand the complex political events leading up to the war and those that unfolded thereafter on both sides of the border. Armed with hindsight, seated accusingly in the knowledge of the present, and ignorant of the compulsions of the past, it is easy to judge. To be fair to the people who led the government then, I have relied on works published by authors whom I consider unbiased academics, unfettered by political compulsions, to bring to you the conditions under which the leaders of India, emerging into independence, took decisions. 

Consolidation of Territory

The years preceding or succeeding independence were unbelievably tough on the administration. According to information available in the public domain, India in 1947 had about 565 princely states within the current geographical limits of India. These states/regions were not part of British India but were semi-autonomous territories ruled by local leaders under British Suzerainty.  A sovereignty, where a state had absolute authority over all its affairs without any external interference, is different from a suzerainty, where the state and the ruler could only make local laws and were under the rule of another state or ruler for all major decisions.

The Indian Independence Act 1947, as interpreted then, gave these states the freedom to join India or Pakistan or even remain independent, once the British Suzerainty ceased. It was left to the leaders of the Indian freedom movement to motivate these rulers to join India. The process involved tough and long-drawn negotiations, assurances and promises of safety, status, income, and such other things. It is very important to understand that the process of integration was a cauldron of boiling contradictions, requiring deft handling. 

According to the information available in the public domain, states like Baroda, Bikaner, and others from Rajasthan were the first among princely states to join the Indian Union. Manipur and Jodhpur are said to have acceded to India on 11 August 1947, and Tripura on 13 August 1947. Piploda joined after March 1948, and Bilaspur on 12 October 1948. Interestingly, a few of the principalities that initially opted to join Pakistan were motivated and convinced to accede to India.  Some required a different motivation.

Sir, CP Ramaswamy Iyer, the Dewan of Travancore, the southernmost Kingdom within the boundaries of India, we now know, declared, on 11 June 1947, that Travancore would stay independent after the British left. The Indian National Congress launched the civil unrest protesting the ruler's decision. Travancore finally agreed to the accession on 30 July, but not before an assassination attempt on the Dewan. They finally ceded to India on 15 August 1947. 

Nawab Hamidulllah Khan, the Muslim ruler of Bhopal, a Hindu-majority state, reluctantly agreed to join after public unrest.  He signed the Instrument of Accession on 30 August 1947. Hyderabad, also a Hindu-majority state with a Muslim Ruler, opted for independence, but was annexed through Operation Polo in September 1948. 

Junagadh, a Hindu-majority state under a Muslim ruler, Nawab Muhammad Mahabat Khanji III, opted to join Pakistan. The choice did not please Delhi. There were severe protests in Junagadh. India imposed economic sanctions and cut off access to the state. On 24 October 1947, the Nawab fled to Pakistan, leaving the administration to the Dewan, Shah Nawaz Bhutto, father of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. On 7 November 1947, Shah Nawaz Bhutto, considering the deteriorating law and order situation, invited India to take over the administration of Junagadh. The Indian forces annexed Junagadh on 9 November 1947. In February 1948, when a plebiscite was conducted, 99% people wanted to join India. Separate polls in other areas too, found most opting in favour of India. It took many more years for India to reach the present boundary configuration. There was a lot more to consolidate.

In 1954, Indian nationalist volunteers, supported by residents, through a non-violent movement, wrested control of Dadra and Nagar Haveli from the Portuguese. These territories were administered by a local body under India’s oversight from 1954 to 1961. The Portuguese also refused to cede Goa, Daman, and Diu, the colonial territories on the western coast of India. Intense diplomatic efforts throughout the 1950s failed. India launched Operation Vijay on 18 December 1961 and annexed Goa, Daman, and Diu on 19 December 1961. After the annexation of Goa in 1961, Portugal relinquished claims, and Dadra and Nagar Haveli were formally integrated as a Union Territory in 1961.

The French agreed to cede Chandernagore, also called Chandan Nagar, a French colony, situated on the west bank of the Hooghly River, 35 km north of Kolkata, after the referendum on 19 June 1949, with 114 voting to stay with the French and 7473 voting to join India. The process was completed in 1950. In 1954, the French handed over de facto control of Pondicherry (now Puducherry), Karaikal, Mahe, and Yanam to India following negotiations and local referendums. The “de jure” (legal) transfer was formalised through the Treaty of Cession signed on May 28, 1956, and ratified by France in 1962 after parliamentary approval.

Sikkim remained an autonomous monarchy under the Chogyal, with special protectorate status under India as per the Indo-Sikkim Treaty of 1950, with external affairs, defence, and communication controlled by India. Dissatisfied with the monarchy, political unrest, led by the Sikkim National Congress and other democratic parties, erupted in Sikkim in 1973, demanding democratic governance. In 1974, elections were held after a new constitution was drafted. The Sikkim Assembly, now pro-India, passed a resolution seeking full integration with India.  This led to serious turmoil in the area. In April 1975, the Indian Army entered Sikkim, disarmed the palace guard, and placed the Chogyal (King) under house arrest. A referendum was held in Sikkim on 14 April 1975, in which over 97% of the population voted in favour of joining India. The Indian Parliament, on 16 May 1975, amended the Constitution (36th Amendment), making Sikkim a full-fledged state of India.

Territorial consolidation of India started earnestly in 1947 and, in the form we know now, was completed only in 1975. The process went far beyond the lives of many who initially led the freedom movement or the territorial consolidation immediately after independence. Irrespective of when it happened, it required a lot of negotiation, mediation, motivation, manoeuvring and even the military. Kashmir presented a different matrix altogether.

Kashmir

Kashmir, the territory between India and Pakistan, consisted of three distinct areas. The Jammu region was predominantly Hindu, the valley predominantly Muslim and Ladakh mostly Buddhist. The kingdom was ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh, a Hindu. He wanted independence from both India and Pakistan. He signed a standstill agreement with Pakistan, but India did not sign the agreement. Pakistan sensed that Maharaja Hari Singh could deliver Kashmir to India and went on the offensive on 22 October 1947. A careful reading of the history books of that time would give a clear picture of the complex and peculiar political situation Kashmir presented to Delhi. Some leaders who are now projected as having strongly wanted Kashmir in India are said to have initially told Lord Mountbatten otherwise. 

With the raiders almost at his doorstep, Maharaja Hari Singh fled Srinagar on the night of 25 October 1947 and reached his palace in Jammu. Aware of the territorial losses suffered, he signed the instrument of accession in the afternoon of 26 October 1947. A decision was immediately taken to airlift troops to Srinagar. The civil and military authorities were busy the entire night of 26 October, getting together the required number of planes, pilots, and supplies to be lifted. By the morning of 27 October, they managed to get about 100 planes. These were used for airlifting 329 soldiers of the 1 Sikh led by Lieutenant Colonel Ranjit Rai from Willingdon Airfield, Delhi. The authorities were not sure if the airfield at Srinagar had already fallen to the enemy.  The Colonel was therefore under instructions to circle the airfield and, in case of doubt, not land but return to Jammu. By 10:30 in the morning, Delhi received the much-awaited message that the planes had landed safely.

Meanwhile, Mohammed Ali Jinnah had already moved from Karachi to Lahore, waiting for a triumphant entry into Srinagar on 26 or 27 October, only to learn that Srinagar had been taken by the Indian forces. Jinnah immediately instructed Sir Francis Mudie, Governor of West Punjab, to telephone General Gracey, Acting Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani army, ordering him to move the Army towards Kashmir. Sir Francis Mudie obeyed Jinnah, but Gracy did not obey Mudie, telling him that he required the permission of General Auchinleck, the Supreme Commander, in Delhi, who remained in charge of all the British officers on both sides. On 28 October, General Auchinleck flew to Lahore and met Jinnah and told him that while India was entitled to send troops to Kashmir, a part of India, Pakistan could not. He also told Jinnah that if he sent troops, British nationals in the Pakistan Army would not participate. Meanwhile, Indian troops were bloodying the encroachers.  

The Elusive Answer

It is said that the military wanted permission to go ahead and capture the entire area of Kashmir that belonged to Maharaja Hari Singh before signing the instrument that accession. There are reasons to believe it, too. The battalion that landed at the airport after securing the airport advanced towards Baramulla to stop the raiders there. When they contacted the enemy, they realised that the raiders “had expert commanders, modern weapons and were in great numerical superiority.” He decided to withdraw to Pattan. Unfortunately, he was killed in action during the withdrawal.

Three more battalions of the Indian Army landed in Srinagar to defend the state's capital. About 700 raiders made a sneak attack on Srinagar on 3 November 1947. The Attack was repulsed, but not without losses. The locals also turned against the raiders because of the cruel loot, plunder, and rape they had inflicted on them. By December 1947, Indian forces were gaining ground against the tribals and Pakistani forces in Jammu and Kashmir. This led to serious discussion in Delhi about pushing the offensive further into Muzaffarabad, Mirpur and other areas held by the Pakistan forces. There were problems.

Both India and Pakistan had retained British officers in the top military positions when they gained independence. General Auchinleck was the Supreme Commander of both Indian and Pakistani forces. The supreme command was dissolved on 30 November 1947, and both countries had their own separate National commands from 1 December 1947. General Sir Francis Robert Roy Bucher, who was the Deputy Commander-in-Chief under General Auchinleck, became the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army on 1 January 1948 and served till 15 January 1949 to hand over the reins to General KM Cariappa, the First Indian Army Chief of free India.

Meanwhile, there were differences of opinion between Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and his Deputy Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel on how the state should be ruled. The issue became so intense that both Patel and Nehru offered to resign. The interaction between the two by way of letters was, however, dignified and with immense respect for each other. In the end, Vallabhbhai, as Minister of States, gave the reins of shaping India's Kashmir policy to Nehru. Nehru continued to take Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel's advice and consent on most issues regarding Kashmir. 

General Sir Francis Robert Roy Bucher advised Nehru against pursuing the offensive because he felt that the Indian Army was not yet logistically or organisationally ready for a full-scale war with Pakistan. He also cautioned the Prime Minister about the harsh winter in the Kashmir region and its impact on already-strained supply lines, which could prolong the operations and increase casualties. He advised the Prime Minister to stop the offensive and refer the case to the United Nations. It is possible that the advice was also to avoid the British officers from the unpleasant situation of being on both sides of the conflict.

Most of the negotiation with the ruler of Kashmir was based on the advice of Lord Mountbatten. The decision to approach the United Nations on the issue of Kashmir was also based on the Governor General’s prescriptions. Sardar Patel was against the reference of Kashmir to the UN and preferred timely action on the ground. While he held that idea, he did not insist because Kashmir was being handled by Nehru, who had the consent from Gandhi.

The Connected Question

Another question connected to the decision to stop the military offensive against Pakistan in 1947 is, “Why did Nehru take the Kashmir issue to the United Nations?”

The United Nations officially came into existence on 24 October 1945, following the end of the Second World War, with the noble aim of preventing future global conflicts. India, still under British colonial rule, was among the 51 founding members of the United Nations, which ratified the charter that came into force on 24 October 1945. It was those heady days when peace was romanticised and everyone thought that the UN would deliver peace from situations of conflict. There was a strong precedent suggesting effective conflict resolution by the UNSC. 

The first complaint to the United Nations Security Council came from Iran on 19 January 1946. Iran complained that the Soviet Union, which was supposed to withdraw its troops, had not done so and was interfering in its internal matters by supporting separatists. The dispute was resolved through discussion, and the Soviet Union withdrew troops in May 1946. In September 1946, Greece accused Bulgaria of a border attack and military aggression. This matter was also discussed and defused. In October 1946, the UK brought the case to the Security Council, the Corfu Channel incident, where British naval ships hit mines in Albanian waters. The UK accused Albania of laying the mines or failing to warn. It also took the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Incidentally, this became the first case ever heard at the ICJ.  ICJ ruled in favour of the UK in 1949, awarding compensation. In July 1947, the Netherlands launched a military action against Indonesian independence forces. When India and Australia raised the issue in the Security Council, the UN called for ceasefires and negotiations, eventually leading to Indonesia’s independence in 1949. With such strong precedence and India being a responsible nation, going to the UN seemed to be the right thing then. After all, the UN had not become the lifeless entity that it has become now.

On 1 January 1948, India submitted its complaint to the president of the Security Council, and it read,

“Under Article 35 of the Charter of the United Nations, any Member may bring any situation whose continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security to the attention of the Security Council. Such a situation now exists between India and Pakistan owing to the aid which invaders, consisting of nationals of Pakistan and of tribesmen from the territory immediately adjoining Pakistan on the north‑west, are drawing from Pakistan for operations against Jammu and Kashmir, a State which has acceded to the Dominion of India and is part of India. The circumstances of accession, the activities of the invaders that led the Government of India to take military action against them, and the assistance which the attackers have received and are still receiving from Pakistan are explained later in this memorandum. The Government of India request the Security Council to call upon Pakistan to put an end immediately to the giving of such assistance, which is an act of aggression against India. If Pakistan does not do so, the Government of India may be compelled, in self‑defence, to enter Pakistan territory to take military action against the invaders. The matter is, therefore, one of extreme urgency and calls for immediate action by the Security Council for avoiding a breach of international peace”

Ours to Judge

The crown of authority comes with the pain of accountability. Weighed down by fear of consequences and unimaginable imponderables, placed in an endless sea of ambiguity, and the possibility of having to eternally bear the cross for the outcome, decision-making is not easy. The hallmark of strong leaders is their ability to take bold decisions with the hope of success, knowingly pushing aside the fear of failure.  The agony of decision-making does not guarantee them kindness in judgment by future generations, especially when it is about political dividends. The toast of the town today could be burnt at the stake tomorrow, even in absentia. It is far easier to evaluate, criticise, and suggest a better way out, without having to bear the cross at all, many decades after a decision was taken. In hindsight, stopping the military advance or going to the UN did no good to us. But did they have the luxury of hindsight?

If the success of an operation is measured by outcomes, given the ambiguity and complexity of the prevailing situation, the First Kashmir War was a resounding success. If peace between India and Pakistan is still a mirage, there are other reasons. The decision to go to the UN is insignificant. In the process of understanding the evolution of modern India’s territorial boundaries, I also realised that knowledge humbles arrogance empowered by ignorance.

(Coming up in the next part -1962 Operations)

PS: The Picture  is representative of soldiers in 1947 and AI-generated

 

 

India's Unparalleled Military Operations: Part 1

 

The Many Roads to Rome 

Operation Sindoor continues to be a popular topic of discussion among military thinkers, policymakers, arms manufacturers, and the self-proclaimed vocal strategic affairs experts proliferating over the equally expanding audio-visual modes of communication. Every aspect of the operation continues to be flogged emotionally with  intentional or inherent bias, but with louder claims of being bias less. The common refrain in all these discussions and analyses is that Operation Sindoor was a multidomain operation combining military precision with diplomatic and strategic messaging, unparalleled in the history of independent India. 

Let us first be on even keel on ‘multi-domain’ that experts now endlessly talk about. According to me, ‘multi domain’ typically includes the well-known conflict domains of land, maritime, air, and the recently evolved realms of cyber, information, space, electromagnetic spectrum, intelligence, and now the all-pervasive narrative and optics management. The presence of so many individual domains matters, but their amalgam becomes a force to reckon with only when there is interoperability among them, ensuring synchronised application before and during the operation. Each expert adds his or her own set of arguments to arrive at the destination many others have already reached. Finally, everybody agrees that OP Sindoor was exceptional and unparalleled. All roads lead to Rome.

Could there be another road, one not leading to Rome?

The Comparison Matrix

How do we describe any event as unparalleled? We compare other events and find nothing similar, or when there are similar events, the unparalleled one stands far beyond comparison. How do we describe a specific military operation as unparalleled in the history of independent India? The verdict must come after a comparison with all the other military operations independent India has undertaken. How do we compare operations? What should be the comparison matrix? Should it be on the range of weaponry used or the modes of delivery? Should it be on the superiority of the means used? Should it be on the length of the operation or its geographical reach? Should it be based on a specific aspect like surprise? Should it be on the quantum of destruction caused to the enemy? Should it be based on what the political or strategic aim of the operation was?

A mission is successful if all the aims for which it was launched have been achieved. Everything else, plans, tactics, targets, weaponry, logistics, innovations, inventions, and technology available and employed are mere means to the end. Means do not matter in war, where anything but success is meaningless. It is the outcome and outcome alone that matters. Comparison should therefore be done on a common denominator of the outcomes of the operations weighed against the intentions with which they were launched. In other words, have the political and strategic aims set for the operation been achieved?  Everything else remains secondary. But there are problems associated with this approach. 

It would be easy if political and strategic aims were explicitly enunciated or declared before the commencement of an operation. It seldom happens. However, when an operation is in progress, political and military authorities make announcements for the consumption of both domestic and foreign audiences. Some announcements are meant specifically for the adversary. The academia or strategic affairs experts can deduce the political and military aims from the maze of these public utterances. Military aims can be deduced from the objectives or targets chosen. Experts can reverse-link military objectives to reasonably assume the political aim behind an operation. Luckily, in the case of some of the recent operations, political aims were enunciated.  

What about comparing military capabilities and technologies employed? Don't they matter?

If we have a capability, it is meant to be used. Otherwise, the presence of such capability, like nuclear warheads, must ensure deterrence. Capability in the stable with no impact is as good as not having it. Comparison of capabilities employed in operations separated by a long period may not be an objective evaluation. Exponential growth of technology measured over an incremental linear scale of time can be brutally biased against the past. To make the statement easy to visualise, imagine telling Gen Z about a time when people normally stood in lines at night to make an STD call. They may not call us primitive or laugh in our face out of respect. Likewise, given the evolution of technology, adaptation, aggregation, and weaponisation, the array of weapons deployed will remain incomparable. On the technology front, the next operation will be ages ahead of the last operation. Comparison, therefore, would be best served by analysing the political and strategic aims and checking if those have been achieved by diplomatic or military means. Knowing the context of the operation will aid in understanding the political and military aims of that operation.

Operations of Independent India

The military operations India has undertaken can be divided into two specific groups. The first one consists of all the wars starting with the First Kashmir War and ending with the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971. All these were full-fledged wars or those that led to full-fledged wars. The second group consists of military operations, starting with Operation Meghdoot and ending with Operation Sindoor, which were limited operations. Irony or coincidence, Operation Meghdoot has not been officially declared closed, but the military face off continues with ceasefire conditions in place, whereas Operation Sindoor has officially been declared, suspended, and NOT terminated, but without any military actions.

Each of the operations will be taken up to evaluate how well the political and military aims that drove the operation were achieved.  Let us start from the first operation of Independent India.  

First Kashmir War. 

When India gained independence in 1947, the British gave the rulers of the princely states the freedom of choice to join India, Pakistan, or remain independent. On 12 Aug 1947, the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir under Maharaja Hari Singh sent a telegram to the authorities of Pakistan and India seeking a ‘standstill agreement’, hoping to remain independent from India and Pakistan. Pakistan responded positively on 14 /15 August. India did not reply, as parleys were on to motivate him to join the Union of India. Legally and technically, Kashmir was still not a part of Independent India. Unknown to the ruler, in breach of the standstill agreement, Pakistan planned to invade and capture Kashmir. On 12 September 1947, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, permitted the launch of Operation Gulmarg. 

About 20,000 tribal fighters, organised into lashkars or militias of 1000 men each, trained and armed by the Pakistani army, crossed the border into Kashmir. They attacked, looted areas on the way and on 22 October 1947, captured Muzaffarabad. Meanwhile, one group of raiders had already occupied the commanding heights of Zojila. The only access to Leh-Ladakh was also threatened. On 26 October, they attacked Baramulla. Srinagar was their intended destination. It is very important to understand this context of the operation. Maharaja Hari Singh was still the ruler of the sovereign Princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, consisting of regions of Jammu, Kashmir Valley, Ladakh, Gilgit Baltistan and many parts of the currently Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. With the enemy fast approaching the gates of his capital and fearing his capture and a certain end at the hands of the marauders, Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947, officially making Jammu and Kashmir and all parts of his Kingdom, including those under the control of the raiders, an integral part of India. 

The moment Maharaja Hari Singh signed the instrument, the entire geographical area that was once the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir became part of India. The Government of India now had to do everything possible to safeguard the integrity and sovereignty of the country. The army airlifted two companies of the 1st Battalion, The Sikh Regiment and landed them at the Srinagar airport on 27 October 1947. They immediately went about the counteroffensive. In a historic first in the history of warfare, the 13-tonne Stuart tanks from the 7th Light Cavalry were most audaciously deployed to engage the enemy entrenched in Zojila heights. The tanks moved to their operational location through equally audacious innovation in transportation. A series of operations were launched across Kashmir by the Indian Army, and the enemy was beaten back. The war ended with a ceasefire brokered by the United Nations. The concept of the “Line of Control” came into being.

What would have been India’s political aim?  

There are no documents in the public domain that can give an official version of the strategic or political aims. At best, we can deduce from the events that took place.

Was it about saving Maharaja Hari Singh? He, having chosen to remain away from India, had asked for a standstill agreement.

Defending India’s territorial integrity? Purely in legal terms, India’s sovereignty had not been threatened directly since that area technically became India only on 26 October 1947. We took over what was available after what the ruler lost to Pakistan. 

Prevent the expansion of the Pakistani estate? Certainly. 

Expand the Indian borders beyond what was handed over and consolidate geographically? Likely, though still undeclared.

Saving Kashmiris from the plunderers? Yes, maybe.

There can be differing versions of defining success or failure, especially in connection with this operation. Expecting the political masters of those times, having won freedom through nonviolence, to militarily annexe the princely state immediately after gaining independence goes against logic. It will be fair to the people then to grant them the credit for adding real estate, redrawing the geographical boundary of the country, and enhancing our strategic depth, through negotiation and diplomacy. They did it at the first possible moment, even when the embers of the biggest human migration in history were still alive. It will be illogical to blame them for the loss of territory that Maharaja Hari Singh brought upon himself. This is one narrative that filled its sails with the contemporary political winds. Why did the army not capture the entire geographical territory that was under Maharaja Hari Singh? The geographical boundary in the above question can be shifted West or North, depending on the convenience. The answer, on the strength of hindsight, lies in the fact that the further West or North we added, that much more chaos, lawlessness, and poverty would have been added to the country. 

To be just and fair, the planners must be credited for their foresight and quick response. They gathered adequate intelligence and prepared the troops and tanks to be moved. Imagine airlifting two companies from Delhi hours after signing the Instrument of Accession. Imagine moving a column of tanks by road, over rickety bridges from Jammu to Zojila without losing surprise. Looking at the operation dispassionately, it is evident that the operation was guided by clear political and strategic aims of territorial gains and holding on to them. To that extent, the military aims were achieved too. That operation remains unparalleled in Indian History, not because it was the first one in independent India, but for the foresight, well-prepared contingencies, audacious aims, quick planning, courageous execution, and for achieving the political and operational aims.

Locked with inimical neighbours ever willing to needle, India was destined for more.

To be Continued in Part 2

Master of the Moat

Palaces, Castles, and Moats

 

In the days of yore, there were kings, queens, and kingdoms. Many of them lived in grand palaces, mighty castles, or formidable forts, spoiled by loyal servants, and surrounded by ruthless soldiers. These grand structures were normally surrounded by moats. Moats were usually deep and wide canals, often embedded with sharp stakes at the slushy bottom, and at times purposely populated with crocodiles or water snakes and served as formidable military obstacles. In his efforts to make the defence impregnable, the ruler spent considerable resources to ensure that the moat around his palace remained unbreachable. It was the most visible element of the defence. The moat was wide enough to beat the stand-off distance of the weapons of the potential adversaries he knew of. However, the ruler had weapons that could cross the moat and inflict injuries on the enemy. 

The ruler considered himself secure only in the heavily guarded palace behind the moat, but lived off the land outside the moat. A lone retractable bridge served as the only physical connection between the island behind the moat and the world beyond. The bridge was either lowered or stretched to touch the far bank and the world beyond. The master of the moat, the ruler himself or his most trusted general, decided when that happened. The mighty ruler lived, isolated from the world around but surrounded and protected by those he chose, in the man-made island dwelling, which he believed was unbreachable by foes and unbridgeable unless expected or accepted.  

The opulence inside these grand buildings, the dangers lurking within the moat, and the ruthlessness of the ruler and his guards notwithstanding, it was still the true reflection of the insecurity the ruler suffered from. It meant, the more insecure and threatened the ruler felt, the more formidable and elaborate the defence. The irony of the situation was that it was a case of a powerful man, often cruel to no end, living in mortal fear, his insecurity addressed by ever-increasing physical means. Despite the invincibility these impregnable mighty defences offered, most moats, history teaches us, were breached and the mighty within felled. In many cases, the reign collapsed, and the structures behind the moats abandoned. 

Ever Wondered Why? 

All these structures, surrounded by moats, had some common characteristics. Steeped in insecurity, it was a cloistered island blanketed by fear of failure. Success was related to the removal of potential threats and the fear of failure but success in each conquest added more to the fear of failure. They lived off the land outside but were deeply suspicious of their subjects. Threat was omnipresent. Bathed in victory, masters of the moats held themselves in high esteem. They believed it was the duty of everyone else to meet their expectations, but never thought of their obligations. They decided when to communicate. The lone bridge, which remained retracted all the time, reached out only at their convenience. It was mostly done to accept obeisance and subservience. Detached from reality and revelling in make-believe self-serving cocoons, they failed to realise the changing seasons. They did not recognise the winds of change.  

All these islands of insecurity met similar fates. Most of them fell to adversaries because they eroded from within. In some cases, when the master ordered the bridge to be launched, he realised that the far bank had moved away so much that the gap had become unbridgeable. Shunned by the world around, they lost relevance. Now they serve as tourist destinations for sale. 

Contemporary Relevance?   

This scene from the yore is contemporary too. If we look around, we can see many such moats and their masters amongst us. Gloating on achievements and floating on inflated egos, people assume eternal invincibility. They demand admiration, allegiance, and subservience in relationships. Most oblige out of goodwill and a few out of compulsion, but esteem soon drives the wedge deep. They distance themselves from others, creating the moat. Their success feels exclusive, but they also feel threatened by the possibility of people exploiting their success. They define the two banks and put a distance between them and the people around. Fear of adversities and failures adds to insecurity. They fill their moats with poisonous ‘suspicion’ snakes and ‘arrogance’ crocodiles. They withdraw the bridge from unprofitable and insignificant interpersonal relationships. Committed to cutting flab for the flight forward, they find more and more people and relationships to be insignificant. They make and break relationships to serve their purpose. Over time, they cocoon themselves into their castles, spending time widening and strengthening the moat around their safe havens. They exult in the exclusivity they build around themselves. Preoccupied with their success story, they do not sense the winds change and the blooms outside their moats. 

Yet, sometimes they feel like landing their bridge on the other bank. When they attempt, they realise the banks have slipped, the gap is difficult to bridge, and there is no one waiting to cross over. The isolation is complete. The story is not about others. It is about us. It is about me and you. We all are behind some moats of our own making. 

Survival - Not entitled? 

The moat is a very effective defence and survival mechanism. Suspicion, anxiety, fear and such other emotions are also essential for survival and growth. Optimum levels of such triggers serve the purpose where whereas excesses prove counterproductive. Considering everything around as adversarial and being over sensitive works like self-inflicted autoimmune affliction. Keeping parasites and negative people away is important, but considering anything and everything around as parasitic is detrimental to happiness. Managing minor infringements and perceived threats works like immunisation. No one is an embodiment of only virtues, and therefore, connecting with the ultimate virtuous person would never happen. We all come as a mix of good, bad, and evil depending on the situation. Creating comfort zones by withdrawing into one's shell or excluding oneself from society or a part of society is easy, but reconnecting at one’s convenience may not work all the time.  

Optimising Moats 

How do I secure myself and yet connect with an unfriendly world? Difficult but not impossible. There are wolves in sheep's clothing and sheep in wolves' clothing.  Yet, it is very important to keep the bridge in place and keep communications going. Wolves and sheep emerge in true colours sooner rather than later. Hoping to start interaction with someone only after identifying them as sheep or wolves is like waiting for the train at a railway station that does not exist. Open communications between individuals bring out the best in both if the intended destinations are the same. If elements do not match, one has the choice to peel off to safety.  

Most interpersonal communication commences on assumptions and presumptions. Divergences, unresolved at the origin of the journey, tend to lead us away from convergence. In most cases, conflicts are resolved, though it may not be an ever- happily after situation.  It is better to reach out and communicate. It is more likely that we find many people with whom we can establish bridges. We may also find people who need to be kept away using the moat. Retract the bridge and keep them out.   

However, if we find that most of the people we interact with need to be kept away, then it is time to look at ourselves more critically. It could help us strengthen good relationships, reset frayed ones and without guilt, discard the toxic ones.