The Many Roads to Rome
Operation
Sindoor continues to be a popular topic of discussion among military thinkers,
policymakers, arms manufacturers, and the self-proclaimed vocal strategic
affairs experts proliferating over the equally expanding audio-visual modes of
communication. Every aspect of the operation continues to be flogged emotionally with intentional or inherent bias, but with louder claims of being bias less.
The common refrain in all these discussions and analyses is that Operation Sindoor was a multidomain
operation combining military precision with diplomatic and strategic messaging,
unparalleled in the history of independent India.
Let us
first be on even keel on ‘multi-domain’ that experts now endlessly talk about.
According to me, ‘multi domain’ typically includes the well-known conflict
domains of land, maritime, air, and the recently evolved realms of cyber,
information, space, electromagnetic spectrum, intelligence, and now the
all-pervasive narrative and optics management. The presence of so many
individual domains matters, but their amalgam becomes a force to reckon with only
when there is interoperability among them, ensuring synchronised application
before and during the operation. Each expert adds his or her own set of
arguments to arrive at the destination many others have already reached.
Finally, everybody agrees that OP Sindoor was exceptional and unparalleled. All
roads lead to Rome.
Could
there be another road, one not leading to Rome?
The
Comparison Matrix
How do
we describe any event as unparalleled? We compare other events and find nothing
similar, or when there are similar events, the unparalleled one stands far
beyond comparison. How do we describe a specific military operation as unparalleled
in the history of independent India? The verdict must come after a
comparison with all the other military operations independent India has
undertaken. How do we compare operations? What should be the comparison matrix?
Should it be on the range of weaponry used or the modes of delivery? Should it
be on the superiority of the means used? Should it be on the length of the
operation or its geographical reach? Should it be based on a specific aspect like
surprise? Should it be on the quantum of destruction caused to the enemy? Should
it be based on what the political or strategic aim of the operation was?
A
mission is successful if all the aims for which it was launched have been
achieved. Everything else, plans, tactics, targets, weaponry, logistics,
innovations, inventions, and technology available and employed are mere means
to the end. Means do not matter in war, where anything but success is meaningless.
It is the outcome and outcome alone that matters. Comparison should therefore
be done on a common denominator of the outcomes of the operations weighed
against the intentions with which they were launched. In other words, have the
political and strategic aims set for the operation been achieved? Everything
else remains secondary. But there are problems associated with this
approach.
It
would be easy if political and strategic aims were explicitly enunciated or
declared before the commencement of an operation. It seldom happens. However,
when an operation is in progress, political and military authorities make
announcements for the consumption of both domestic and foreign audiences. Some
announcements are meant specifically for the adversary. The academia or
strategic affairs experts can deduce the political and military aims from the
maze of these public utterances. Military aims can be deduced from the
objectives or targets chosen. Experts can reverse-link military objectives to
reasonably assume the political aim behind an operation. Luckily, in the case
of some of the recent operations, political aims were enunciated.
What
about comparing military capabilities and technologies employed? Don't they
matter?
If we
have a capability, it is meant to be used. Otherwise, the presence of such
capability, like nuclear warheads, must ensure deterrence. Capability in the
stable with no impact is as good as not having it. Comparison of capabilities employed
in operations separated by a long period may not be an objective evaluation.
Exponential growth of technology measured over an incremental linear scale of
time can be brutally biased against the past. To make the statement easy to
visualise, imagine telling Gen Z about a time when people normally stood in
lines at night to make an STD call. They may not call us primitive or laugh in
our face out of respect. Likewise, given the evolution of technology,
adaptation, aggregation, and weaponisation, the array of weapons deployed will
remain incomparable. On the technology front, the next operation will be ages
ahead of the last operation. Comparison, therefore, would be best served by
analysing the political and strategic aims and checking if those have been
achieved by diplomatic or military means. Knowing the context of the operation
will aid in understanding the political and military aims of that operation.
Operations
of Independent India
The
military operations India has undertaken can be divided into two specific
groups. The first one consists of all the wars starting with the First Kashmir
War and ending with the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971. All these were
full-fledged wars or those that led to full-fledged wars. The second group
consists of military operations, starting with Operation Meghdoot and ending
with Operation Sindoor, which were limited operations. Irony or coincidence, Operation
Meghdoot has not been officially declared closed, but the military face off continues
with ceasefire conditions in place, whereas Operation Sindoor has officially
been declared, suspended, and NOT terminated, but without any military actions.
Each of the operations will be taken up to evaluate how well the political and military aims that drove the operation were achieved. Let us start from the first operation of Independent India.
First
Kashmir War.
When
India gained independence in 1947, the British gave the rulers of the princely
states the freedom of choice to join India, Pakistan, or remain independent. On
12 Aug 1947, the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir under Maharaja Hari Singh
sent a telegram to the authorities of Pakistan and India seeking a ‘standstill
agreement’, hoping to remain independent from India and Pakistan. Pakistan
responded positively on 14 /15 August. India did not reply, as parleys were on
to motivate him to join the Union of India. Legally and technically, Kashmir
was still not a part of Independent India. Unknown to the ruler, in breach of
the standstill agreement, Pakistan planned to invade and capture Kashmir. On 12
September 1947, Mr Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, permitted
the launch of Operation Gulmarg.
About
20,000 tribal fighters, organised into lashkars or militias of 1000 men each,
trained and armed by the Pakistani army, crossed the border into Kashmir. They
attacked, looted areas on the way and on 22 October 1947, captured
Muzaffarabad. Meanwhile, one group of raiders had already occupied the
commanding heights of Zojila. The only access to Leh-Ladakh was also
threatened. On 26 October, they attacked Baramulla. Srinagar was their intended
destination. It is very important to understand this context of the operation.
Maharaja Hari Singh was still the ruler of the sovereign Princely state of
Jammu and Kashmir, consisting of regions of Jammu, Kashmir Valley, Ladakh,
Gilgit Baltistan and many parts of the currently Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
With the enemy fast approaching the gates of his capital and fearing his
capture and a certain end at the hands of the marauders, Maharaja Hari Singh
signed the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947, officially making Jammu
and Kashmir and all parts of his Kingdom, including those under the control of
the raiders, an integral part of India.
The
moment Maharaja Hari Singh signed the instrument, the entire geographical area
that was once the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir became part of India. The
Government of India now had to do everything possible to safeguard the
integrity and sovereignty of the country. The army airlifted two companies of
the 1st Battalion, The Sikh Regiment and landed them at the Srinagar airport on
27 October 1947. They immediately went about the counteroffensive. In a
historic first in the history of warfare, the 13-tonne Stuart tanks from the
7th Light Cavalry were most audaciously deployed to engage the enemy entrenched
in Zojila heights. The tanks moved to their operational location through
equally audacious innovation in transportation. A series of operations were
launched across Kashmir by the Indian Army, and the enemy was beaten back. The
war ended with a ceasefire brokered by the United Nations. The concept of the
“Line of Control” came into being.
What
would have been India’s political aim?
There
are no documents in the public domain that can give an official version of
the strategic or political aims. At best, we can deduce from the events that
took place.
Was it
about saving Maharaja Hari Singh? He, having chosen to remain away from India,
had asked for a standstill agreement.
Defending
India’s territorial integrity? Purely in legal terms, India’s sovereignty had
not been threatened directly since that area technically became India only on 26
October 1947. We took over what was available after what the ruler lost to
Pakistan.
Prevent
the expansion of the Pakistani estate? Certainly.
Expand
the Indian borders beyond what was handed over and consolidate geographically? Likely,
though still undeclared.
Saving
Kashmiris from the plunderers? Yes, maybe.
There
can be differing versions of defining success or failure, especially in
connection with this operation. Expecting the political masters of those times,
having won freedom through nonviolence, to militarily annexe the princely state
immediately after gaining independence goes against logic. It will be fair to
the people then to grant them the credit for adding real estate, redrawing the
geographical boundary of the country, and enhancing our strategic depth,
through negotiation and diplomacy. They did it at the first possible moment,
even when the embers of the biggest human migration in history were still
alive. It will be illogical to blame them for the loss of territory that
Maharaja Hari Singh brought upon himself. This is one narrative that filled its
sails with the contemporary political winds. Why did the army not capture the
entire geographical territory that was under Maharaja Hari Singh? The
geographical boundary in the above question can be shifted West or North,
depending on the convenience. The answer, on the strength of hindsight, lies in
the fact that the further West or North we added, that much more chaos,
lawlessness, and poverty would have been added to the country.
To be
just and fair, the planners must be credited for their foresight and quick
response. They gathered adequate intelligence and prepared the troops and tanks
to be moved. Imagine airlifting two companies from Delhi hours after signing
the Instrument of Accession. Imagine moving a column of tanks by road, over
rickety bridges from Jammu to Zojila without losing surprise. Looking at the
operation dispassionately, it is evident that the operation was guided by clear
political and strategic aims of territorial gains and holding on to them. To
that extent, the military aims were achieved too. That operation remains
unparalleled in Indian History, not because it was the first one in independent
India, but for the foresight, well-prepared contingencies, audacious aims,
quick planning, courageous execution, and for achieving the political and
operational aims.
Locked
with inimical neighbours ever willing to needle, India was destined for more.
To be Continued in Part 2
