First February 2003, would never be forgotten by NASA, Americans and all
those who watched Space Shuttle Columbia’s re-entry. As the world watched in disbelief, a beautiful morning turned tragic when “Columbia”
on its earthbound journey, unable to withstand the heat of re-entry, fragmented
into many fire balls shooting through the sky. The 27 previous successful missions under its wings, couldn’t
prevent Colombia from its burning disintegration. The seven crew members who should
have returned to celebrity status didn't make it home alive.
The catastrophic failure
precipitated by damage to its left wing was initiated by "foam strike” “during
the launch. The “problem with foam”, is believed to have been “known
for many years”. It is also known that Department of Defence (DoD) had
capabilities to get a closer look at the
breached left-wing, but NASA officials had “declined the offer”. Post-incident investigations by
Columbia Accident Investigations Board (CSAIB) Chaired by Admiral Harold Gehman in its harsh indictment[1] concluded the accident was rooted in the “space
shuttle program history and culture”, …
. “Cultural traits and organisational practices detrimental to
safety was allowed to develop, including reliance on past successes as a
substitute for sound engineering practices,… organisational barriers
that prevented effective communication of critical safety information and stifled
professional differences of opinion; lack of integrated management across
program elements and the evolution of an informal channel of command and
decision-making processes that operated outside the organisation's rules”.
On not having obtained the DoD’s help with
its high-resolution ground and space-based systems, it was found that requests were
made by NASA's engineers through incorrect channels and when the
request officially reached the appropriate authority, NASA cancelled request 90
minutes later. It was felt that “no
one knew of a requirement of an imagery”.
The report also brought out the “low level of concern by program
managers”, “lack of clear
communication”, “lack of effective leadership”.
It is wrong to believe that
Columbia was an exception. STS- 27 launched in December 1988, on a
classified mission dedicated to the Department of Defence, had a similar story,
with a tense but happier ending. The orbiter's thermal
protection system tiles sustained severe damage during the flight. Inspection using the robot arm with a limited
resolution camera made it impossible to determine the full extent of the tile
damage. It is believed that, due to the
classified nature of the mission, the crew was forced to send encrypted images
resulting in NASA receiving poor quality of video which in turn led them to
believe that the damage was actually, "just lights and shadows". The crew was told by the Mission control that
the damage was nothing more severe than the past missions.
Mission Commander Robert Hoot
Gibson, it is said that “did not think that the shuttle will survive re-entry”. Inspections post landing, revealed over 700
damaged tiles and one missing. Hoot Gibson is said to have adversely remarked
on the poor understanding of the real situation of the mission, by the mission
control on ground. It is also widely
believed that this narrow escape led NASA to believe in the infallibility of their
decisions.
The two incidents, though 15 year apart, clearly brings out the
evolutionary process of organisational deviation and its after effects. Most organisations are not as lucky as NASA,
which is subjected to intense scrutiny.
Driven by aggressive and ambitious CEOs, egged on by “seemingly”
appreciative “coterie” colleagues out to reap short-term benefits,
organisations are destined to disintegrate. For short-term benefits, such CEOs
turn blind eye to small deviant steps that eventually mar the long evolutionary
process of Organisational culture. Branding professional difference of opinions
as disloyalty, emergence of extra organisational hierarchies, visible presence
of informal communication and decision systems indicate the overwhelming
presence of the erosion of organisational culture. Reluctance to accept
failures, deviations and refusal to allow external audit and help, confirm the
disease of a deaf and dumb hierarchy blind to the impending doom. It doesn't take much time thereafter for an
organisation, built brick-by-brick by the sweat and sacrifices of many people
to come crashing down.
Unfortunately, many those who are responsible for the debacle and precipitated
the erosion would have fled the nest well in time leaving the hapless dedicated
foot soldiers to fend for themselves.
Every industry has adequate examples to prove this point. It is in the interest an organisation to
foster the spirit of internal criticism to ensure that it doesn't deviate from
organisational principles. For that, it
must first outline the sanctified boundaries of acceptable organisational
practices.
Each situation offers opportunities for diverging views to emerge. Each diverging view is an input for growth,
provided it is evaluated and dealt with appropriately. Dismissing them as mere “play
of lights and shadows” can actually kill organisational growth. Branding bruised escapes as success without honest introspection can only
hasten the process of disintegration.
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